

Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi and Huayan Thought

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Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi and Huayan Thought

*A Confucian Appropriation of Buddhist Ideas in
Response to Scientism in Twentieth-Century China*

By

King Pong Chiu



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This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

*To my parents,
Chiu Sik Lan 趙錫蘭 and Lee Siu Wing 李小穎,
my wife, Ting Ting 婷婷 and
my daughter, Tze Ning 子寧*



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List of Abbreviations

Works by Thomé H. Fang

CMN	<i>Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection of Philosophical Essays</i>
CPSD	<i>Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development</i>
CVL	<i>The Chinese View of Life</i>
FDXY	<i>Fang Dongmei xiansheng yanjiangji</i> 方東美先生演講集
HZ	<i>Huayanzong zhexue</i> 華嚴宗哲學
KZR	<i>Kexue zhexue yu rensheng</i> 科學哲學與人生
SSD	<i>Sheng sheng zhi de</i> 生生之德
XRZSJ	<i>Xin rujia zhexue shiba jiang</i> 新儒家哲學十八講
YRDZ	<i>Yuanshi rujia daoia zhexue</i> 原始儒家道家哲學
ZDF	<i>Zhongguo dasheng foxue</i> 中國大乘佛學
ZRZ	<i>Zhongguo rensheng zhexue</i> 中國人生哲學
ZZJF	<i>Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan</i> 中國哲學精神及其發展

Works by Tang Junyi

DZZJ	<i>Daode ziwo zhi jianli</i> 道德自我之建立
NZX	<i>Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu</i> 年譜；著述年表；先人著述
RJZC	<i>Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian</i> 人文精神之重建
RZT	<i>Rensheng zhi tiyan</i> 人生之體驗
RZTX	<i>Rensheng zhi tiyan xubian</i> 人生之體驗續編
SCYXJ	<i>Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie</i> 生命存在與心靈境界
SJ	<i>Shujian</i> 書簡
WYYDL	<i>Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing</i> 文化意識與道德理性
XWYR	<i>Xin wu yu rensheng</i> 心物與人生
ZG	<i>Zhexue gailun</i> 哲學概論
ZL	<i>Zhexue lunji</i> 哲學論集
ZRDS	<i>Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie</i> 中華人文與當今世界
ZRDSB	<i>Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian</i> 中華人文與當今世界補編
ZTS	<i>Zhi Tingguang shu</i> 致廷光書
ZYDL	<i>Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Daolun pian</i> 中國哲學原論·導論篇
ZYYD	<i>Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian</i> 中國哲學原論·原道篇
ZYYX	<i>Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian</i> 中國哲學原論·原性篇

Others

DZJ *Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing* 大正新修大藏經

A Note on Transliteration and Translation

- 1.) For authors who have both Chinese and English works cited, names are shown in the Wade-Giles transliteration but not in *pinyin*, though their names in *pinyin* will be in parentheses the first time their Chinese works appear. Charles Wei-hsun Fu 傅偉勳, for example, is used here, but Charles Wei-hsun Fu (Fu Weixun) 傅偉勳 will also be used the first time his Chinese work is cited.
- 2.) For authors with only Chinese works cited, names are in *pinyin*, even though their names may be better known in the Wade-Giles transliteration in academia. For instance, Ran Yunhua will be used, rather than Jan Yün-hua, as the transliteration of 冉雲華.
- 3.) For Chinese authors with only English works cited, names are shown in the Wade-Giles transliteration but not in *pinyin*. For example, Chiang Monlin 蔣夢麟, is used, not Jiang Menglin.
- 4.) To make the transliterations consistent, the title of works which are written in Chinese will be in *pinyin*, including *Dazheng xinxiu dazang jing* 大正新修大藏經, though in other scholarship its title is usually shown as *Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka*.
- 5.) The translations in this book follow those of my PhD thesis, *Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi and the Appropriation of Huayan Thought*, and are my own unless otherwise indicated.

Introduction: Research Questions and Methodology

1.1 Research Questions

This study discusses two modern Chinese thinkers, Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899–1977) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), who sought to appropriate aspects of the medieval Chinese Buddhist school of Huayan 華嚴 to develop a response to the challenges posed by ‘scientism’ (Chi. *kexue zhuyi* 科學主義), an issue widely discussed in twentieth-century China. As the thinkers who are often categorised as the members of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ (Chi. *dangdai xin rujia* 當代新儒家),¹ their Confucian ideas have been the focus of studies about them. However, the contribution made to their thought by Huayan Buddhist ideas and methods has rarely been studied. In fact, Fang’s and Tang’s potential appropriations of Huayan thought help constitute a phenomenon found among many contemporary Chinese thinkers, which is to ‘go back to the origin and develop new elements’ (Chi. *fanben kaixin* 返本開新).² I shall address three related research questions in this study, helping critically to discuss this issue: first, why ‘scientism’ became a problem in twentieth-century China; second, why Chinese thinkers at that time inclined to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas; and third, why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought in particular to develop the response to ‘scientism’.

Although how modern Confucian thinkers appropriated Buddhist ideas to develop their thought has been well studied in recent years, the foci of study have been Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988), Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995).³ In a talk commemorating the first

¹ I will further discuss this term in the following section.

² Ambrose Y. C. King (Jin Yaoji) 金耀基, ‘Cong xiandaihua guandian kan xin rujia 從現代化觀點看新儒家’, in *Zhongguo luntan* 中國論壇 vol. 15, no. 1 (1982): 28–32; Lin Chen-kuo (Lin Zhenguo) 林鎮國, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing* 空性與現代性 (Taipei: Lixu wenhua 立緒文化, 1999), pp. 72–84; Yu Ying-shih (Yu Yingshi) 余英時, ‘Tang Junyi xian-sheng xiangming 唐君毅先生像銘’, in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 5 ‘liujing zhu wo’ haishi ‘wo zhu liujing’ 中國哲學與文化：第五輯 — ‘六經注我’ 還是 ‘我注六經’ (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2009), p. 1. However, I stress that the practice of *fanben kaixin* was not exclusive to Fang and Tang but a common intellectual tendency at their time.

³ For details, see Chapter 2.

anniversary of Tang's death, Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 (Lao Siguang, 1927–2012) said that Tang's philosophical method is actually Huayan's idea of 'All is One, One is All',⁴ though Tang has commonly been considered a Hegelian idealist⁵ and a loyal Confucian thinker.⁶ Since then, the view that Tang was influenced by Huayan thought appears to have been increasingly accepted in Chinese academia,⁷ although detailed studies on the topic are rarely seen. In 2009, Lao raised this issue again in a conference, recounting that once in a private conversation with Tang, he was asked by the latter whether it is possible to explain Confucianism using Huayan thought.⁸ Lao's recollection reminds us that Huayan thought may play an important role in Tang's thought.

In fact, Tang's probable appropriation of Huayan thought is not exceptional among thinkers in his time, as Thom   H. Fang also makes much of this Buddhist tradition. Regardless of the controversy over his identity as a 'pure' Confucian thinker,⁹ the huge effort Fang paid in interpreting Huayan thought is unusual among his contemporaries, even compared with Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883–1967), who is famous for using Huayan ideas to explain Confucian canons such as *Xiao jing* 孝經 (*Classic of Filial Piety*). Together, Fang and Tang and the other above-mentioned Confucian thinkers helped create 'one of the great moments

4 Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Siguang) 勞思光, *Siguang renwu lunji* 思光人物論集 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001), pp. 81–89.

5 S. J. O. Bri  re, *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy 1898–1950* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 75; Nicholas Bunnin, 'Tang Junyi (Tang Chun-i)', in Stuart Brown, Dian   Collinson and Robert Wilkinson ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-century Philosophers* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 768.

6 As Frederick J. Streng argues, Tang was the spokesman of Confucianism in the twentieth century, much as Paul Tillich and Keiji Nishitani were spokesmen, respectively, of Christianity and Buddhism. See his *Understanding Religious Life* (California: Wadsworth, 1985), pp. 257–263.

7 In a private conversation, Kwan Tze-wan 關子尹, professor of the Philosophy Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, says that Huayan's influence on Tang is 'obvious'. However, he does not explain further. For a similar interpretation, see William Yau-nang Ng, *Tang Chun-i's Idea of Transcendence: with special reference to his Life, Existence, and the Horizon of Mind-Heart* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1996), p. 194.

8 Lao Sze-kwang, 'Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai 從唐君毅中國哲學的取向看中國哲學的未來', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua no. 8 Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu* 中國哲學與文化：第八輯—唐君毅與中國哲學研究 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2010), pp. 15–26.

9 In fact, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, it is difficult to find a 'pure' Confucian thinker in modern China because most of the so-called Confucian thinkers were, to varying degrees, influenced by Western philosophy and Buddhist thought. For the case of Fang, see the discussion in Chapter 3.

in world intellectual history',¹⁰ which was to use non-Confucian ideas to develop new theories to meet current needs, a principal characteristic of *fanben kaixin*. Buddhist ideas, among various non-Confucian traditions, play a particularly important role here.¹¹

Amongst the modern Chinese thinkers who employed Buddhist ideas to develop their theories, there are several reasons to study Fang and Tang in particular. First, serious studies about Fang and Tang are few compared with their contemporaries, despite the great reputation they enjoyed in the field of Chinese philosophy. As a thinker who consciously wrote in English, Fang enjoyed an international reputation as illustrated in the admiration of D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), Charles Moore (1901–1967), Chan Wing-tsit (1901–1994) and Lewis E. Hahn (1908–2004).¹² His English book *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* is considered more philosophical than such classics as Chan Wing-tsit's *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Fung Yu-lan's 馮友蘭 (Feng Youlan, 1895–1990) *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* and H. G. Greel's (1905–1994) *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tsê-tung*, that it would be a 'worthy addition to any philosophical library'.¹³ Probably the first person who taught Chinese philosophy in Hong Kong,¹⁴ where Chinese thought could be discussed freely in the mid-twentieth century,¹⁵ Tang is even considered the most remarkable Confucian thinker since Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529).

10 Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 9.

11 Tu Wei-ming, *Way, Learning and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 141–159.

12 Charles Moore, for instance, considered that Fang was the greatest philosopher of China. Lewis E. Hahn also said that 'any one who has exchanged just a few words with Thomé Fang will recognize him as a great scholar, no matter how much or how little he has published!' For the above comments, see Thomé H. Fang, *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Ltd., 1986), pp. 529–530. For comments from the other figures, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing* 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台灣學生書局, 2007), pp. II–III.

13 Sandra A. Wawrytko, 'Book Review: *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* by Thomé H. Fang', *Philosophy East and West* vol. 36, no. 1 (1986): 72–74.

14 Yu Ying-shih, 'Tang Junyi xiansheng tongxiang jiemu yishi zhici 唐君毅先生銅像揭幕儀式致辭', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 6 *Jianbo wenxian yu xinqishi* 中國哲學與文化：第六輯—簡帛文獻與新啟示 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2009), p. 1.

15 Zhang Peijie 張丕介, *Fenbi shengya ershi nian* 粉筆生涯二十年 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 1970), pp. 50–60.

His *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (*The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind*) was viewed as comparable to Plato's *Republic*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Whitehead's *Process and Reality*.¹⁶ Due to his contribution to contemporary Chinese thought, Tang was described by Mou Zongsan as a 'giant in the universe of cultural consciousness' (Chi. *wenhua yishi yuzhou de juren* 文化意識宇宙的巨人), similar to Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955) as giants in the field of science, and to Plato (424 BC–347 BC) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as giants in the field of philosophy.¹⁷ As Li Runsheng 李潤生 (1936–), a student of Tang and a leading Buddhist scholar in the Chinese academy,¹⁸ notes, though Tang was widely considered a Confucian thinker, his scholarship in Buddhist thought is comparable to that of an expert in the field.¹⁹ Astonishingly, not only are Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Buddhist ideas rarely studied²⁰ but even their own theories are seldom critically discussed, a phenomenon certainly worthy of closer attention.²¹

16 Joseph Wu, 'Contemporary Philosophers Outside the Mainland', in Donald H. Bishop ed., *Chinese Thought: An Introduction* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), pp. 422–440.

17 Mou Zongsan, *Daode de lixiang zhuyi* 道德的理想主義 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), pp. 263–273.

18 Chiu King Pong (Zhao Jingbang) 趙敬邦, 'Weishi zai Xianggang de chuancheng 唯識在香港的傳承', *Zhongguo wen zhe yanjiu tongxun* 中國文哲研究通訊 vol. 24, no. 2 (2014): 37–48.

19 Li Runsheng, 'Tang, Mou ershi dui chanxue kaixian de chuli shuyi 唐、牟二師對禪學開顯的處理述異', *Xinya xuebao* 新亞學報 vol. 28 (2010): 67–87.

20 Although Cheng Hsueh-li points out that both Fang and Tang considered Huayan 'the highest and accurate thought of Buddhism', he fails to explain why they considered this to be so. See his 'Phenomenology and T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen Buddhism', *Analecta Husserliana* vol. XVII (1984): 215–227.

21 There could be numerous reasons behind this phenomenon. That their writing styles are difficult to understand is one of them. For this view, see Liu Shu-hsien, *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 73–88; Ng Yu-kwan (Wu Rujun) 吳汝鈞, *Dangdai xin ruxue de shenceng fansi yu duihua quan-shi* 當代新儒學的深層反思與對話詮釋 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2009), pp. 407–408. The huge influence of Mou Zongsan in the camp of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism', likened to 'a crane standing out among chickens' (Chi. *heli jiqun* 鶴立雞群) by some scholars, is perhaps another reason preventing academia from studying Fang and Tang, as Fang is not considered a 'mainstream' Confucian thinker and Tang is only a secondary figure behind Mou. For the above comment on Mou, see Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan's New Confucianism* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 9. For further discussion of this point, see Li Tu (Li Du) 李杜, 'Tang Junyi

In fact, there is a close relationship between Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi, though this point is largely overlooked in academia. When Tang completed his undergraduate degree in the 1920s, Fang was one of his teachers and both of them seem to consider this teacher-student relationship lifetime. Once, chatting with an anonymous Western scholar in the 1960s, Tang said, in English, 'Fang is my teacher'. The scholar wondered if Tang had said, 'Fang was my teacher' but Tang emphasized that even though a long time may have passed, in the Chinese tradition, the relationship between a teacher and a student continues.²² Fang also appointed Tang as one of the people to manage his personal effects and unpublished manuscripts after his death.²³ Instead of the relationship between Fang and Tang, however, it is the so-called teacher-student relationship between Xiong Shili and Tang Junyi that academia tends to discuss. Although I agree that Xiong cannot be neglected when discussing the thought of Tang, in my view, the relationship between Fang and Tang may be more important to our understanding of the thought of the latter.²⁴ Since this study appears to be the first attempt in academia to put these two thinkers together, reviewing their appropriations of Huayan thought and the relationship between their own ideas, I argue that, in terms of both quantity and quality, this study helps deepen the research on Fang and Tang.

Second, both Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought play an unusual role in Huayan studies in twentieth-century China and are valuable to modern Chinese Buddhist study. As a medieval Buddhist school which mainly prevailed in the Tang 唐 Dynasty (618–907), the Huayan School has been inconsistently regarded in Chinese history. Although there was a 'Huayan University' established in Shanghai in the early 1910s by the monk Yuexia 月霞 (1858–1917), its method of study was criticized as 'old-fashioned'.²⁵ In other words, it has not 'contributed much to the philosophical current in contemporary Buddhism'.²⁶ In fact, philological study alone cannot make Huayan thought live, a modern

xiansheng yu Taiwan ruxue 唐君毅先生與台灣儒學, *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 24, no. 8 (1997): 710–724.

22 Yang Zuhan 楊祖漢, 'Yonghuai Tang Junyi xiansheng 永懷唐君毅先生', in *Tang Junyi quanji* vol. 30 *Jinian ji* 唐君毅全集 vol. 30 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuji, 1991), pp. 517–522.

23 Feng Huxiang ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing*, note 12, pp. 1–4.

24 For details, see section 4.2.

25 Fafang 法舫, *Weishi shiguan ji qi zhexue* 唯識史觀及其哲學 (Taipei: Tianhua chuban 天華出版, 1978), p. 6.

26 Chan Wing-tsit, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 104.

interpretation of the thought is required.²⁷ In *Haichaoyin* 海潮音, a famous Buddhist journal primarily edited by the influential monk Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) in the early twentieth century, for example, modern issues such as ‘scientism’ have been discussed amongst many Chinese Buddhists.²⁸ In my view, both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are a modern interpretation of the thought that makes this Buddhist tradition more responsive to the issues of their times, similar to what their Buddhist counterparts as set out in *Haichaoyin* achieved during the same period. It explains why their appropriations of Huayan thought should not be ignored.

Third, ‘scientism’ has long been and still is a problem facing China and therefore, Fang’s and Tang’s responses to it are worth further consideration. As I will suggest in Chapter 2, many Chinese intellectuals in the last century considered ‘scientism’ a threat to Chinese traditions, as ‘scientism’ appeared to negate the value of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In fact, there was a ‘polemic on science and metaphysics’ (*Chi. ke xuan dazhan* 科玄大戰) about ‘scientism’ in early twentieth-century China, discussing the relevance of science in many aspects of human life. Instead of coming to an end, debate about and problems indicated by ‘scientism’ continue in present-day China, as ‘scientism’ is a main characteristic of Marxism-Leninism, the leading ideology of the Chinese Government.²⁹ In this sense, Fang’s and Tang’s thought can be regarded as a Chinese way of dealing with the issue of modernity.

Fourth, the cases of Fang and Tang inevitably raise a live issue in current Chinese philosophical study, which is the development of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, an issue about interpreting ancient Chinese texts from a modern perspective. As the Huayan thought Fang and Tang discussed is restricted to that of the

27 Deng Keming 鄧克銘, *Huayan sixiang zhi xin yu fajie* 華嚴思想之心與法界 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 1997), pp. 169–170.

28 Since Taixu suggested most of his ideas about the reform of Buddhism in *Haichaoyin*, the journal enjoys a great reputation in modern Chinese Buddhism. For more discussion about the influence of the journal, see Wang Senfu 王森甫, ‘*Haichaoyin* yu Taixu fashi 《海潮音》與太虛法師’, *Pumen xuebao* 普門學報 vol. 49 (Jan 2009): 211–212.

29 H. Lyman Miller, *Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Knowledge* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996), pp. 4–12; Ouyang Guangwei, ‘Scientism, Technocracy, and Morality in China’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 30, no. 2 (2003): 177–193; Richard G. Olson, *Science and Scientism in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), pp. 302–303; Jennifer Oldstone-Moore, ‘Scientism and Modern Confucianism’, in Kenneth J. Hammond and Jeffrey L. Richey ed., *The Sage Returns: Confucian Revival in Contemporary China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), pp. 39–63.

medieval period, there is a huge historical gap facing their modern appropriations of it. The ultimate concerns, approaches and even languages of Huayan's patriarchs and Fang and Tang are so different that it is important to stress that the latter certainly interpreted Huayan thought from their own perspectives. In this sense, I argue that Fang and Tang are significant to the discussion of 'Chinese hermeneutics', though very few studies pay attention to this.

To sum up, this study will contribute to the discussion of modern Chinese thought in general and to both Fang's and Tang's thought in particular. All such issues as the historical context facing Fang and Tang, the characteristics of 'scientism', the key concepts of classical Huayan thought, and the current discussion of 'Chinese hermeneutics' will be covered in Chapter 2. By now I turn to discuss the methodology I use in this study and how it helps shape my findings.

1.2 Methodology

Throughout this study, I will mainly employ textual and conceptual analyses, which help construct the historical context in which Fang and Tang wrote and indicate the characteristics of their appropriations of Huayan thought.³⁰ In my view, many misunderstandings of Fang and Tang are due to incomplete readings of their original works. On the one hand, some scholars focus on their theories and pay little attention to the historical context in which they were writing. As a result, the discussion tends to be purely theoretical but not responsive to their real-life situations. As I will discuss later, their appropriations of Huayan thought relate to their belief that this Buddhist tradition helped them solve the intellectual challenges they faced.³¹ To a large extent, their appropriations of Huayan thought have had impact on these issues. Since works in an autobiographical style usually reveal the intentions of the authors and the

30 For this methodology, I refer to Eske Møllgaard, 'Eclipse of Reading: On the "Philosophical Turn" in American Sinology', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 4, no. 2 (2005): 321–340; Chad Hansen, 'Reading with Understanding: Interpretive method in Chinese Philosophy', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 4, no. 2 (2005): 341–346; Roger T. Ames, 'Getting Past the Eclipse of Philosophy in World Sinology: A Response to Eske Møllgaard', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 4, no. 2 (2005): 347–352; Shun Kwong-loi, 'Studying Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 36, no. 3 (2009): 455–478.

31 Lin Chen-kuo, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing*, note 2, p. 69.

socio-cultural situations facing them,³² I focus not only on their philosophical works but also on their autobiographical writings. All of these, together with other studies about the intellectual environment in early twentieth-century China, constitute the historical context that I will discuss in Chapter 2. On the other hand, some scholars tend to discuss Fang's and Tang's lives but ignore the relationships between their lives and theories. These kinds of study miss the point that both their roles as thinkers make them significant in the field of Chinese philosophy. The stories related to their lives are only supplementary to our understanding of their thought but they cannot be regarded as a replacement for their theories. In consideration of the limitations of the studies as mentioned above, all Fang's and Tang's published works will be reviewed thoroughly in this study though some will be examined more critically in detail.

However, as this study is to examine the relationships of different forms of thought, conceptual analysis is necessary and it will therefore be employed throughout the study. By doing this I will be in a better position to assess the characteristics, strengths and limitations of Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought. Furthermore, I shall show why it was that some aspects of Huayan thought were appropriated by them, whilst other aspects of it were ignored. In a sense, this helps explain why some intellectual traditions were not favoured in their own thought. In addition to employing conceptual analysis in reading Fang's and Tang's works, I also use the concepts of '*ti*' 體 and '*yong*' 用, two traditional Chinese terms which play essential roles in almost all of the modern Chinese thought,³³ to discuss the historical context facing Fang and Tang, and the characteristics of their appropriations of Huayan thought. As I argue in the study, their tasks were to re-define the meaning of the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of Chinese culture, including that of Confucianism. Since the concepts are closely related to the content of Chapter 2, I will continue the discussion of them there.

In brief, while textual analysis helps provide the necessary foundation for this study, conceptual analysis is needed to probe deeply and provide evidence for the comments I make about their works. However, in consideration

32 Wu Pei-yi, *The Confucian's Progress: Autobiographical Writings in Traditional China* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 42; Lin Chen-kuo, *Bianzheng de xinglu* 辯證的行旅 (Taipei: Lixu wenhua, 2002), pp. 16–22.

33 Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, 'Jinxiandai rujia sixiangshi shang de tiyonglun 近現代儒家思想史上的體用論', in Chen Rongkai 陳榮開 ed., *Tianrenzhiji yu renqinzhibian: bijiao yu duoyuan de guandian* 天人之際與人禽之辨：比較與多元的觀點 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 2001), pp. 195–226.

of the large corpus of texts relating to Fang and Tang, it is necessary to define the scope of the study in order to be able to have a sustained discussion.

Fang's and Tang's ideas are so extensive that many intellectual traditions of the West, China and even India are covered in their works. In this study, I will focus on their most important writings, though others will also be discussed when necessary. For Fang, his last work *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*³⁴ is important as it shows his general view on different Chinese intellectual traditions and reveals the characteristics of his idea of 'comprehensive harmony'. However, his ideas on Huayan are mainly found in the two volumes of *Huayanzong zhexue* 華嚴宗哲學 (*The Huayan Philosophy*).³⁵ All these works will be reviewed thoroughly in Chapter 3 where I will discuss Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought.

Tang stated explicitly that some of his books are representative of his thought, such as his early works *Rensheng zhi tian* 人生之體驗 (*The Experience of Life*),³⁶ *Daode ziwo zhi jianli* 道德自我之建立 (*The Formation of Moral Self*),³⁷ *Xin wu yu rensheng* 心物與人生 (*Minds, Material and Life*),³⁸ *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* 人文精神之重建 (*The Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit*)³⁹ and his final work *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie*.⁴⁰ In his own words, Tang considered that the early works mentioned above cover such vital topics as the characteristics of Mind (Chi. *Xin* 心) and the value of human beings, while his final work is a further response to these issues.⁴¹ Although *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* covers some of Tang's ideas on Buddhism, his comments on Huayan are mainly discussed in *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian* 中國哲學原論·原性篇 (*The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy—Original Nature*)⁴² and the third volume of *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao*

34 Thomé H. Fang, *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*, note 12. For translated version, see George C. H. Sun (Sun Zhixin) 孫智桑 trans., *Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan* 中國哲學精神及其發展 vol. 1 (Taipei: Liming wenhua 黎明文化, 2005). This translated version is considered authoritative as Sun is the person who was asked to translate the work by Fang. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22. For another translated version, see Kuang Zhao 匡釗, *Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan* (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 2009).

35 Fang, *Huayanzong zhexue* (2 vols. Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1992).

36 Tang, *Rensheng zhi tian* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000).

37 Tang, *Daode ziwo zhi jianli* (Hong Kong: Rensheng chubanshe 人生出版社, 1963).

38 Tang, *Xin wu yu rensheng* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002).

39 Tang, *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞研究所, 1974).

40 Tang, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* (2 vols. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1986).

41 Tang, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* vol. 1, *Ibid.*, pp. 3–7.

42 Tang, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991).

pian 中國哲學原論·原道篇 (*The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy—Original Way*).⁴³ All these works will be further reviewed in Chapter 4 where I will discuss Tang's interpretation of Huayan.

Since this study is about Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought but not a study of Huayan thought itself, the discussion of this Buddhist tradition will be mainly restricted to the scope of their interpretation of it. In consideration of this point, I will discuss the Huayan thought in the Tang Dynasty, as Fang and Tang only paid attention to the thought in this period.

All of the key concepts relevant to the thought of Fang, Tang and their use of Huayan will be discussed in the respective chapters below. However, two concepts need more clarification here, which are '*zhexue*' 哲學 or 'philosophy' and '*dangdai xin rujia*' or 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'. As I will discuss in the following chapters, both Fang and Tang considered their thought 'philosophy' and this word will appear very often throughout this study. However, Lao Sze-kwang reminds us that the characteristic of 'philosophy' in the Chinese tradition is somewhat different from that in the West, as the former mainly aims at achieving 'self-transformation' and 'transformation of the world'.⁴⁴ In his view, the meaning of 'philosophy' in China is closer to that of 'religion' in the West.⁴⁵ Fang's and Tang's employments of the word obviously follow this suggestion of Lao.

The term 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' is crucial in almost all of the modern Chinese philosophical studies. The term '*xin rujia*' 新儒家 or Neo-Confucianism was probably first suggested in Fung Yu-lan's *Zhongguo zhexue*

43 Tang, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian* vol. 3 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991).

44 Lao Sze-kwang, 'On Understanding Chinese Philosophy: An Inquiry and a Proposal', in Robert E. Allinson ed., *Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 265–293. Wilmon Henry Sheldon also shares similar view. See his 'Main Contrasts Between Eastern and Western Philosophy', in Charles A. Moore ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), pp. 288–297.

45 Lao Sze-kwang, *Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wenhua* 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp. 149–150. However, I stress that there are exceptional cases. The School of Names 名家 in the Warring States period 戰國時代 (403BC–221BC) of China, for instance, focused on the issue of logic as well as the relationship between names and actuality, while 'self-transformation' and 'transformation of the world' were not its concern. In this sense, Lao's idea is not totally correct though it fits the cases of Fang and Tang, which I will explore in the following chapters. For more discussion about using 'philosophy' to describe Chinese thought, see Kim Young-oak, *The Philosophy of Wang Fu-Chih (1619–1692)* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1982), pp. 4–22.

shi 中國哲學史 (*A History of Chinese Philosophy*) published in 1934, in which he used the term to refer to the Confucianism of the Song 宋 (960–1279) and Ming 明 (1368–1644) dynasties. After Fung's book was translated from Chinese into English by Derk Bodde in 1937, the term 'Neo-Confucianism' became better known in academia.⁴⁶ In order to distinguish the thought of modern thinkers from those in the dynasties, 'Contemporary' is usually added to the former, signifying modern thought.⁴⁷ Most studies consider that the appearance of the thought of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' is traced back to Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili. However, its development is mainly the contribution of Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982).⁴⁸

In fact, although the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang 中國國民黨 ended the civil conflicts amongst warlords in China and established a central government in 1928, the political difficulties facing the country did not change much. Domestically, there was a serious disagreement between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨. Externally, there was the threat of Japanese invasion. After the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Nationalist-Communist Civil War (1945–1949), the Chinese Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國 run by the Communist Party was established in 1949, a turning point for the country both politically and culturally. In order to escape the Communist Party, many scholars fled from mainland China to Hong Kong and Taiwan from the late 1940s. Facing the Party's total denial of Chinese culture, many exiled scholars considered it a life-and-death moment for the Chinese tradition. Hong Kong and Taiwan were therefore regarded as the last places to preserve the tradition.⁴⁹ In Hong Kong, Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990), Tang Junyi and Zhang Pijie 張丕介 (1905–1970) established the New Asia College 新亞書院 in 1949, arguing that it followed the private schooling tradition of the

46 John Makeham, 'The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism', in John Makeham ed., *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. 25–53. However, some scholars argue that the term was first suggested by He Lin 賀麟 (1902–1992). See Jiang Guobao 蔣國保 and Yu Bingyi 余秉頤, *Fang Dongmei si-xiang yanjiu* 方東美思想研究 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe 天津人民出版社, 2004), editor word, p. 1.

47 Liu Shu-hsien, 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism: Its Background, Varieties, Emergence, and Significance', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 2, no. 2 (2003): 213–233.

48 Liu, *ibid.*; John H. Berthrong, *Transformations of the Confucian Way* (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 185–186; Tan Sor-hoon, 'Modernizing Confucianism and "New Confucianism"', in Louie Kam ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Chinese Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 135–154.

49 For Tang Junyi, Communist rule meant the end of Chinese culture. See his *Riji* 日記 vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1988), p. 39.

Song Dynasty.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan taught Chinese philosophy in Tunghai University 東海大學 in Taiwan in the 1950s. Both New Asia College and Tunghai University are considered centres of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' by some scholars.⁵¹

Two events helped establish the identity of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'. First, in 1958, 'A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese Culture—Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook' (Chi. *Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie: women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi* 中國文化與世界：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識), a declaration suggested by Carsun Chang 張君勱 (Zhang Junmai, 1887–1969), drafted by Tang and jointly signed by Mou and Xu, was published.⁵² In the Manifesto, the four thinkers argued that 'Heart-Mind and Nature' (Chi. *Xinxing* 心性) was the core spirit of Chinese thought and that Confucian orthodoxy was also based on it.⁵³ These four thinkers, Tang, Mou and Xu in particular, are widely considered the representative figures in the camp of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'. Second, after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the

50 The original name of the college was 'Yazhou wenshang 亞洲文商'. 'New Asia' is the name used since 1950. For the ideal and the history of New Asia College, see Qian Mu, *Xinya yiduo* 新亞遺鐸 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1989); Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong's New Asia College* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

51 Tu Wei-ming, *Way, Learning and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual*, note 11; Liu Shu-hsien (Liu Shuxian) 劉述先, *Ruxue de fuxing* 儒學的復興 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu 天地圖書, 2007), p. 94.

52 For the Manifesto, see Tang Junyi, *Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi huaquo piaoling* 說中華民族之花果飄零 (Taipei: Sanmin shujupp 三民書局, 2002), pp. 125–192. For the English version published in 1962, see Tang Junyi, *Tang Junyi quanji* 唐君毅全集 vol. 19 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp. 492–562.

53 The term in the Manifesto is '*Xinxing zhi xue*' 心性之學, which is translated as 'studies of heart-mind and nature' in most studies. See Mou Bo, *Chinese Philosophy A-Z* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 38. In the English version of the Manifesto, however, the term is translated as the 'study of Moral Mind and Moral Reason'. Since the English Manifesto was published before the death of the four thinkers, I argue that this translation is endorsed by them. Interestingly this translation is seldom used in academia. To avoid disputation, I will follow the practice of most scholars, employing 'studies of heart-mind and nature' here temporarily. For the process of drafting and translating the Manifesto, see Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, *Xueshu yu jingshi: Tang Junyi de lishi zhixue ji qi zhongji guanhuai* 學術與經世：唐君毅的歷史哲學及其終極關懷 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2010), pp. 490–495.

Chinese Government began to think of the relationship between modernization and traditional Chinese culture, which were observed to co-exist in some Chinese societies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.⁵⁴ A national project entitled 'The Investigation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the Trend of Thought' (Chi. *Xiandai xin rujia yu sichao yanjiu* 現代新儒家與思潮研究) was therefore established in 1986, aiming at examining the thought of ten twentieth-century pro-Confucianism thinkers: Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Carsun Chang, Fung Yu-lan, He Lin, Qian Mu, Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan.⁵⁵ Since then, the term 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' has been dominant in Chinese academia.

Despite its prevalence, and unlike most other scholars, I will not use this term to describe the thought of Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi in this study because the term causes fierce controversy. First, even some thinkers listed as 'Contemporary Neo-Confucian' did not accept such identification. In fact, in the 1958 declaration, Qian Mu refused to sign since he argued that the declaration could lead to different 'factions' or 'sects' (Chi. *menhu* 門戶) in academia, a phenomenon he deplored throughout his life.⁵⁶ Although Thomé H. Fang gave his opinion as the document was drafted,⁵⁷ he did not sign it. As Yu Ying-shih argues in his famous article 'Qian Mu yu xin rujia 錢穆與新儒家' (Qian Mu and Neo-Confucianism), the meaning of the term 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism', on the one hand, is so broad that it tends to include all thinkers who show sympathy for Confucianism. In this sense, the term becomes

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- 54 Benjamin A. Elman, 'Confucianism and Modernization: A Reevaluation', in Joseph P. L. Jiang ed., *Confucianism and Modernization: A Symposium* (Taipei: Freedom Council, 1987), pp. 1–19; Tu Wei-ming, 'Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center', in Tu Wei-ming ed., *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (California: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 1–34.
- 55 Fang Keli 方克立 and Li Jinquan 李錦全 ed., *Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji* 現代新儒學研究論集 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1989), pp. 1–13. In 1991, a similar project begun and Ma Yifu, Yu Ying-shih, Liu Shu-hsien, Cheng chung-ying and Tu Weiming were added to the list. See John Makeham, *Lost Soul: Confucianism in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 6–9.
- 56 Qian Mu, *Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi luncong* 中國學術思想史論叢 vol. 9 (Taipei: Sushulou wenjiao jijinhui lantai chubanshe 素書樓文教基金會蘭臺出版社, 2000), pp. 251–252.
- 57 Qiang Rixin 江日新, 'Zhang Junmai yu 'Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie' xuan yan—qi xiangfa ji suqiu 張君勱與「中國文化與世界」宣言—其想法及訴求', *Ehu xuezhì* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 40 (2008): 1–30.

meaningless. On the other hand, the meaning of it may be so narrow that it only refers to those who stress the study of 'Heart-Mind and Nature'. The term, therefore, appears exclusively to refer to Xiong, Tang, Mou and Xu. Other thinkers outside this academic line, including Yu himself, cannot be included within it.⁵⁸

Second, the approaches to and conclusions about the study of Confucianism in the figures as listed in the national project are so different that it is difficult, if not impossible, to classify them as part of the same group. Since there is little consensus about the definition of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism', the use of the term is seen as somewhat arbitrary.⁵⁹ To some extent, the usage of the term becomes a political rather than an academic issue.⁶⁰ Since the employment of the term is so controversial, I will avoid using it to describe the thought of Fang and Tang in this study.

In fact, there are two advantages to not using the term. The first is that Fang's and Tang's thought can be reviewed more objectively and comprehensively without any unnecessary preconceptions. Their interpretations and appropriations of other intellectual traditions, including Huayan thought, therefore, will not be simply considered from a Confucian perspective.⁶¹

Second, because, for some scholars, the term 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' means Xiong's academic line, it consolidates the image of the teacher-student relationship between Xiong and Tang but ignores the

58 Yu Ying-shih, *You ji fengchui shuishang lin: Qian Mu yu xiandai Zhongguo xueshu* 猶記風吹水上鱗：錢穆與現代中國學術 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1991), pp. 31–98. Li Zehou 李澤厚 also shares this view, see his *Shuo ruxue si qi* 說儒學四期 (Shanghai: Shanghai yuwen chubanshe 上海譯文出版社, 2012), pp. 111–112.

59 Yu Dan 于丹, a popular figure introducing Confucianism via a television show in mainland China, for example, is considered a 'Contemporary Neo-Confucian' by some scholars. See Ronnie L. Littlejohn, *Confucianism: An Introduction* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 177–186. However, Yu's understanding of Confucianism is highly debatable.

60 It is said that the proprietary rights of mainland thinkers over the interpretation of Confucianism would be diminished if Fung Yu-lan and He Lin, who stayed in mainland after 1949, were excluded from the list. See John Makeham, 'The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism', note 46.

61 Once in a private conversation with a former professor in the Philosophy Department, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, I was told that Fang and Tang simply viewed Huayan from a Confucian perspective. Therefore, their interpretations are not 'objective'. For similar criticism, see Charles Wei-hsun Fu (Fu Weixun) 傅偉勳, *Cong chuangzao de quanshixue dao dasheng foxue* 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1990), p. 346. In this study, I will prove this kind of view incomplete.

fact that Tang actually refused to be the private student of Xiong.⁶² As Tang himself admitted, he had established his own thought before meeting Xiong.⁶³ In this sense, I argue that Xiong's influence on Tang may not be as great as many scholars think.⁶⁴ In consideration of this, not using the term 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' is to be preferred.

In order to answer the research questions of this study, I will work according to the following plan. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the necessary elements constituting the historical context in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, including i.) the ideas of 'ti' and 'yong', ii.) the Western challenge, 'scientism' in particular, and Chinese responses from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, iii.) examples of Chinese thinkers' appropriations of ideas other than Confucianism to develop their theories, and iv.) characteristics of classical Huayan thought. I will also discuss 'Chinese hermeneutics', so that the cases of Fang and Tang can be included in the discussion in current academia. In Chapters 3 and 4, Fang's and Tang's own theories and their respective interpretations of Huayan thought will be addressed. All these chapters together will thus help answer the research questions, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5. In short, I consider that Fang appropriated Huayan's idea of 'harmony' to support his own idea of 'comprehensive harmony' in response to the challenge of 'scientism', while Tang used the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification to address the issue, though their appropriations of Huayan thought cannot be simply explained in one or two sentences.

First, let us turn to a more detailed examination of the historical context facing their appropriations, which brings us to the discussion of Chapter 2.

62 Tang, *Nianpu*; *Zhushu nianbiao*; *Xianren zhushu* 年譜; 著述年表; 先人著述 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), p. 42.

63 Tang, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* vol. 2, note 40, p. 480.

64 Liu Shu-hsien's saying that 'he [Tang] acknowledged that it was through the influence of Hsiung Shih-li [Xiong Shili] that he could see the true insights in Chinese philosophy' is obviously contrary to Tang's own wishes. See Liu, 'Tang Chun-i (1909–1978)', in Robert Audi ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 900. For scholarship stressing the relationship between Xiong and Tang, also see Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, 'Tang Junyi yu Xiong Shili 唐君毅與熊十力', in Huo Taohui 霍韜晦 ed., *Tang Junyi sixiang guoji huiyi lunwenji* 唐君毅思想國際會議論文集 vol. 3 (Hong Kong: Fazhu chubanshe 法住出版社, 1991), pp. 128–141.

The Historical Context of Modern Confucian Thinkers' Appropriations of Buddhist Ideas

2.1 'Ti' and 'Yong' as a Theoretical Framework

According to Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901), an influential official during China's late Qing 清 Dynasty (1644–1912), the challenges facing China from the mid-nineteenth century on were so revolutionary that they amounted to 'the greatest change in more than three thousand years' (Chi. *sanqian yu nian yi da bianju* 三千餘年一大變局) of Chinese history.¹ It is certainly impossible to discuss the entire historical context in which Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi used Huayan thought in a single chapter, and, in fact, there have been many excellent studies about the historical events of this period.² In my view, it is not a lack of information about the historical events of the period but the lack of an appropriate theoretical framework that makes the characteristics and relationships of these events difficult to understand. In order better to analyse this complex area, I will therefore be employing the concepts of 'ti' 體 and 'yong' 用, two traditional Chinese terms which play a vital role in both pre-modern³ and modern Chinese intellectual history.⁴

The concepts of 'ti' and 'yong' have been employed, from the time of the early Six Dynasties (220–589) to the present day. Literally, the word 'ti' means

- 1 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Li Hongzhang zhuan* 李鴻章傳 (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe 海南出版社, 1993), pp. 42–43.
- 2 For instance, see Tang Degang 唐德剛, *Wanqing qishi nian* 晚清七十年 (5 vols., Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 1998); Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York and London: Norton, 1999); Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
- 3 Qian Mu 錢穆, *Xinya yiduo* 新亞遺鐸 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 2004), p. 194; Walter Liebenthal, *Chao lun: the treatises of Seng-chao* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968), p. 17.
- 4 Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, 'Jinxiandai rujia sixiangshi shang de tiyonglun 近現代儒家思想史上的體用論', in Chen Rongkai 陳榮開 ed., *Tianrenzhiji yu renqinzhibian: bijiao yu duoyuan de guandian* 天人之際與人禽之辨：比較與多元的觀點 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 2001), pp. 195–226. Li Zehou 李澤厚 also argues that these concepts help explain the characteristics of the present-day economic reforms of China. See his *Shuo xiti zhongyong* 說西體中用 (Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 上海譯文出版社, 2012), pp. 62–79.

'body', which approximates to the English word 'substance' or 'essence', while 'yong' usually means the response of a thing when stimulated.⁵ Although Chan Wing-tsit's 'substance' and 'function' are widely adopted in English writing as the most appropriate translations of the terms,⁶ their employment has varied widely in different periods.⁷ Amongst various explanations, that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the great Confucian thinker in the Song Dynasty, is probably the most influential:

Consider our body as *ti*, seeing and hearing, as well as the movements of our hands and legs, are its *yong* (functions/operations). But if we consider our hand as *ti*, then the movement of the fingers is its *yong*.⁸

Zhu also cited the famous motto of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), another important Confucian thinker, to complement his idea:

Ti and *yong* come from the same source, and there is no gap between the manifest and the hidden.⁹

The above citations on '*ti*' and '*yong*' contain two implications for this study. First, the usages of '*ti*' and '*yong*' are context-dependent. In other words, their exact meanings depend on individual situations.¹⁰ As both Qian Mu and He

5 A. C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers: Ch'eng Ming-tao and Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan* (London: Lund Humphries, 1958), p. 39; Max Ko-wu Huang, *The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2008), pp. 244–246.

6 Antonio S. Cua, 'Ti and Yong (T'i and Yung): Substance and Function', in Antonio S. Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 720–723.

7 For examples of different uses in Chinese history, see Zhang Dainian, Edmund Ryden trans., *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 240–257; Xue Huayuan 薛化元, *Wanqing 'Zhongti xiyong' sixiang lun (1861–1900): guanding yishixingtai de xihua lilun* 晚清「中體西用」思想論 (1861–1900): 官定意識型態的西化理論 (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe 稻香出版社, 1991), pp. 27–35.

8 The original Chinese is '如這身是體，目視，耳聽，手足運動處，便是用；如這手是體，指之運動提掇處便是用。' See Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 vol. 6. For this translation, see Antonio S. Cua, 'Ti and Yong (T'i and Yung): Substance and Function', note 6, p. 721.

9 The original Chinese is '體用一源，顯微無間'. For the translation, see Antonio S. Cua, *ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

Lin argue, meanings of 'ti' and 'yong' are never clear,¹¹ implying that an understanding of them needs to include concrete events or texts. Although 'ti' is generally regarded as body, substance or principle, while 'yong' is considered function, phenomenon or approach,¹² on some occasions, especially those related to the thought of Fang and Tang, translating 'ti' as state or condition may be better, a point I will further discuss in the following chapters.¹³ Second, 'ti' and 'yong' are not separate, but actually two sides of the same coin. I will use these two points to help sharpen our understanding of the historical context in which Fang and Tang developed their thought and the nature of their appropriations of Huayan thought.

However, before I analyse the historical context, it is essential to have a basic understanding of the historical events, which constitute the context. In what follows, I first discuss the historical context facing modern Confucian thinkers' appropriations of Buddhist ideas from a macro-perspective, such as the declining status of Confucianism, the appearance of 'scientism' and the Chinese search for ideas alternative to Confucianism to develop their thought, which I summarize as 'Western challenge' and 'Chinese response'. I then focus, first, on appropriations of Buddhist ideas by individual Confucian thinkers and, second, discuss the Huayan thought relevant to Fang's and Tang's appropriations.

2.2 The Western Challenge and the Chinese Response—An Overview

Many scholars have argued that Chinese history from the mid-nineteenth century was a response to the Western challenge.¹⁴ Although this 'challenge-and-response' model is criticized as an oversimplification of the concept of the

11 Qian Mu, *Zhongguo sixiang shi* 中國思想史 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 1962), p. 165; He Lin, 'Wenhua de ti yu yong 文化的體與用', in Zhang Xuezhong 張學智 ed., *He Lin xuan ji* 賀麟選集 (Changchun Shi: Jilin renmin chubanshe 吉林人民出版社, 2005), pp. 116–124.

12 Feng Qie 馮契 ed., *Zhexue da cidian* 哲學大辭典 vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe 上海辭書出版社, 2001), p. 1441.

13 As John Makeham argues, 'substance carries an undue amount of Aristotelian baggage and is incompatible with the process ontologies of Neo-Confucian thought.' This point is important in our understanding of Fang's and Tang's thought, which I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. For Makeham's comments, see his 'Introduction', in John Makeham ed., *Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (London and New York: Springer, 2010), pp. ix–xliii.

14 Teng Ssu-yü and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839–1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Paul Hibbert Clyde and Burton

'West' and neglects the autonomy of China,¹⁵ it remains useful for this study since Tang Junyi himself conceptualised Chinese thought in the past hundred years as a response to the West.¹⁶ In brief, as many scholars agree, modern Chinese thought, including the so-called 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism', was a kind of cultural response to the Western challenge.¹⁷ In this sense, what we should do is not to deny the influence of the West on modern Chinese thought but to define the 'Western challenge' and 'Chinese response' more carefully.

It is always difficult to define 'Chinese' as the concept entails many dimensions, such as the historical, the ethnic, the linguistic and the geopolitical. There is thus no common consensus on the content of it in academia.¹⁸ Further, in saying that modern Chinese thought is a cultural response to the West, the word 'culture' also needs more clarification. Literally, the Chinese term '*wenhua*' 文化, which is translated as 'culture' in English, first appears in *The Book of Changes* or *Yi Jing* 易經, where it is said that 'through contemplation of the forms existing in human society it becomes possible to shape the world' (Chi. *guan hu renwen, yi huacheng tianxia* 觀乎人文，以化成天下).¹⁹ As Qian Mu argues, 'culture' can be considered in two ways: the first, material (Chi. *wuzhi de* 物質的), and the second, spiritual (Chi. *jingshen de* 精神的). While architecture is a good example of the former, literature, philosophy and music are examples of the latter. For Qian, when using the term 'culture', the Chinese people mainly understand it in a spiritual context as

Floyd Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response* (1830–1970) (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 5–6.

- 15 Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 9–55.
- 16 Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie* 中華人文與當今世界 vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1988), pp. 373–377; Tang Junyi, *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* 人文精神之重建 (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞研究所, 1974), pp. 122–126.
- 17 Tan Sor-hoon, 'Modernizing Confucianism and "new Confucianism"', in Louie Kam ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Chinese Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 135–154. Also see Wen Haiming, *Chinese Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 138.
- 18 For discussion, see Tu Wei-ming, 'Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center', in Tu Wei-ming ed., *The Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (California: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 1–34; Rey Chow, 'Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem', *Boundary 2*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1998): 1–24.
- 19 For the translation, see Richard Wilhelm, Cary F. Baynes trans., *The I Ching or Book of Changes* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 91.

referring to intellectual rather than material pursuits.²⁰ Here I am not going to evaluate Qian's idea, but argue that his idea is the interpretation that Fang and Tang would have made of the term. As I will argue in the following chapters, Fang and Tang, in their understanding of 'culture', were more concerned with intellectual and religious traditions such as the thought of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Material culture was not their focus.²¹

However, even though 'culture' mainly means intellectual or spiritual traditions in this study, changes in such traditions happen continuously throughout history. In short, 'culture' is not a static but a dynamic concept.²² In consideration of the difficulties in defining 'Chinese' and 'culture', I use the term 'Chinese culture' in a very loose sense in this study. In fact, this clarification is necessary in two aspects. First, the employment of the term is so arbitrary in many studies that a particular form of 'culture' may be easily classified as 'Chinese' but not considered relevant to the West, and vice versa. As a result, the cultural gap between China and the West appears to be unnecessarily enlarged.²³ Second, this ambiguity of the terms provides room for Fang and Tang, who are widely regarded as Confucian thinkers, to appropriate Huayan thought, though this ambiguity is also criticized by some scholars.²⁴ As I previously mentioned, the content of the 'ti' of 'Chinese culture' was never clear. I argue that this is because the meaning of the term 'Chinese culture' itself is not clear enough. Since the meaning of this term is unclear, it is impossible to provide a clear definition of its 'ti'. In the final chapter, I will discuss how Fang

20 Qian Mu, *Xinya yiduo*, note 3, pp. 560–574.

21 As Tang admitted, while discussing 'culture', he focused on its spiritual dimension. See his *Bingli qiankun* 病裡乾坤 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2013), p. 114.

22 Stephen C. Angle, 'Zhongguo zhhexuejia yu quanqiu zhexue 中國哲學家與全球哲學', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 1 *Fanxiang geyi yu quanqiu zhexue* 中國哲學與文化：第一輯—反向格義與全球哲學 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2007), pp. 239–256; Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國, *Kongxing yu fangfa: kuawenhua fojiao zhexue shisi lun* 空性與方法：跨文化佛教哲學十四論 (Taipei: Zhengda chubanshe 政大出版社, 2012), p. 2.

23 For more discussion, see Wolfgang Kubin, "Only the Chinese Understand China"—The Problem of East-West Understanding', in Karl-Heinz Pohl ed., *Chinese Thought in a Global Context: a Dialogue between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 47–57; Fan Fa-ti, 'Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China', *Isis* vol. 98, no. 3 (2007): 524–538.

24 As Grace Ai-ling Chou (Zhou Ailing) 周愛靈 criticizes, the concept of 'culture' as suggested by the Contemporary Neo-Confucians is not clear. See her *Huaguo piaoling: Lengzhan shiqi zhimindi de Xinya shuyuan* 花果飄零：冷戰時期殖民地的新亞書院 (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 2010), p. 12.

and Tang make use of this ambiguity of the term to re-define the 'ti' and 'yong' of 'Chinese culture', making it more responsive to the challenge of 'scientism'.

Traditionally, it is usually considered that specific religions and intellectual traditions prevailed in various periods. For instance, in the Jin 晉 Dynasty (265–420), *Xuanxue* 玄學, which developed from the ideas of Laozi 老子 (?–?), appeared to play a main role among thinkers of that time. In the Tang 唐 Dynasty (618–907), it was Buddhism that played the key role.²⁵ From the time of the Song 宋 Dynasty (960–1279), Confucianism seemed to predominate among leading thinkers. This change in intellectual and religious trends is endorsed by many influential scholars in the field of Chinese philosophical studies.²⁶ To some extent, the observation that particular intellectual traditions prevailed in certain periods is true. However, it may easily overlook the role of other traditions, not to mention the interaction amongst them. In fact, this kind of interaction, which I call the 'tradition of dialogue', takes place throughout Chinese history.²⁷ Therefore, ignoring this fact will make the understanding of an intellectual tradition incomplete. For many Chinese thinkers, Confucianism and Buddhism are not incompatible but interactive with each other.²⁸ This principle obviously applies to Fang and Tang.²⁹

Before further discussion, one more point needs attention here. Although terms like 'Confucianism' and 'Buddhism' are widely used in academia, they conceal many aspects of different underlying Chinese characteristics. 'Confucianism', in particular, may refer to 'ru jia' 儒家, 'ru jiao' 儒教, 'ru xue'

25 I will discuss the entry of Buddhism into China in the following sections.

26 For example, see H. G. Greel, *Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tsê-tung* (London: University Paperbacks, 1962); Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973); Wm. Theodore de Bary, *East Asian Civilizations: A Dialogue in Five Stages* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988); Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* 新編中國哲學史 (3 vols., Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005).

27 In *Shiji* 史記 (*Records of the Grand Historian*), for instance, it is recorded that Confucius asked Laozi about 'li' 禮 or ritual. Zhuangzi 莊子 (369BC–286BC), another influential Taoist thinker, also exchanged his ideas with Hui Shi 惠施 (370BC–310BC), a leading figure of the School of Names 名家. Leading Confucians in the Song and Ming dynasties confessed their fellowship with contemporary Buddhist monks as well.

28 Wang Zongyu, 'Confucianist or Buddhist? An Interview with Liang Shuming', *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* vol. 20, no. 2 (1988–1989): 39–47.

29 Lewis E. Hahn, *Enhancing Cultural Interflow between East & West: Collected Essays in Comparative Philosophy & Culture* (Mobile: Thomé H. Fang Institute, 1998), pp. 35–43.

儒學 and 'ru' 儒, which are difficult to summarize in a single word.³⁰ In this study, I mainly employ the terms 'Confucianism' and 'Buddhism' to describe the philosophical and religious sides of these two intellectual traditions, while the social and political aspects of them are not relevant here. All of this provides a wider context for what follows.

2.2.1 *The Declining Status of Confucianism from the Mid-Nineteenth Century*

The reasons for Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought are partly to do with the failings in Confucianism from the mid-nineteenth century on. Although there are various intellectual traditions in Chinese history, Confucianism is widely considered to have been the most influential among the ruling élites, particularly in late imperial China.³¹ However, its status began to decline after the defeat of the Qing Dynasty in the Opium War (the First Anglo-Chinese War, 1839–1842). At first, because many Chinese people thought that the backwardness of Chinese technology and military equipment was the reason for China's defeat in the war, the status of Confucianism among intellectuals was not immediately critically challenged. Therefore, in the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–1894) of the Qing Government, it was mainly technology that was introduced from the West, whilst the 'soft power' of philosophical and religious ideas, and musical and aesthetic practices as well as political institutions remained largely untouched.³² The leading ideology of the Movement, in short, was 'Chinese learning for fundamental principles (*ti*), Western learning for practical applications (*yong*)' (Chi. *zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong* 中學為體，西學為用), an idea probably first suggested by the scholar Feng Guifen 馮桂芬 (1809–1874) and developed by another scholar Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 (1842–1922) and the official Zhang Zhidong 張之洞

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- 30 For the complexity of using the term 'ru', see Lee Rainey, 'Confucianism and Tradition', in Steven Engler and Gregory P. Grieve ed., *Historicizing "Tradition" in the Study of Religion* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), pp. 227–243; Yao Xinzong, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 16–47; Shun Kwong-loi, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought* (California: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 3–4.
- 31 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, p. ix; Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi*, note 26, p. 75; Roger T. Ames, 'Confucianism: Confucius (Kongzi, K'ung Tzu)', in Antonio S. Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, note 6, pp. 58–64.
- 32 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, note 2, pp. 261–294. Although, in terms of Nye's discussion, 'soft power' may specifically mean the ability to affect others' preferences through attraction, here I use the term in a very broad sense, indicating knowledge that has significant cultural implications. For the specific meaning of the term, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Soft Power', in Mark Haugaard and Stewart R. Clegg ed., *Power and Politics* vol. 4 (London: SAGE, 2012), pp. 125–138.

(1837–1909).³³ As Li Hongzhang argued, Chinese attitudes towards Western learning in the Self-Strengthening Movement were negative:

In peacetime we sneer at the effective weapons of the foreigners as things produced by strange techniques and tricky crafts, which we consider unnecessary to learn. In wartime we are alarmed by these weapons; we marvel at them but regard them as something which we cannot possibly learn. We do not realize that for several centuries the foreigners have considered the study of firearms indeed as important as that of body and mind, human nature and destiny.³⁴

According to Li, many Chinese people at that time regarded Western learning as 'strange techniques and tricky crafts' (Chi. *qiji yinqiao* 奇技淫巧), which simply belonged to the category of 'yong'. Here we see an example of the use of the terms 'ti' and 'yong' which I shall employ throughout my analysis.

In the last section, I mentioned that there is no strict usage of the terms of 'ti' and 'yong'. The meanings depend on context. In the Self-Strengthening Movement which attempted to make China as 'modern' as the West, for instance, the Qing Government inclined to consider that the 'ti', for which I think substance or principle is an acceptable translation here, should be 'Chinese learning', while 'Western learning' or scientific facility was envisaged only as a kind of function (*yong*). In the eyes of the Qing Government and many Chinese thinkers at that time, 'Western learning' would not change or endanger the substance or fundamentals of Chinese society, including the people's confidence in their traditional value system.³⁵ This idea of 'Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications', however, violates the second characteristic of the terms 'ti' and 'yong' I mentioned, namely, that they cannot be discussed separately. This violation

33 Luo Zhitian 羅志田, *Minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo sixiang* 民族主義與近代中國思想 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 2011), pp. 105–111.

34 The original Chinese is '無事則嗤外國之利器為奇技淫巧，以為不必學；有事則驚外國之利器為變怪神奇，以為不能學。不知洋人視火器為身心性命之學者已數百年。' See Wen Qing 文慶 et al. ed., *Chouban yiwu shimo. Tongzhi chao* 籌辦夷務始末·同治朝 vol. 25 (Taipei: Guofeng chubanshe 國風出版社, 1963), pp. 4–10. For this translation, see Kuo Ting-yee and Liu Kwang-ching, 'Self-strengthening: the pursuit of Western technology', in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank ed., *The Cambridge History of China vol. 10 Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 1* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 498.

35 For discussion, see Yu Ying-shih 余英時, *Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai quanshi* 中國思想傳統的現代詮釋 (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 1987), p. 522; Luo Zhitian, *Minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo sixiang*, note 33.

became an issue to Chinese thinkers after the defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

Japan, a country employing a 'closed door' policy since the seventeenth century, faced a military threat from the West in the early nineteenth century. In order to defend the country, the Japanese Government commenced a series of reforms from the mid-nineteenth century, at almost the same time as China's Self-Strengthening Movement.³⁶ In this sense, therefore, the two countries were engaged in a kind of 'competition',³⁷ helping to explain why Chinese people were shocked when the country was defeated by Japan in 1895. The result of the war not only meant the failure of Chinese reforms but also raised a further wave of reflection. Many Chinese thinkers considered that the decay of the political system was the reason for the country's defeat. Thus Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) suggested constitutional reform, while Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925) promoted revolution. Although their ideas were different, all demanded a change at the institutional level.³⁸

According to the analyses of 'ti' and 'yong', I argue that the rationale behind the ideas of Kang, Liang and Sun is that they considered an institution 'ti', where I consider state or condition a better translation of the term here, and each kind of institution had its own 'yong'. It was through a change of the institutions of China that the country could get overcome its difficulties. While institution can be regarded as 'ti', however, I stress that it can also be regarded as 'yong'. That is to say, what *constitutes* institution is considered 'ti'. In fact, this is the argument many Chinese thinkers held in the early twentieth century, as I shall now explain.³⁹

Historically, Kang's and Liang's ideas were accepted by the Qing Government in 1898. The subsequent reform which is called the Hundred Days of Reform, however, lasted only for 103 days before it was suppressed by the conservatives, encouraging more Chinese people to support Sun and participate in revolutionary activities, thus accelerating the end of the Qing Dynasty. But the fall

36 George M. Wilson, *Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 1–11.

37 W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (California and London: Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 1.

38 For details, see Chang Hao, 'Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 1890–8', in John K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-ching ed., *The Cambridge History of China vol. 11: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 274–338.

39 For more discussion, see Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Triloggy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 59–78.

of the Dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China 中華民國, which was officially proclaimed the following year, did not affect the difficulties China faced. As a republic, China was not the equal of Japan and many Western countries, as the latter continued to enjoy legal and economic privileges in China, privileges protected by the treaties signed by the Qing Government with various countries.⁴⁰ Furthermore, there were numerous civil conflicts amongst warlords within the country.⁴¹ Many thinkers finally took the view that it was 'Chinese culture', and Confucianism in particular, that was the ultimate reason for the country's backwardness. The idea of 'Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications' was therefore under serious attack,⁴² as seen in the statement of the influential translator Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921):

'*Ti*' and '*yong*' are actually referring to the same thing. While there is '*ti*' of a cow, its '*yong*' is to bear a heavy burden. If there is '*ti*' of a horse, then its '*yong*' is to cover a long distance. I have never heard that a thing having the '*ti*' of a cow will have the '*yong*' of a horse. The differences between Chinese and Western learning, like the faces of their people, cannot, assertively, be claimed alike.⁴³

While both the words condition and substance seem to match the meaning of '*ti*' here, Yan's position implies that if Western learning is to be endorsed, Chinese learning needs to be abandoned. Based on this understanding of '*ti*' and '*yong*', a huge demand for a complete re-evaluation of 'Chinese culture' erupted, leading eventually to the 'New Cultural Movement' 新文化運動 (1915–1923).⁴⁴

40 Zhang Yongjin, 'China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of "Civilization"', *Review of International Studies* vol. 17 (1991): 3–16; John S. Gregory, *The West and China since 1500* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 131–153.

41 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, note 2, pp. 475–486.

42 Luo Zhitian, *Minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo sixiang*, note 33.

43 The original Chinese is '體用者，即一物而言之也。有牛之體，則有負重之用；有馬之體，則有致遠之用。未聞以牛為體，以馬為用者也。中西學之為異也，如其種人之面目然，不可強調似也。' See Yan Fu, *Yan Jidao wenchao* 嚴幾道文鈔 Book 4 (Shanghai: Zhongguo tushu 中國圖書, 1916), pp. 18–19.

44 The period of the Movement is controversial amongst scholars. For details, see Zhang Yufa 張玉法, *Zhongguo xiandai shi* 中國現代史 (Taipei: Taiwan donghua shuju 臺灣東華書局, 1998), pp. 254–257; Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, note 2, pp. 1–6.

This idea of Yan Fu implies that the 'ti' of a thing helps determine its 'yong'. However, while discussing the relationship between 'ti' and 'yong', the idea of Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692), a leading Confucian thinker in the late Ming Dynasty, should not be neglected, which is to acknowledge the 'ti' of a thing through reviewing its 'yong'. As he said:

I know there is such a 'ti' of a thing through its 'yong'. Is it not certain?⁴⁵

Here I argue that state or condition is a more appropriate translation of the word 'ti'. As Wang noted, the content of 'ti' is defined by the 'yong'. That is to say, it is not only the 'ti' determining the 'yong' as suggested by Yan Fu, but the 'yong' helps define the 'ti'. In Chapter 5, I will argue that Wang's idea is not only valued in current Chinese philosophical study⁴⁶ but that it is also essential to our understanding of Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought in particular.

Let us return to the discussion of the 'New Cultural Movement'. During this Movement, Confucianism was fiercely attacked by influential thinkers such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942), Zhou Shuren 周樹人 (known as Lu Xun 魯迅, 1881–1936) and Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962). Instead of Confucianism, 'Democracy', 'Science' and 'Westernization' occupied the thought of many Chinese thinkers at that time.⁴⁷ To a large extent, the focus of demands for reform shifted from institutions to the general culture.⁴⁸ To these Chinese thinkers, the development of 'Democracy' and 'Science' was not a technical nor an institutional but a cultural issue. Although Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生 argues that this shift of focus

45 The original Chinese is '吾從其用而知其體之有，豈待疑哉?' Wang Fuzhi, *Zhouyi waizhuan* 周易外傳 vol. 2.

46 See Chen Ming 陳明, 'Jiyong jianti chushuo: yi "zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong" ji "xiti zhongyong" wei beijing 即用見體初說：以「中學為體，西學為用」及「西體中用」為背景', in Chen Ming and Zhu Hanmin 朱漢民 ed., *Yuan dao* 原道 vol. 10 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005), pp. 65–78.

47 For discussion, see Chow Tse-tsung, 'The Anti-Confucian Movement in Early Republican China', in Arthur F. Wright ed., *The Confucian Persuasion* (California: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 288–312; Charlotte Furth, 'Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920', in John K. Fairbank ed., *The Cambridge History of China vol. 12: Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 322–405; Tu Wei-ming, 'The Confucian Tradition in Chinese History', in Paul S. Ropp ed., *Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 112–137.

48 Here I just stress the main characteristics of the reforms. I do not mean that there was no demand for cultural reform in the Self-Strengthening Movement and the Hundred Days of Reform.

was 'a fallacy of cultural reductionism',⁴⁹ I argue that the relationship between culture and institution is like that of 'ti' and 'yong', and I will discuss this further below.

To a large extent, the denial of Confucianism means a negation of the original 'ti' of 'Chinese culture', that its 'yong' was not able to meet the current needs of China. Such negation not only implied a change of faith for individuals but also for the entire moral system in society as a whole.⁵⁰ As *Da Xue* 大學 (*The Highest Order of Cultivation*) argues, the constitution of a society begins from the cultivation of each individual:

The ancients, in wishing to manifest luminous virtue in the world, first brought good order to their states. In wishing to bring good order to their states, they first regulated their households. In wishing to regulate their households, they first cultivated themselves.⁵¹

In this regard, the failure of Confucianism means the undermining of the social order, including the five relationships indicated by Mencius 孟子 (Mengzi, 372 BC–289 BC): love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends,⁵² as was reflected by the widespread attacks against patriarchal family and arranged marriages, traditions perceived to be derived from Confucianism. The famous distinction between 'the fall of dynasty'

49 Lin Yu-sheng, 'Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese Liberalism', in Benjamin I. Schwartz ed., *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 23–58.

50 Ambrose Y. C. King, '“Modernisation” and “Modernity”: The Construction of a Modern Chinese Civilisational Order', in Tam Kwok-kam, Wimal Dissanayake & Terry Siu-han Yip ed., *Sights of Contestation: Localism, Globalism and Cultural Production in Asia and the Pacific* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 1–16; Chang Hao 張灝, 'Chongfang wusi: lun wusi sixiang de liangqixing 重訪五四：論五四思想的兩歧性', in Yu Ying-shih et al., *Wusi xinlun: jifei wenyifuxing, yifei qimengyundong* 五四新論：既非文藝復興，亦非啟蒙運動 (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 1999), pp. 33–65.

51 The original Chinese is '古之欲明明德於天下者，先治其國；欲治其國者，先齊其家；欲齊其家者，先脩其身。' For the translation, see Ian Johnston and Wang Ping, *Daxue and Zhongyong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012), p. 135.

52 See Mencius, book 3, part A. For the translation, see D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 60. For discussion about how the love between father and son affects the operation of Chinese society, see Hsieh Yu-wei, 'Filial Piety and Chinese Society', in Charles A. Moore ed., *The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp. 167–187.

(Chi. *wang guo* 亡國) and ‘the loss of commonality’ (Chi. *wang tianxia* 亡天下), which means the loss of common values, by Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), the leading Confucian thinker in the early Qing Dynasty, helps explain the significance of the rejection of Confucianism by Chinese people:

There is the fall of dynasty (*guo*) and there is the loss of the commonality (*tianxia*). How is the loss of the polity to be distinguished from the loss of the commonality? I would say that a different surname and change in reign name is what is meant by the loss of the dynasty. But ‘when the path of morality is blocked, then we show animals the way to devour men, and sooner and later it will come to men devouring men’—that is the loss of the commonality.⁵³

In my view, ‘the loss of commonality’ was exactly the situation facing China in the early twentieth century,⁵⁴ as observed in the monologue of a professor recorded in *Tides from the West*, the well-known autobiography of the former chancellor of Peking University Chiang Monlin 蔣夢麟 (1886–1964):

Strikes here, there, and everywhere—strikes yesterday, today, tomorrow and every day. Mr. Chancellor, what are you going to do about them? When is the thing going to end? Someone has said that the new spirit is born, but I say the old tranquil spirit is dead!⁵⁵

If Chiang’s observation is rather general, the suicide of Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927) illustrates the impact of the decline of Confucian values on the Chinese people in a more tangible way. A leading philology scholar, Wang

53 The original Chinese is ‘有亡國，有亡天下。亡國與亡天下奚辨？曰易姓改號謂之亡國；仁義充塞而至於率獸食人，人將相食，謂之亡天下。’ For this translation, see John Patrick Delury, *Despotism Above and Below: Gu Yanwu’s Record of Daily Learning on Power, Money and Mores* (unpublished PhD thesis, Yale University, 2007), p. 280.

54 Zhang Pijie 張丕介, ‘Lixiang yu lixiang de fuhezhe 理想與理想的負荷者’, in Xinya yanjiusuo ed., *Xinya jiaoyu* 新亞教育 (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞研究所, 1981), pp. 111–114; Chak Chi-shing (Zhai Zhicheng) 翟志成, ‘Wenhua jijin zhuyi vs. wenhua bao-shou zhuyi: Hu Shi yu gangtai xin rujia 文化激進主義 vs. 文化保守主義：胡適與港臺新儒家’, *Xinya xuebao* 新亞學報 vol. 26 (2008): 125–196.

55 Chiang Monlin, *Tides from the West* (Taipei: The World Book, 1963), p. 135. Lao Sze-kwang also shares this view in his *Weiji shijie yu xin xiwang shiji: zailun dangdai zhexue yu wenhua* 危機世界與新希望世紀：再論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2007), p. vii.

drowned himself in a lake in Beijing in 1927. Although the reason for his suicide is controversial in academia,⁵⁶ the one given in the epitaph by Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890–1969), an influential historian, is the most generally accepted:

As a culture is declining, people growing up under that culture definitely feel suffering. The more one feels attached to the culture, the more one suffers. In the most serious situation, committing suicide is the only means by which one can enjoy peace of mind and show righteousness.⁵⁷

Chen's words show the impact of the collapse of traditional values in the society, and helps answer the first research question of this study, which is why 'scientism' became an issue in twentieth-century China. As Lao Sze-kwang notes, Chinese thought from the Self-Strengthening Movement onwards was full of the 'consciousness of saving the nation from extinction' (Chi. *jiu wang yishi* 救亡意識).⁵⁸ Many scholars have noted that the crucial task of Chinese thinkers from the mid-nineteenth century was to establish a kind of new morality and new social ethics from new sources alternative to Confucian ideas so that a rejuvenated and unified China could be formed to deal with the problems facing the country, including warlordism, an exploitative landlord system and foreign imperialism.⁵⁹ As I will discuss later, both Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought are just such an attempt to help establish a new social order for China by means of re-defining the 'ti' and 'yong' of 'Chinese culture', particularly Confucianism. Below, I explain the characteristics of the 'scientism' facing China in greater detail.

56 For details, see Joey Bonner, *Wang Kuo-wei: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

57 The original sentences are '凡一種文化值衰落之時，為此文化所化之人，必感苦痛，其表現此文化之程量愈宏，則其所受之苦痛亦愈甚；迨既達極深之度，殆非出於自殺無以求一己之心安而義盡也。' See Chen Yinke, *Chen Yinke shiji: fu Tang Yun shi cun* 陳寅恪詩集：附唐寅詩存 (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1993), pp. 10–16.

58 Lao Sze-kwang, *Zhongguo wenhua luxiang wenti de xin jiantao* 中國文化路向問題的新檢討 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1993), p. 89.

59 For details, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, note 2, pp. 301–303; Cheng Chung-ying, 'Confucianism: Twentieth Century', in Antonio S. Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, note 6, pp. 160–171; Chang Hao, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890–1911)* (California: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 6–8.

2.2.2 'Scientism' as a Western Challenge in Early Twentieth-Century China

The history of science in China can be traced back to as early as the fourth century BC.⁶⁰ Even China's encounter with Western science happened in the seventeenth century AD. From that time, Western science began to affect Confucian studies in different ways.⁶¹ During the times of Fang and Tang, science became much more popular among Chinese people, as reflected in the fact that Western scientific texts were widely translated into Chinese, institutes specifically for scientific education were set up in the country, and modern science eventually replaced Confucian classics in official examinations in 1905.⁶² Therefore, we cannot consider that Fang's and Tang's rejection of 'scientism' was due to their ignorance of science. As I will show later, their theories did not reject scientific investigation, but rather rejected 'scientism'.⁶³ To be more specific, they were to confirm the values of both scientific investigation and

60 Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China vol. 1 Introductory Orientations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 6.

61 Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611–1671), for example, employed the scientific knowledge he learned from the Jesuits in China, redefining the meaning of *gewu* 格物 or 'investigation of things' of the traditional Confucian theory. For details, see Yu Ying-shih, 'Confucianism and China's Encounter with the West in Historical Perspective', in *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. IV, no. 2 (2005): 203–216.

62 There are plenty of studies discussing how modern science was introduced into China and how it affected Chinese ways of life. For examples, see Wang Hui 汪暉, *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi* 現代中國思想的興起 vol. 2 part 2 (Beijing: San lian shu dian 三聯書店, 2004), pp. 1107–1124; David Wright, *Translating Science: The Transmission of Western Chemistry into Late Imperial China, 1840–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Laurence Schneider, *Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 21–91; Danian Hu, *China and Albert Einstein: the reception of the physicist and his theory in China 1917–1979* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 5–46; Benjamin A. Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Fan Fa-ti, *British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001).

63 As Chang Hao argues, 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism' is a reaction to 'scientism'. See his 'New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China', in Charlotte Furth ed., *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 276–302. Also see Liu Shu-hsien, 'Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical Review of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought', in Tu Wei-ming ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 92–111; Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國, *Bianzheng de xinglu* 辯證的行旅 (Taipei: Lixu wenhua, 2002), pp. 255–260.

'Chinese culture', and Confucianism in particular.⁶⁴ I argue that the aspects of Huayan thought which were used by Fang and Tang needed to help satisfy these two requirements. However, the key questions to consider here are what 'scientism' meant and to what kinds of 'scientism' they tried to respond. Only by understanding these questions can we answer the first research question of this study: why 'scientism' became an issue in twentieth-century China, though science had existed in the country for centuries.

The definition of 'scientism' differs amongst scholars. In this study, I summarize their findings as follow: 'scientism' is a belief that quantitative natural science is the only valuable part of human learning and the only source of truth. Based on this notion, subjects that do not belong to quantitative natural science should imitate the method and language of it, or be seen from a scientific perspective, which leads to a view that only what is measurable in terms of quantitative natural science is considered knowledge.⁶⁵

The first appearance of the term *kexue zhuyi* 科學主義, which is commonly translated as 'scientism', is uncertain, though 'the polemic on science and metaphysics' (Chi. *ke xuan dazhan* 科玄大戰) is commonly considered the main discussion of the issue in early twentieth-century China.⁶⁶ From the mid-nineteenth century, the West had gradually become a focus of admiration in the eyes of many Chinese people. However, the outbreak of the First World War (1914–1918) seriously challenged this admiration.⁶⁷ In his *Ouyou xinying lu* 歐遊心影錄 (*Reflection of the Trip to Europe*) written in 1919,⁶⁸ Liang Qichao criticized Western imperialism, arguing that Western culture was not as

64 Robert Cummings Neville, 'Contemporary Confucian Spirituality and Multiple Religious Identity', in Tu Wei-ming and Mary Evelyn Tucker ed., *Confucian Spirituality* vol. 2 (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 440–462.

65 For this summary, I refer to F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (New York: Free Press, 1952), pp. 15–16; Tom Sorell, *Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 1–3; Donald J. Munro, 'Against Scientism—For a Workable Ethics', *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 8 *Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu* 中國哲學與文化：第八輯—唐君毅與中國哲學研究 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2010), pp. 363–366.

66 D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 135–160; Yang Guorong, 'The Debate between Scientists and Metaphysicians in Early Twentieth Century: Its Theme and Significance', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 2, no. 1 (2002): 79–95.

67 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, note 2, pp. 509–510.

68 Liang Qichao, *Ouyou xinying lu jielu* 歐遊心影錄節錄 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1936).

superior as many Chinese people thought.⁶⁹ Although the visit of John Dewey (1859–1952) to China from 1919 to 1921 impressed many younger Chinese people, his promotion of pragmatism was criticized by many Chinese thinkers.⁷⁰ All showed that Western thinkers were no longer unchallengeable. Furthermore, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) blamed Western imperialism and militarism during his stay in China in the early 1920s, arguing that the West should learn from China about the ‘large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind’,⁷¹ which suggests that Western culture was itself not perfect and could even be considered to be in decline. More important, all these help show that ‘Chinese culture’ was not as inadequate as many Chinese thinkers had thought. On the contrary, ‘Chinese culture’ might help supplement the shortcomings of the West in the eyes of many Chinese thinkers. This point is important to our discussion in the following chapters.

In fact, some thinkers began to consider ‘scientism’ the main cause behind the apparent failure of Western culture. For instance, Liang Qichao stressed in his *Ouyou xinying lu* that it was the idea of the ‘omnipotence of science’ (Chi. *kexue wanneng* 科學萬能) that was causing the West to become over-materialistic.⁷² In 1923, a debate on ‘the polemic of science and metaphysics’ developed while Carsun Chang 張君勱 (Zhang Junmai, 1887–1969), a politician who studied in Germany and taught philosophy at Peking University, delivered a speech, arguing against the idea that science could solve all problems, including those concerning life, death and the soul. Instead of relying on science, Chang argued that Chinese people needed a ‘view of life’. Only in this way could the country successfully overcome the challenges that it had faced since the mid-nineteenth century. Chang’s view was attacked by Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 (1887–1936), a geologist trained at the University of Glasgow who argued that ‘the omnipotence of science, and its comprehensiveness, lies not in its subject matter, but in its method’,⁷³ implying that the scientific approach

69 Joseph R. Levenson, *Laing Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 199–204.

70 Jessica Ching-Sze Wang, *John Dewey in China: to Teach and to Learn* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp. 41–63. Lewis E. Hahn also argues that Thomé H. Fang would not be a follower of Dewey as he did not appreciate Dewey’s ‘scientific method’. See his *Enhancing Cultural Interflow between East & West: Collected Essays in Comparative Philosophy & Culture*, note 29, p. 126. For reasons, see Chapter 3.

71 Bertrand Russell, *The Problem of China* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922), p. 198.

72 Liang Qichao, *Ouyou xinying lu jielu*, note 68.

73 Charlotte Furth, *Ting Wen-chiang: Science and China’s New Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 111.

was applicable to all issues.⁷⁴ Although there were many figures involved and many articles published during the polemic,⁷⁵ the main theme of it was clear, which was the growing doubt about the applicability of science to the entire field of human values.⁷⁶

In the time of the 'New Cultural Movement', in fact, two kinds of 'scientism' could be identified, which were 'empirical scientism' represented by Hu Shi and 'materialistic scientism' represented by Chen Duxiu.⁷⁷ Generally speaking, 'empirical scientism' was based on the experimental tradition in Western physical science largely deriving from Francis Bacon (1561–1626). The core idea of this approach is that it is the concepts and methodology of the physical sciences which are to be applied in the studies of so-called 'unscientific' subjects such as ethics and history.⁷⁸ To a large extent, figures subscribing to the idea of 'empirical scientism' are also positivists, who insist that data derived from perception and cognition as well as logical and mathematical treatments exclusively form the sources of all knowledge. To those holding the idea of 'empirical scientism', value judgments are neither true nor false but merely expressions of emotion because they are not cognitive.⁷⁹ These ideas of 'empirical scientism' seriously threatened the status of Confucianism, as many of the latter's moral values were simply considered 'unscientific'. 'Materialistic scientism', on the other hand, is the belief that matter forms the ultimate reality of the universe. 'Materialistic scientism' assumes that all aspects of life belong to a natural order, following definite scientific laws. Therefore, all aspects of life

74 For more discussion, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, 'Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and After', in Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee ed., *An Intellectual History of Modern China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 97–141; D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950*, note 66; Yang Guorong, 'The Debate between Scienticists and Metaphysicians in Early Twentieth Century: Its Theme and Significance', note 66.

75 Literature about the debates among Chang, Ding and other figures are recorded in *Kexue yu renshengguan* 科學與人生觀 (Taipei: Wenxue chubanshe 問學出版社, 1977).

76 Wang Hui, 'Discursive Community and the Genealogy of Scientific Categories', in Madeleine Yue Dong and Joshua L. Goldstein ed., *Everyday Modernity in China* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 80–120.

77 D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950*, note 66, pp. 24–30. Hua Shiping also mentions 'technological determinism', which is a kind of 'materialistic scientism' according to Kwok's classification. See Hua Shiping, 'Scientism and Humanism', in Antonio S. Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, note 6, pp. 663–669.

78 See Tom Sorell, *Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science*, note 65, p. 9.

79 Hua Shiping, *Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China (1978–1989)* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 17–18.

are knowable by methods of science.⁸⁰ As 'materialistic scientism' is axiomatic and monistic, it can form a platform for the development of state socialism, in which only one source of power is permitted.⁸¹ To some extent, there became a close relationship between the idea of 'materialistic scientism' and the subsequent twentieth-century Chinese political environment, especially the development of Marxism in China.

As a main figure of 'scientism' in early twentieth-century China, Hu Shi had long been the target for hatred and contempt among modern Confucian thinkers. Thomé H. Fang's criticism that Hu's view of Chinese culture was 'nonsense' (Chi. *hushuo* 胡說) was very serious.⁸² Tang Junyi's observation that Hu enjoyed a great reputation in Chinese academia mainly because of the Chinese tradition of 'respecting elders' (Chi. *jinglao* 敬老) was also very uncompromising. During a public lecture in 1958 in Taiwan, Hu Shi, in the presence of Mou Zongsan, said openly that Mou was his student as Hu had taught Mou philosophy at Peking University. Mou's immediate reply, 'I was not your student' made the atmosphere extremely tense. In my view, Xu Fuguan's suggestion that Hu's 'scientific method' rejected the value of 'Chinese culture' helps explain the attitude of these modern Confucian thinkers towards him.⁸³

The impact of 'scientism' on Confucianism was regarded as potentially fatal, which can be partly illustrated by the following. As Mou Zongsan recollected, Xiong Shili and Fung Yu-lan were once discussing the question of the existence of the mind, which is generally considered to be the fundamental element of Confucianism.⁸⁴ On this occasion, Fung challenged Xiong, saying that the existence of the mind and its function of moral consideration were merely theoretical presumptions of Confucianism. Xiong then replied that they were not theoretical presumptions, but the real 'manifestation' (Chi. *chengxian* 呈現) of the life of humanity. Mou concluded, therefore, that Fung viewed the issue of the mind from a cognitive perspective and thus failed to comprehend the mind of the Confucian tradition.⁸⁵

80 See D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950*, note 66, pp. 24–26.

81 See Hua Shiping, 'Scientism and Humanism', note 77.

82 For Fang's attitude towards Hu Shi, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., *Fang Dongmei xian-sheng de zhexue dianxing* 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2007), pp. 72–76.

83 For the discussion about Tang, Mou and Xu in this paragraph, see Chak Chi-shing, 'Wenhua jijin zhuyi vs. wenhua baoshou zhuyi: Hu Shi yu gangtai xin rujia', note 54.

84 Roger T. Ames, 'Confucianism: Confucius (Kongzi, K'ung Tzu)', note 31.

85 Mou Zongsan, *Shengming de xuewen* 生命的學問 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 2000), p. 136. For more discussion, see Liu Shu-hsien, 'Confucianism as World Philosophy:

In fact, Fung and Xiong represented two approaches to understanding Confucianism which, as Chan Wing-tsit notes, can be classified as the 'New Rationalistic Confucianism' and the 'New Idealistic Confucianism' respectively.⁸⁶ Here I do not intend to discuss these approaches in detail, but would point out that many Confucian ideas are difficult to measure from a scientific perspective. As Tang Junyi argued, with the notion of the 'omnipotence of science', humanity is forced to employ a scientific perspective to view the world. As a result, both humanity and the natural environment are considered a type of material and even objects to be conquered. This materialism, Tang claimed, was the cause of imperialism and Marxism, in which such human values as morality, aesthetics and religion are denied.⁸⁷ In brief, 'scientism' inclines to negate the value of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, Chinese traditions which are considered kinds of humanism, involving the issues of morality, aesthetics and religion.⁸⁸ How Chinese thinkers responded to the challenge of 'scientism' was either to abandon traditional value systems or to find ways to defend them, representing exactly two of the main foci of academia in the time of Fang and Tang.

2.2.3 *Searching for New Sources for Cultural Transformation as the Chinese Response*

In early twentieth-century China, thinkers could be broadly divided into two groups, which, as Edmund S. K. Fung defines, were those demanding a total 'Westernization' and those asking for a protection or re-construction of Chinese culture.⁸⁹ Although the latter group is often regarded as conservative,⁹⁰ almost all figures of the period sought change. The main difference between them

A Response to Neville's Boston Confucianism from a Neo-Confucian Perspective', *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* vol. 40, nos. 1–2 (2003): 59–73.

86 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, pp. 751–772.

87 Tang Junyi, *RJZC*, note 16, pp. 39–52.

88 Julia Ching, *Chinese Religions* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), pp. 51–52. For more discussion, see W. H. Werkmeister, 'Scientism and the Problem of Man', in Charles A. Moore ed., *Philosophy and Culture East and West: East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), pp. 135–155.

89 Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 27–95.

90 Charlotte Furth, 'Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism', in Charlotte Furth ed., *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China*, note 63, pp. 22–53; Chang Hao, 'New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China', note 63; Edmund S. K. Fung, *ibid.*

was the degree of change. In this sense, considering the latter group conservative appears inappropriate.⁹¹ In this study, I describe them as ‘pro-traditional’ and it is to this group that Fang and Tang belonged. Following this clarification, I identify the questions the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers faced as below: what should be changed in ‘Chinese culture’ in order to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’? How was this change to be achieved?⁹² Certainly, there were no simple answers to these questions, but absorbing new ideas from the West was obviously an option.⁹³

Despite the prevalence of Western thought in early twentieth-century China, its influence on Chinese thinkers should not be overestimated, particularly for those categorized as ‘pro-traditional’. It is because, first and practically, Western thought was no longer unchallengeable in the eyes of many Chinese thinkers, as I have earlier explained. Therefore, even though Western thought was absorbed by Chinese thinkers at that time, I argue that the adoption of it was selective.⁹⁴ Overemphasizing the role of Western thought amongst Chinese thinkers may thus neglect the latter’s autonomy. Second and theoretically, if Western influence played the sole essential role in the thought of the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers, the distinction between these thinkers and those seeking total ‘Westernization’ would become unclear, as both of them employed Western thought as the foundation of their theories. In this sense, it is almost impossible to classify any thinkers as ‘pro-traditional’. Unfortunately, this point seems to be overlooked by many studies. As a result, in many cases, Western influence rather than traditional Chinese thought has been the focus of studies concerning those I regard as the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers.⁹⁵ This

91 Yu Ying-shih 余英時, *Youji fengchui shuishang lin: Qian Mu yu xiandai Zhongguo xueshu* 猶記風吹水上鱗：錢穆與現代中國學術 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 1991), pp. 199–242.

92 For more discussion, see Thomas A. Metzger, ‘Limited Distrust of Reason as a Prerequisite of Cultural Convergence: Weighing Professor Lao Sze-kwang’s Concept of the Divergence between “the Confucian Intellectual Tradition” and “Modern Culture”, *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 3 *Jingdian quanshi zhi dingxiang* 中國哲學與文化：第三輯—經典詮釋之定向 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2008), pp. 22–75.

93 Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 205–209.

94 I will further discuss this point in the following paragraphs.

95 For example, see Alexander V. Lomanov, ‘Western Impacts on Chinese Postconfucianism’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 21, no. 1 (1994): 93–108; Zhao Dezhi 趙德志, *Xiandai xin rujia yu xifang zhexue* 現代新儒家與西方哲學 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe 遼寧大學出版社, 1994).

causes a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the so-called 'Contemporary Neo-Confucians' are often considered conservative or, as I argue, 'pro-traditional'. On the other hand, it is their appropriations of Western thought, which was definitely a new source of ideas for these thinkers, that is the focus of many studies.

For instance, Mou Zongsan's appropriation of Western philosophical ideas is apparent. As he argued, in the Western tradition, only Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) successfully suggested a kind of metaphysics of morals, which Mou saw as based on the analysis of the mind-heart of human beings.⁹⁶ According to Mou, Kant's idea was similar to Confucianism in this sense, and, to go a step further, he even considered that Kant's philosophy could be a bridge between Western philosophy and Chinese thought, and Confucianism in particular.⁹⁷ Since he employed Kant's ideas on a very large scale, Mou has been criticized for misinterpreting both the thought of Kant and of Confucianism.⁹⁸ His works have also been described as like 'German philosophy in Chinese'.⁹⁹ All this seems to make clear the impact of Western philosophical ideas on the 'pro-traditional' thinkers.

Although Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi did not use Western ideas as widely as Mou did, Western influence on their writings can still be seen. Indeed, both Fang and Tang were considered similar to certain European philosophers. In consideration of his emphasis on the primacy of spirit, for instance, Tang was seen as a 'Hegelian', a follower of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).¹⁰⁰ The place of Hegel's dialectic in Tang's thought is not only thoroughly studied,¹⁰¹ but the idea that Tang was hugely affected

96 John H. Berthrong, *Transformations of the Confucian Way* (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 187–191; Roger T. Ames, 'New Confucianism: A Native Response to Western Philosophy', in Hua Shiping ed., *Chinese Political Culture 1989–2000* (New York and London: An East Gate Book, 2001), pp. 70–99.

97 See his *Yuan shan lun* 圓善論 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1996).

98 For discussion, see Guo Qiyong, 'Mou Zongsan's view of interpreting Confucianism by "moral autonomy"', *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* vol. 2, no. 3 (2007): 345–362.

99 Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, 'Review of T. A. Metzger's *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*', in *Philosophy East and West* vol. 28, no. 4 (1978): 501.

100 O. Brière, *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy 1898–1950* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 75. Also see Nicholas Bunnin, 'Tang Junyi (T'ang Chun-i)', in Stuart Brown, Diané Collinson and Robert Wilkinson ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-century Philosophers* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 768.

101 Lai Xianzong 賴賢宗, *Tiyong yu xinxing: dangdai xin rujia zhexue xin lun* 體用與心性：當代新儒家哲學新論 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 2001),

by Hegel is also recognized by many of Tang's disciples.¹⁰² To a large extent, it explains why a serious study of Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought rather than his use of Hegel's philosophy is so important, as it may challenge a key assumption in the field of Chinese philosophical study. Similarly, since Fang strongly favoured 'comprehensiveness', a point I will discuss in detail in the next chapter, his thought is widely viewed as a kind of organic philosophy, like that of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947).¹⁰³ From these examples which discussed Chinese thought using a comparative method,¹⁰⁴ considering that Western ideas helped make the 'creative transformation' of modern Chinese thought appears perfectly reasonable.¹⁰⁵ The question is, how important were Western ideas in this process of 'creative transformation'?

As I suggested earlier, the influence of Western philosophy on the 'pro-traditional' thinkers should not be overestimated. For example, Mou's using Kant's philosophy not only constructs a bridge between Western philosophy and Confucianism, but also places Confucianism in a superior position to Kant's philosophy, as he argued that Confucianism was the only intellectual tradition that successfully constructed a metaphysics of morals and comprehended the state of 'Noumena' via intellectual intuition.¹⁰⁶ In this sense, Confucianism is the essence of Mou's thought. The case of Tang employing Hegel's philosophy

pp. 45–81; Peng Wenben 彭文本, 'Tang Junyi lun "geti de ziwo" 唐君毅論「個體的自我」', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 36, no. 8 (2009): 77–100; Stephan Schmidt, 'Humanity as Trans-Individuality: Tang Junyi's (1909–1978) Philosophy of *Renwen* Humanism', in Oliver Kozlarek, Jörn Rüsen & Ernst Wolff ed., *Shaping a Humane World: Civilisations, Axial Times, Modernities, Humanisms* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012), pp. 257–280.

102 Lao Sze-kwang, 'Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai 從唐君毅中國哲學的取向看中國哲學的未來', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 8 *Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu*, note 65, pp. 15–26.

103 Yu Yin-Hsien, 'Two Chinese Philosophers and Whitehead Encountered', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 32, no. 2 (2005): 239–255.

104 Roger T. Ames, Wen Haiming 溫海明 trans., *Heerbutong: Zhong xi zhexue de huitong* 和而不同：中西哲學的會通 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009), preface of first edition, p. 4; Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011), pp. 3–4.

105 For more discussion, see Lin Yu-sheng, 'Reflections on the "Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition"', in Karl-Heinz Pohl ed., *Chinese Thought in a Global Context: A Dialogue between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 73–114.

106 Nicholas Bunnin, 'God's Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 35, no. 4 (2008): 613–624.

is somewhat similar. Although Tang admitted that he was affected by Hegel,¹⁰⁷ he stressed his independence as follows:

I respect and love the spirit of Western philosophers. However, I cannot prostrate myself before it nor worship it. Even if there were a rebirth of Plato and Hegel, I could not admire them sincerely. I am not willing to follow them with my life and spirit. For Confucius, Buddha and some Chinese and Indian philosophers, however, I am willing to do that.¹⁰⁸

Tang's own words here suggest that, at least for him, the influence of Western philosophy on the development of his thought may not be as great as many scholars have believed.

At the very beginning of this study, I mentioned that the objective of Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought, together with other thinkers' appropriations of different ancient Chinese thought, is to 'go back to the origin and develop new elements' or *fanben kaixin* in Chinese. I also observed that the ideas of 'ti' and 'yong' run through almost all modern Chinese thought. As He Lin argues, Chinese thinkers' appropriations of Western thought in their own theories are 'to enrich "ti" with "ti" and to complement "yong" with "yong"'.¹⁰⁹ Take Mou's appropriation of Kant's ideas as an example. He tried to combine Kant's philosophy with Confucianism, arguing that the moral values suggested by Confucianism were not assertion but had 'metaphysical'

107 Tang Junyi, *Rensheng zhi tiyan* 人生之體驗 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), pp. 18–19.

108 The original Chinese is '我對西洋哲人的精神，景仰之、心愛之，而不能頂禮之、膜拜之。雖柏拉圖黑格耳復生，我亦不能心悅誠服之，不願傾吾之生命精神與之。然吾於孔子釋迦以及若干中、印哲人則願。' See Tang, *ibid.*, p. 27. In a letter to Xu Fuguan, in fact, Tang explicitly stated why he could not admire Hegel sincerely. He acknowledged admiring the inclusiveness of Hegel's philosophy, but he did not admire the dominating tendencies of Hegelianism. See Tang Junyi, *Shujian* 書簡 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990), p. 77. As I will discuss in chapters 4 and 5, Tang considered that both Huayan thought and Confucianism are inclusive but not dominant. This is important in order to understand why he appropriated Huayan thought to respond to the challenge of 'scientism'.

109 Song Zhiming 宋志明 ed., *Rujia sixing de xin kaizhan: He Lin xin ruxue lunzhu jiyao* 儒家思想的新開展：賀麟新儒學論著輯要 vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dian-shi chubanshe 中國廣播電視出版社, 1995), pp. 4–10. For similar ideas, see Robert Cummings Neville, 'Confucianism as a World Philosophy: Presidential Address for the 8th International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Beijing 1993', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (1994): 5–25.

reasons, which Mou summarised as ‘moral metaphysics’. To Mou, Confucianism was not outdated but could be responsive to modern subjects, such as developing ‘science’ and ‘democracy’. In my opinion, Mou’s appropriation of Kant’s ideas is a fine example of ‘enriching “*ti*” with “*ti*” and complementing “*yong*” with “*yong*”’. However, I consider that this enrichment of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ can be achieved by means of re-discovering ancient Chinese thought, rather than using Western philosophy, and this is exactly what many Chinese thinkers did in the early twentieth century.

As I mentioned earlier, there are many varied of intellectual traditions in Chinese history and Confucianism was only one of them. As the West became seen as no longer the only object of modern Chinese learning, these ancient intellectual traditions began to be seen as another source of ideas for cultural transformation. In the face of the trend to revolution, for example, Liang Qichao employed the ideas of Mohism 墨家, which flourished along with Confucianism in the Spring and Autumn Period (771BC–403BC) and the Warring States Period (403BC–221BC), to support his anti-revolutionary ideas.¹¹⁰ As Li Yushu 李漁叔 (1905–1972) notes, a main reason for early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers to stress Mohism was because they viewed the thought as ‘scientific’ and ‘logical’,¹¹¹ two elements the Chinese people crucially needed at the time under the challenge of ‘scientism’. In consideration of the benefit of the rule of law as observed in the West, Chen Lie 陳烈 (?–?), together with other famous thinkers like Xie Wuliang 謝無量 (1884–1964), emphasised the function of Legalism 法家, an intellectual tradition prevailing in the late Warring States Period, considering its spirit equivalent to the idea of the rule of law.¹¹² Since there were a number of thinkers discussing Legalism in the early twentieth century, the term ‘Neo-Legalism’ has even been introduced recently, based on the argument that there was a ‘school’ at that time.¹¹³ Li Zongwu 李宗吾 (1879–1943) also published his well-known work *Hou hei xue* 厚黑學 (*Thick Black Theory*) in 1911, claiming that Chinese people should learn to have

110 Tang Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: the Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (California: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 152–155.

111 Li Yushu, *Mozi jinzhu jinyi* 墨子今註今譯 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe 天津古籍出版社, 1988), pp. 1–2. For more discussion, see Ouyang Zhesheng 歐陽哲生, *Wusi yundong de lishi quanshi* 五四運動的歷史詮釋 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2012), pp. 77–78.

112 Chen Lie, *Fajia zhengzhi zhaxue* 法家政治哲學 (Shanghai: Huatong shuju 華通書局, 1929), author preface.

113 Yu Zhong 喻中, ‘Xian yin zhijian: bainianlai de xin fajia sichao 顯隱之間：百年來的新法家思潮’, in *Dushu* 讀書 (Aug 2013): 40–49.

a thick hide and dark mind in order to be more powerful and more cunning.¹¹⁴ As Li admitted, his idea is similar to Legalism.¹¹⁵ I argue that his theory is also a combination of the idea of *Guiguzi* 鬼谷子, a classic of the School of Diplomacy 縱橫家, which is notorious for overlooking moral considerations but focusing on persuading and pleasing superiors. In my view, all these appropriations of ancient intellectual traditions were responses to the situation facing China, as the country urgently needed to become more practical, scientific, wealthy and powerful.¹¹⁶ In brief, the nature of the works of these thinkers can be seen as remoulding the past to respond to current issues.¹¹⁷

Undeniably, the scope of the appropriations of ancient Chinese thought identified above was somewhat limited. In terms of range, the appropriations of Buddhist ideas are much more significant. I argue that a key reason for this is that the theories of Mohism and Legalism are, to differing extents, incompatible with Confucianism.¹¹⁸ To use the language of *'ti'* and *'yong'*, it means there is a contradiction between the *'ti'* of Confucianism and that of Mohism or Legalism. In this sense, thinkers insisted the *'ti'* of Confucianism should not employ the function or *'yong'* of Mohism or Legalism. For Buddhism, however, Confucian thinkers seem to find ways to communicate the *'ti'* of both. And it is in this context that Confucian thinkers appropriated different Buddhist ideas to develop their thought.

114 Li Zongwu, *Hou hei xue* (Taipei: Chuanwen wenhua 傳文文化, 1994). Interestingly, the preface of the book was written by Tang Difeng 唐廸風, a Confucian scholar and father of Tang Junyi.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

116 For more details, see Wang Ermin 王爾敏, *Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun* 中國近代思想史論 (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe 華世出版社, 1978), pp. 527–529.

117 Wm. Theodore de Bary, 'New Directions in Chinese Philosophy—Opening Speech for the Conference Celebrating the Centenary of Tang Junyi', *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 8 *Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu*, note 65, pp. 7–14.

118 For instance, the 'universal love' or *jian ai* 兼愛 of Mohism is widely considered incompatible with the 'love with distinctions' 愛有等差 of Confucianism. See David B. Wong, 'Universalism versus Love with Distinctions: An Ancient Debate Revived', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 16, nos. 3–4 (1989): 251–272. For more discussion about the theoretical conflict between Confucianism and Mohism, see Shun Kwong-loi, 'Mencius' Criticism of Mohism: An Analysis of Meng Tzu 3A:5', *Philosophy East and West* vol. 41, no. 2 (1991): 203–214. For the case of Confucianism and Legalism, see Cheng Chung-Ying, 'Legalism versus Confucianism: A Philosophical Appraisal', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 8, no. 3 (1981): 271–302.

2.3 Confucian Thinkers' Appropriations of Buddhist Thought— An Overview

Buddhist study so flourished in early twentieth-century China that it was, in Holmes Welch's words, a 'Buddhist revival'.¹¹⁹ In order fully to comprehend the influence of Buddhism at this time, one should not focus solely on the religion's thinkers and organizations but also acknowledge the studies of contemporary Confucian thinkers. This is because, to a large extent, the ideas of Confucian thinkers helped transform the development of modern Buddhism.

As Zhang Mantao 張曼濤 (1933–1981) notes,¹²⁰ Buddhist study in early twentieth-century China could be broadly divided into two groups: studies within Buddhism by Buddhist monks and scholars themselves, and studies by those outside the religion. For the former, three sub-groups can be further identified. First were those who aimed at saving the religion and the country through various reforms of Buddhism. Second were those who tried to revive the religion by means of studying particular Buddhist ideas and texts. Third were those who insisted on traditional Buddhist practice without significant amendments. As Zhang argues, Taixu,¹²¹ Ouyang Jian 歐陽漸 (1871–1943)¹²² and Yinguang 印光 (1862–1940) were the representatives of these three different sub-groups. Certainly, the distinction between the sub-groups is not rigid, as even Taixu stressed the study of particular Buddhist ideas such as those in Consciousness-Only, and there were also some amendments of Buddhist practice in Yinguang.¹²³ As I will discuss later, the Huayan School in early twentieth-century China appeared to follow traditional Huayan study and practice with very limited changes. In this sense, Fang's and Tang's appropriations of

119 Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Also see Li Xiangping 李向平, *Jiushi yu jiaxin: Zhongguo jindai fojiao fuxing sichao yanjiu* 救世與救心：中國近代佛教復興思潮研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1993).

120 Zhang Mantao, 'Dangdai zhongguo de fojiao sixiang' 當代中國的佛教思想, *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 6, no. 5 (1979): 25–29.

121 For the life and thought of Taixu, see Don. A. Pittman, *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

122 For reference, see Eyal Aviv, *Differentiating the Pearl from the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871–1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism* (unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 2008).

123 Daniel B. Stevenson, 'Pure Land Buddhist Worship and Meditation in China', in Donald S. Lopez Jr. ed., *Buddhism in Practice* (New Jersey and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 271–291.

the ideas of this Buddhist tradition are 'revolutionary' when compared with their Huayan contemporaries.

In terms of studies by non-Buddhists, Zhang also divides them into three further sub-groups, including those using a historical approach to study Buddhism like Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (1893–1964),¹²⁴ those integrating scientific knowledge with Buddhist thought like Wang Xiaoxu 王小徐 (1875–1948),¹²⁵ and those employing Buddhist ideas to develop their own thought. For this final sub-group, Zhang further classifies them as those with no strong religious position, such as Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–1898),¹²⁶ and those with clear Confucian standpoints like Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili.

This classification by Zhang not only provides us with a general picture of Buddhism in twentieth-century China, but also helps locate the contribution of Fang and Tang amongst these different kinds of Buddhist study. As I will show, Confucian thinkers who appropriated Buddhist ideas at that time did not aim at reviving any particular Buddhist school at all. Their interest was not to save Buddhism and so most of them did not attempt to integrate scientific knowledge with Buddhist ideas in order to demonstrate that Buddhism does not contradict science. Apart from Liang Shuming, no Confucian thinkers I will discuss followed Buddhist practice. Historical accuracy was not their concern as they did not approach Buddhist ideas from a historical perspective. Rather, as I previously mentioned, the goal of their appropriations of Buddhist ideas was to enrich the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of 'Chinese culture', particularly Confucianism, so that the latter could be more responsive to the challenges posed by 'scientism'.

Amongst those Confucian thinkers who used Buddhist ideas, Liang Shuming was probably the most influential during his own lifetime. Having been considered a Confucian thinker for a long time,¹²⁷ Liang confirmed in an interview in the late twentieth century that both Confucianism and Buddhism played a

124 For reference, see Thierry Meynard, 'Introducing Buddhism as Philosophy: The Cases of Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and Tang Yongtong', in John Makeham ed., *Learning to Emulate the Wise: the Genesis of Chinese philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2012), pp. 187–216.

125 Erik J. Hammerstrom, 'Science and Buddhist Modernism in Early 20th Century China: The Life and Works of Wang Xiaoxu', *Journal of Chinese Religions* vol. 39 (2011): 1–32.

126 For reference, see Chan Sin-wai, *Buddhism in Late Ch'ing Political Thought* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1985), pp. 53–75; Ip Hung-yok, 'The Power of Interconnectivity: Tan Sitong's Invention of Historical Agency in Late Qing China', *Journal of Global Buddhism* vol. 10 (2009): 323–374.

127 See Guy S. Alitto, *The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity* (California: University of California Press, 1979).

vital role in his thought. To more fully understand him, therefore, both intellectual traditions should be used.¹²⁸ In his famous *Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue* 東西文化及其哲學 (*Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies*) published in 1922,¹²⁹ Liang considered that Western culture was so aggressive that it led to a conquest of nature and even of peoples. Indian culture, mainly *Hinayāna* Buddhism, however, was viewed as too regressive, putting the emphasis on death rather than life. In Liang's view, 'Chinese culture', and Confucianism in particular, sat between Western and Indian cultures. Liang also argued that all Western, Indian and Chinese cultures had their own strengths and weaknesses. Chinese people should not choose Indian culture at a time when China was suffering from both civil unrest and foreign challenge. On the other hand, the country should avoid blindly following the West, as the outbreak of the First World War clearly showed there were limitations in Western culture. In short, 'Chinese culture' was to be preferred.¹³⁰

While Liang's attitude toward various cultures seems to be at the core of his thought, his attitude toward Buddhist ideas is more relevant to this study. As I discussed earlier, 'scientism' had been the main challenge facing Chinese thinkers since the early twentieth century. Many scholars have noted that Liang valued the concept of Consciousness-Only particularly, considering its method rational and scientific, and capable of competing with Western philosophy.¹³¹ Linking Liang's attitude towards Consciousness-Only and the challenge of 'scientism' in his time together, I argue that Liang's adoption of Buddhist ideas was not restricted to Buddhism's overall analysis of life and death, but included its potential to respond to 'scientism'. That is to say, Liang considered that 'science' and a philosophy of life are not necessarily exclusive to each other. This point not only provides an alternative to the positions of Carsun Chang and Ding Wenjiang, but also helps sharpen our understanding of Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan, as they too tried to confirm both the value of science and of traditional Chinese thought. In fact, in my view, Liang's confirmation of the values of different cultures also used the

128 Wang Zongyu, 'Confucianist or Buddhist? An Interview with Liang Shuming', note 28.

129 Liang Shuming, *Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue* (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1989).

130 For more discussion, see Lin Anwu, 'Liang Shuming and his theory of the Reappearance of Three Cultural Periods', *Contemporary Chinese Thought* vol. 40, no. 3 (2009): 16–38.

131 Thierry Meynard, *The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 81–103; John J. Hanafin, 'The "Last Buddhist": The Philosophy of Liang Shuming', in John Makeham ed., *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 187–218.

Buddhist idea of doctrinal classification (Chi. *panjiao* 判教) implicitly, as he thought that different ideas could be applicable in various periods, a point I will return to in section 2.4.3.

The importance of Liang's ideas to this study will become clearer if we relate them to the discussion of '*ti*' and '*yong*'. Although Liang himself did not use these terms, his ideas actually touch on these concepts. Liang argued that the characteristics of various cultures were determined by the spirit of their people.¹³² Following this idea, Yang Rubin points out that Liang viewed human spirit as '*ti*' while culture is its '*yong*'.¹³³ In this sense, people with Chinese spirit could not develop Western culture, and vice versa. In other words, Chinese '*ti*' could not sustain Western '*yong*'. The above implies that Liang rejects Zhang Zhidong's idea of 'Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications'. Although the concept of Consciousness-Only potentially helped Liang to respond to the challenge of 'scientism', he did not use it to re-define the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of 'Chinese culture'. In short, Liang considered 'Chinese culture' preferable, although it failed fully to respond to the challenge it faced. Here we see a paradox, in that Liang's approach was that 'Chinese culture' might not survive even though it was considered preferable. In my view, this is exactly the question other Confucian thinkers in Liang's times needed to consider.

Xiong Shili is another Confucian thinker whose thought was affected by Buddhist ideas. Having studied the concepts associated with Consciousness-Only under the famous Buddhist scholar Ouyang Jian, Xiong later transferred his allegiance to Confucianism, arguing that only the ideas of *Yi Jing* or *Book of Changes* successfully developed a kind of ontology with '*ti*' and '*yong*', which could be responsive to the challenges then facing China.

In his *Xin weishi lun* 新唯識論 (*New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only*) published in 1932,¹³⁴ Xiong complained that Buddhism denies the essence of the universe and that Consciousness-Only regards *ālayavijñāna* as the ultimate self of the human being.¹³⁵ According to Xiong, the Buddhist idea of 'emptiness' only developed a kind of 'dead' body or '*ti*', which fails to sustain any functions or '*yong*'. This idea fits with the second principle of '*ti*' and '*yong*' which I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, namely that the two concepts are

132 Liang Shuming, *Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue*, note 129, pp. 150–152.

133 See Yang Rubin, 'Jinxiandai rujia sixiangshi shang de tiyonglun', note 4.

134 Xiong Shili, *Xin weishi lun* (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju 中華書局, 1985).

135 For the idea of *ālayavijñāna*, see below.

not separate from each other.¹³⁶ For Xiong, in order to sustain different functions or 'yong', the 'ti' of humanity has to be infinite. In Xiong's view, this infinite 'ti' is expressed in *Yi Jing*'s ideas of 'xi' 翕 and 'pi' 闢, which imply 'closing' and 'opening' respectively. As Chan Wing-tsit argues, 'closing' means the 'tendency to integrate' and 'opening' suggests the 'tendency to maintain', and both consist of 'a process of unceasing production and reproduction'.¹³⁷ Xiong used this idea from *Yi Jing*, insisting that the main characteristic of human minds is 'changing'. Therefore, in the face of the different challenges facing China, the Chinese should return to the mind, re-discovering its aspect of 'openness' and thus finding solutions to these problems.¹³⁸ Although Xiong's understanding of Consciousness-Only was widely criticized by the Buddhist scholars and monks of his time,¹³⁹ in this study, I argue that the focus is not the accuracy of his interpretation of Consciousness-Only, but his suggestion that the Chinese people should 'go back to the origin and develop new elements', though the 'origin' here does not mean 'Chinese culture' but rather the human mind.¹⁴⁰

To Xiong, all the cultures and achievements of humanity are developed using the mind, and science is no exception to this. However, scientific knowledge is a kind of 'worldly truth' (Skt. *saṃvṛti-satya*; Chi. *sudi* 俗諦) and its effectiveness is restricted to the empirical and physical worlds. The knowledge of the mind, according to Xiong, belongs to 'supreme truth' (Skt. *paramārtha-satya*; Chi. *zhendi* 真諦). In this sense, there is no contradiction between scientific knowledge and the knowledge of the mind since they belong to different levels of truth. Together with the ideas of 'closing' and 'opening' identified above, Xiong's argument becomes clearer: the mind is always in a process of development and never a fixed or unchanging entity. Since human culture develops from the mind, the former must be dynamic. The Western challenge is thus simply a kind of stimulus to China, which pushes it to improve its culture. In short, learning from others is a natural process. This idea of Xiong, on the one

136 For more discussion, see Ran Yunhua 冉雲華, *Cong Yindu Fojiao dao Zhongguo Fojiao* 從印度佛教到中國佛教 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1995), pp. 263–276; Ng Yu-kwan, 'Xiong Shili's Metaphysical Theory about the Non-Separability of Substance and Function', in John Makeham ed., *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*, note 131, pp. 219–251.

137 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, p. 763.

138 Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, *Xiong Shili yu Zhongguo chuantong wenhua* 熊十力與中國傳統文化 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu 天地圖書, 1988), pp. 52–61.

139 For the debate between Xiong and his opponents, see Lin Anwu 林安梧 ed., *Xiandai ru fo zhi zheng* 現代儒佛之爭 (Taipei: Mingwen shuju 明文書局, 1990).

140 Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing* 空性與現代性 (Taipei: Lixu wenhua 立緒文化, 1999), pp. 72–84.

hand, answers those rejecting the idea that China should learn from the West. On the other hand, it suggests that Confucianism should not be abandoned as it is valuable at the level of 'supreme truth'.¹⁴¹ In principle, Xiong reminds us of the flexibility of the mind and its significance in responding to the Western challenge, though he does not indicate what the Chinese should learn from the West and what of 'Chinese culture' should be retained.¹⁴² In my view, this is a point that Fang and Tang tried to answer, as I will discuss in detail in the following chapters.

Following Xiong, Mou Zongsan suggested that there are two levels of knowledge: those from 'sensible intuition' (Chi. *ganxing de zhijue* 感性的直覺) and those from 'intellectual intuition' (Chi. *zhi de zhijue* 智的直覺) respectively. According to Mou, the knowledge stemming from the former is 'phenomenal' (Chi. *xianxiang* 現象), while the knowledge from the latter is 'of the thing itself' (Chi. *wuzishen* 物自身). Apparently, this distinction of Mou's is inspired by Kant's philosophy, which is commonly considered the building block of Mou's thought.¹⁴³ However, Kant believed that 'the thing itself' could not be known by humans. Mou, instead, argued that it is knowable.¹⁴⁴ And this brings us to his understanding of the characteristics of Chinese thought, including those of Tiantai 天台 thought.

In his autobiography *Wushi zishu* 五十自述 (*Self-introduction at Fifty*), Mou recollected that in the late 1920s, 'idealism' (Chi. *weixinlun* 唯心論) was seriously attacked by young people at a time when the status of human beings was solely determined by financial situation and social class. Mou emphasised that these 'inhuman' (Chi. *feiren* 非人) criteria made him uncomfortable, as they opposed the traditional values and faith of his youth. During this period, the arguments deriving from the 'polemic on science and metaphysics' particularly attracted him.¹⁴⁵ In Mou's view, scientific knowledge belonged to the field of 'phenomena', which applies to the empirical and physical world. However, obtaining this kind of knowledge cannot be separated from humanity. In this regard, the understanding of humanity becomes more important.

141 See Yang Rubin, 'Jinxiandai rujia sixiangshi shang de tiyonglun', note 4.

142 For more discussion, see Chak Chi-shing, *The contemporary Neo-Confucian rehabilitation: Xiong Shili and his moral metaphysics* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1990), pp. 323–366.

143 For Mou's appropriations of Kant's philosophy, see Serina N. Chan, *The Thought of Mou Zongsan* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), chapters 4 to 6.

144 Sébastien Billioud, *Thinking through Confucian Modernity: a Study of Mou Zongsan's Moral Metaphysics* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 96–108.

145 Mou Zongsan, *Wushi zishu* (Taipei: Ehu chubanshe 鵝湖出版社, 2000), pp. 28–35.

To Mou, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism all contribute to human understanding, which he called 'intellectual intuition'. In order to develop scientific knowledge, Chinese people should temporarily stop focusing on such 'intellectual intuition' but concentrate on the world of 'phenomena'. This comprises his famous although controversial idea of 'self-negation of innate moral consciousness' (Chi. *liangzhi zhi kanxian* 良知之坎陷), which attempts to explain the co-existence of scientific knowledge and traditional Chinese thought, as well as putting the latter in a superior position from both an ontological and an axiological point of view.¹⁴⁶

Amongst those intellectual traditions which contributed to building up 'intellectual intuition', Mou considered Tiantai thought the most important within the Buddhist tradition. According to Mou, the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as suggested by Consciousness-Only failed to construct a 'tī', not to mention 'yong'. The pure mind of Huayan thought, an idea I will discuss later, tends to view the mind as an entity, which appears to contradict the Buddhist idea of 'emptiness'. In Mou's view, the mind suggested by Tiantai succeeds in weakening its solid image and therefore raises little controversy.¹⁴⁷ More important, Mou explicitly used Tiantai's theory of doctrinal classification to harmonize different seemingly controversial theories within Buddhism.¹⁴⁸ As Lin Chen-kuo argues, Mou's harmonization of various Buddhist theories helps make 'Buddhism' a coherent unity so that he could compare it with 'Confucianism', leading to the conclusion that it is 'Confucianism' and not 'Buddhism' which accomplishes the '*Summum Bonum*' (Eng. the Highest Good; Chi. *yuan shan* 圓善).¹⁴⁹ In this sense, therefore, arguing that Tiantai thought helps construct Mou's theory of Confucianism is reasonable, as the former constructs a bridge for Mou to assess the two intellectual traditions, and ultimately consider 'Confucianism' more favourably.

While Liang, Xiong and Mou are the most widely discussed modern Confucian thinkers, Ma Yifu has been overlooked in the discussion concerning 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'. Regarded as one of the 'three sages' 三聖

146 For further discussion of this idea, see Tao Guozhang 陶國璋, *Shengming kanxian yu xianxiang shijie* 生命坎陷與現象世界 (Hong Kong: Shulin chubanshe 書林出版社, 1995), pp. 216–226. For the English translation of it, see Serina N. Chan, *The Thought of Mou Zongsan*, note 143, pp. 115–116.

147 See Lin Chen-kuo, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing*, note 140, p. 88–89.

148 For discussion, see Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan's New Confucianism* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 151–153.

149 Lin Chen-kuo, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing*, note 140, p. 121. Also see Clower, *ibid.*, pp. 191–197.

together with Liang and Xiong in modern Confucian history,¹⁵⁰ Ma has been criticised by some scholars who claim that his thought is very traditional, difficult to consider 'new',¹⁵¹ and thus unresponsive to the challenge of his times.¹⁵² This criticism seems valid as Ma gave much of his attention to the ancient 'six arts' (Chi. *liu yi* 六藝) of Confucianism and the main Confucian canons such as the *Classic of Filial Piety* (Chi. *Xiao Jing* 孝經). However, Ma is as important as the other modern thinkers identified above for this study as he was not only one of the many who used Buddhist ideas to develop his thought, but also one of the very few who appropriated Huayan ideas in particular to interpret Confucian canons.

As I discussed in the last section, traditional Confucian values had been attacked from the New Cultural Movement onwards. The five relationships,¹⁵³ including filial piety between father and son, were viewed as obstacles to the modernization of China.¹⁵⁴ I argue that Ma's emphasis on the *Classic of Filial Piety* at that time is a response to this kind of criticism. Instead of simply accepting the values of filial piety, Ma used the terms of Huayan, arguing that there was a metaphysical foundation behind this Confucian value. In Chapter 1, I briefly mentioned that there was a Huayan School existing in twentieth-century China and Yuexia was a key figure of the school. In fact, Yuexia was a close friend of Ma and the interest in Huayan of the latter was influenced by the former.¹⁵⁵ As Ma discussed in his well-known *Fuxing shuyuan jianglu* 復性書院講錄 (*Lecture Notes of Fuxing College*), filial piety is the truth of 'Heaven' (Chi. *tian* 天), 'Earth' (Chi. *di* 地) and 'Humanity' (Chi. *ren* 人). The filial piety in 'Humanity' is a reflection of that of 'Heaven' and 'Earth'. That is to say, the truth of 'Heaven' and 'Earth' manifests itself through 'Humanity'.

150 Wang Ruhua 王汝華, *Xiandai rujia sansheng: Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Ma Yifu de jiaoyi jishi* 現代儒家三聖：梁漱溟、熊十力、馬一浮的交誼紀實 (2 vols., Taipei: Xinrui wenchuang 新銳文創, 2012).

151 For example, see Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, *Ruxue de fuxing* 儒學的復興 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu 天地圖書, 2007), p. 85.

152 Chai Wenhua, 'Traditional Confucianism in modern China: Ma Yifu's ethical thought', *Frontier of Philosophy in China* vol. 1, no. 3 (2006): 366–381.

153 See the discussion in note 52.

154 For more discussion, see Xu Fuguan, *Zhongguo sixiangshi lunji* 中國思想史論集 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002), pp. 196–200.

155 Chen Yongge 陳永革, 'Ma Yifu dui fojiao xinfu de zhixing quanshi: yi Huayan chan weili 馬一浮對佛教心法的知性詮釋：以華嚴禪為例', in Wu Guang 吳光 ed., *Ma Yifu sixiang xintan: jinian Ma Yifu xiansheng danchen 125 zhounian ji guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* 馬一浮思想新探：紀念馬一浮先生誕辰125周年暨國際學術研討會論文集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 2010), pp. 291–307.

On the one hand, filial piety in 'Humanity' is like Huayan's idea of '*dharmadhātu* of events' (Chi. *si fajie* 事法界). Behind it there is the filial piety of 'Heaven', which Ma considered similar to Huayan's idea of '*dharmadhātu* of principle' (Chi. *li fajie* 理法界). On the other hand, the filial piety of 'Earth' links the filial pieties of 'Humanity' and 'Heaven', which Ma regarded as the '*dharmadhātu* of Non-Obstruction of Principle against Events' (Chi. *li shi wuai fajie* 理事無礙法界). In Ma's view, to discuss all these three aspects of filial piety is the '*dharmadhātu* of Non-Obstruction of Events against Events' (Chi. *shi shi wuai fajie* 事事無礙法界).¹⁵⁶

Admittedly, Ma's use of Huayan ideas to explain Confucian canons is somewhat challenging. Without considering the huge difference between Huayan thought and Confucianism, he seems to stretch the Huayan ideas to suit his own purpose. Compared with Fang and Tang whom I will discuss in the following chapters, the scope of Ma's appropriation of Huayan thought is limited. However, his example indicates that there is possible connection between Huayan and Confucian ideas, which is important to our understanding of Fang's and Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought.

Thinkers appropriating Buddhist ideas to develop their own thought were not restricted to those listed above.¹⁵⁷ However, in the context of this study and Zhang Mantao's classification which I cited at the beginning of this section, I believe the thinkers considered above are the most relevant to explain the wider context of the appropriations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang, namely why and how Chinese thinkers in the twentieth century sought sources other than Confucianism to develop their theories. More specifically, I have shown why and how Confucian thinkers at that time employed Buddhist ideas in particular to develop their thought.

Since Fang and Tang used Huayan ideas on a large scale, it is essential to have a basic understanding of this Buddhist tradition, including its main arguments and its modern development. In what follows, I will discuss these in detail to ground the discussion of Fang's and Tang's appropriations in the later chapters.

156 Ma Jingquan 馬鏡泉 ed., *Ma Yifujuan* 馬一浮卷 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe 河北教育出版社, 1996), pp. 211–212. For these Huayan concepts, I will further discuss in the next section.

157 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868–1936), Yang Du 楊度 (1874–1932) and Chen Daqi 陳大齊 (1886–1983) are other examples who used Buddhist ideas to develop or support their own thought. For more discussion, see Chan Sin-wai, *Buddhism in Late Ch'ing Political Thought*, note 126, pp. 137–151.

2.4 Classical Huayan Thought and its Modern Development

The interpretation of Huayan thought is always controversial in academia. Here I stress that the objective of this study is to examine why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought to develop their thought, but not to study Huayan thought itself. That means, I am not aiming to discuss the whole Huayan tradition here, nor am I attempting to discuss in depth the controversies within Huayan thought. Hence, I shall restrict my discussion about Huayan thought here to those issues which are closely related to Fang's and Tang's appropriations of this Buddhist tradition.

Considering the fact that Fang and Tang focused only on the Huayan thought of the Tang Dynasty (618–907), I will myself concentrate only on the thought of that period. The only exception to this is that I will also consider its modern development because this will help to introduce the nature of the thought at the time that Fang and Tang appropriated it, thus making the characteristics of the appropriations clearer. Below, I briefly discuss the history of the Huayan School, which provides us with the background to the appearance of the thought.

2.4.1 *A Brief History of the Huayan School in the Tang Dynasty*

The exact date and route of the introduction of Buddhism into China are unknown,¹⁵⁸ though it has traditionally been considered to have been around or just before AD 67 and via the land route from north-west India.¹⁵⁹ Regardless of the disputes about this, it is clear that the religion, characterized by substantial developments in philosophical thought in several Buddhist schools, among them the Huayan School, bloomed during the Tang Dynasty. The name of the School is developed from *Huayanjing* 華嚴經 (Skt. *Avatamsaka Sūtra*; Eng. *Garland Sūtra*) and its dominance mainly began in the time of Fazang 法藏 (643–712), between the periods of the dominance of, respectively, the Tiantai

158 Erich Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), p. 23.

159 For this information, I mainly draw from Tang Yongtong, *Han Wei liangjin NanBeichao fojiaoshi* 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1983), pp. 1–60; Arthur F. Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (California and London: Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 21–41; Erich Zürcher, 'Han Buddhism and the Western Region', in W. L. Idema and Erich Zürcher ed., *Thought and Law in Qin and Han China: Studies to Anthony Hulswé on the Dedicated Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 158–182; Rong Xinjiang, 'Land Route or Sea Route? Commentary on the Study of the Paths of Transmission and Areas in which Buddhism Was Disseminated during the Han Period', *Sino-Platonic Papers* no. 144 (July 2004).

School and the Chan School, which arose around the time of Zhiyi 智顗 (538–596) and Huineng 惠能 (638–713).¹⁶⁰ Apparently, there was competition and reciprocal absorption of the ideas amongst these schools. In fact, both Tiantai and Huayan regarded their own philosophical systems as ‘yuan’ 圓, a term, which, to some extent, implies finality and closure.¹⁶¹ From the perspectives of Tiantai and Huayan, further theoretical development in Buddhism was considered unnecessary and even impossible. Therefore, Huayan thought, at least in the eyes of the Huayan patriarchs, was the intellectual apex of Buddhism.¹⁶²

The exact lineage of the Huayan patriarchs differs amongst individual scholars, though most think that Dushun 杜順 (557–640), Zhiyan 智儼 (602–668), Fazang, Chengguan 澄觀 (738–839) and Zongmi 宗密 (780–841) were the leading patriarchs of the School during the dynasty.¹⁶³ According to *Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳 (*Continuation of Biographies of Eminent Monks*), Dushun once practised meditation with Chan master Sengzhen 僧珍 (dates unknown). Apart from this, his learning is something of a mystery.¹⁶⁴ As Zhiyan claimed, his own understanding of *Huayanjing* was learned from Dushun,¹⁶⁵ which provides the only hint about the relationship between Dushun and *Huayanjing*.¹⁶⁶ Since information about Dushun is so limited, most studies about Huayan thought tend not to discuss his thought. However, as I will discuss in Chapter 3,

160 Tang Yongtong, *Sui Tang fojiao shigao* 隋唐佛教史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), pp. 162–230.

161 I will discuss this term in section 2.4.3.

162 Nakamura Hajime, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan* (Honolulu: East-West Centre, 1964), p. 245; Fred Sturm, ‘Chinese Buddhist Philosophy’, in Donald H. Bishop ed., *Chinese Thought: An Introduction* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), pp. 184–234.

163 Lu Cheng 呂澂, *Zhongguo foxue yuanliu luejiang* 中國佛學源流略講 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), pp. 353–368; Kenneth K. S. Chen, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 313–316; Mokusen Miyuki, ‘Chinese Response to Buddhism: The Case of Hua-yen Tsung’, in Laurence G. Thompson ed., *Studia Asiatica: Essays in Asian Studies in Felicitation of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Professor Ch'en Shou-yi* (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1975), pp. 221–260; Francis H. Cook, *Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra* (New York: The Pennsylvania State University, 1977), pp. 20–33. For the discussion in this section, I mainly refer to Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄, Guan Shiqian 關世謙 trans., *Zhongguo fojiao shi* 中國佛教史 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng 新文豐, 2010), pp. 188–193.

164 *Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing* 大正新修大藏經, vol. 50, no. 2060, pp. 653b–654a. *Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing* is abbreviated as *DZJ* in this study.

165 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1868, p. 514a.

166 Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽, Li Shijie 李世傑 trans., *Zhongguo fojiao shi* 中國佛教史 (Taipei: Xiezhì gongyè 協志工業, 1970), p. 124.

unlike almost all interpreters of Huayan thought, Thomé H. Fang focused on Dushun in particular, arguing that Dushun was the most important figure in the Huayan tradition.

Although Zhiyan was a disciple of Dushun, he also learned from the masters of the Nan Dilun 南地論宗 and Shelun Schools 攝論宗,¹⁶⁷ which are viewed as the early schools of Consciousness-Only (Skt. *Yogācāra*; Chi. *Weishi* 唯識) in China.¹⁶⁸ As Fazang noted, Zhiyan derived his profound understanding of *Huayanjing* from the masters of these Schools,¹⁶⁹ which suggests a close relationship between Huayan thought and that of Consciousness-Only.¹⁷⁰

Although Fazang was called the third patriarch of the Huayan School, he is commonly regarded as the real founder of the School.¹⁷¹ In fact, Huayan gained its political and intellectual importance during the time of Fazang, as it is traditionally believed that Fazang explained his thought to Empress Wu 武后 (624–705) face-to-face around the year 700. The speech is claimed to be recorded in *Jin shizi zhang* 金師子章 (*Treatise on the Golden Lion*),¹⁷² though its designation as a speech delivered by Fazang to Empress Wu seems apocryphal.¹⁷³ Despite the disputes over the historical accuracy of the speech, most of the important concepts of Huayan, like the doctrinal classification theory, were developed by Fazang.¹⁷⁴ Due to his central role in the School, the discussion here will be mainly around Fazang's thought.

After the death of Fazang, his disciple Huiyuan 慧苑 (673–743) amended the former's ideas of doctrinal classification, arguing that 'sudden teaching' should be removed from the doctrinal classification theory. This suggestion of Huiyuan was seriously criticized by Chengguan, who was the fourth patriarch

167 *DZJ*, vol. 51, no. 2073, pp. 163b23–163c18.

168 Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the Doctrinal Foundations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 99–100.

169 *DZJ*, vol. 51, no. 2073, p. 163c, 1–18.

170 For the early history of Huayan, see Yang Weizhong 楊維中, 'Huayanzong de yunyu xinkao 華嚴宗的孕育新考', *Zhexue men* 哲學門 vol. 10, no. 2 (Feb 2010): 29–60.

171 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, pp. 406–408.

172 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1880, pp. 663a–667a.

173 For details about the transmission, see Chen Jinhua, *Philosopher, Practitioner, Politician: The Many Lives of Fazang (643–712)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 176–183.

174 Although Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification was first suggested by Zhiyan, it was developed by Fazang. For a discussion on this, see Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, Li Huiying 李惠英 trans., *Zhongguo Huayan sixiangshi* 中國華嚴思想史 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1996), pp. 117–122. For Zhiyan's theory of doctrinal classification, see Robert M. Gimello, *Chih-yen (602–668) and the Foundations of Hua-yen Buddhism* (unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1976), Chapter 5.

of the School.¹⁷⁵ In Chapter 5, I will argue that doctrinal classification is probably the most important Huayan element in Tang's appropriation. Therefore, we cannot overlook the disputation between Huiyuan and Chengguan in this study, though the former is not considered a Huayan patriarch. Zongmi, a disciple of Chengguan, also known as the 'Chan master of Guifeng' 圭峰禪師,¹⁷⁶ was the fifth patriarch of the School. His attitude towards the harmonization of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, to some extent, appears to have inspired Tang Junyi.

Apart from the patriarchs mentioned above, Li Tongxuan 李通玄 (635–730), a layman and a member of the Li royal family of the Tang Dynasty, also contributed to the development of Huayan thought. Interpreting *Huayanjing* from the perspective of the *Yi Jing*, Li emphasised the role of practice,¹⁷⁷ a point important to our understanding of Thomé H. Fang's understanding of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in Chapter 3.

Despite the significance of the School during the Tang Dynasty, the 'Huichang Persecution' (Chi. *Huichang fanan* 會昌法難), a political movement led by Emperor Wu of Tang 唐武宗 (814–846) in 845 which tried to destroy Buddhism fundamentally, accelerated the decline of the School.¹⁷⁸ In my view, Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought provide excellent opportunities to discuss the creative interpretation of the thought in contemporary society, and I will consider this in detail after introducing Huayan's key ideas.

2.4.2 *The Foundation of Huayan Thought*

As already discussed, the name of the Huayan School implies that its thought is based on the *Huayanjing*. It is not possible to explain the content of the entire text of the *Huayanjing* here. However, as Liu Ming-wood notes, its main theme is to describe the 'numerous stages a bodhisattva has to pass through before he can achieve the supreme end of Buddhahood'.¹⁷⁹ In my opinion, this 'supreme end of Buddhahood' highlights the relationship between *Huayanjing*

175 For the life of Chengguan, see Imre Hamar, *A Religious Leader in the Tang: Chengguan's Biography* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2002).

176 For the life of Zongmi, see Ran Yunhua 冉雲華, *Tsung-mi* 宗密 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1998), pp. 1–56; Peter N. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 27–90.

177 Thomas Cleary, *Entry Into the Inconceivable: An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 9–18.

178 Stanley Weinstein, *Buddhism under the Tang* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 114–136.

179 Liu Ming-wood, 'The Lotus Sūtra and Garland Sūtra According to the T'ien-t'ai and Huayan Schools in Chinese Buddhism', *T'oung Pao* vol. LXXIV (1988): 47–80.

and Huayan thought, as the latter effectively starts from the perspective of this 'supreme end', a point I will elaborate below. There are in total three translations of the *Huayanjing* in Chinese, all translated from Sanskrit.¹⁸⁰ The first was by Buddhahadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (359–429) finished around 420;¹⁸¹ the second was by Siksānanda 實叉難陀 (652–710) around 699;¹⁸² and the third was by Prajñā 般若 (734–810?) around 798, this last being a re-translation of 'Entry into the Realm of Reality' (Chi. *ru fajie pin* 入法界品), the thirty-ninth chapter of Siksānanda's translation.¹⁸³

Although Huayan patriarchs argued that they based their teachings on the *Huayanjing*, individual monk-scholars complained that there was no relationship between the two as their ideas were actually inconsistent.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, the *Huayanjing* is only one of the Buddhist texts that the Huayan patriarchs relied on and there are other sources of Buddhist ideas which have contributed to the development of Huayan thought; Consciousness-Only being one of them.

Earlier I mentioned that Zhiyan once learned from the masters of the Nan Dilun and Shelun Schools, the representatives of the thought of early Consciousness-Only in China. There is a close relationship between the Nan Dilun School and the translations of *Shidijing lun* 十地經論 (Skt. *Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra*),¹⁸⁵ a work considered to have been written by Vasubandhu 世親 (around 4th century) to interpret *Shidijing* 十地經 (Skt. *Daśabhūmiśvara*), and which now features as a chapter in the '*shidi pin*' 十地品 in *Huayanjing*. The Sanskrit version of *Shidijing lun* first appeared in China in the times of Emperor Xuanwu 宣武帝 (483–515), when three Indian Buddhist monks, Bodhiruci 菩提流支 (?–527), Ratnamati 勒那摩提 (?–?) and Buddhāsanta 佛陀扇多 (?–?), visited the country.¹⁸⁶ Commissioned by the

180 Yang Weizhong 楊維中, *Xinyi Huayanjing ru fajie pin* 新譯華嚴經入法界品 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 2004), pp. 1–20; Imre Hamar, 'The History of the Buddhāvataṃsaka-Sūtra: Shorter and Larger Texts', in Imre Hamar ed., *Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), pp. 139–167.

181 *DZJ*, vol. 9, no. 278, 395a–788b.

182 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, no. 279, 1a–444c.

183 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, no. 293, 661a–851c.

184 Shi Rihui 釋日慧, *Huayan fajie weibo* 華嚴法海微波 vol. 2 (Taipei: huiju chubanshe 慧炬出版社, 2000), pp. 313–345. For discussion about the relationship between the two, see Jan Nattier, 'Indian Antecedents of Huayan Thought: New Light from Chinese Sources', in Imre Hamar ed., *Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), pp. 109–138.

185 *DZJ*, vol. 26, no. 1522, pp. 123a–204b.

186 For the discussion in this paragraph, I mainly draw on Kamata Shigeo, *Zhongguo fojiao shi*, note 163, pp. 92–96.

Emperor, the three monks, working with several others, translated the text into Chinese, completing the task around 511.¹⁸⁷ However, there were disputes amongst them about how to interpret the term ‘*xin*’ 心, which is usually translated as ‘mind’, literally ‘heart-and-mind’, and its functions, leading to the rise of the Dilun School. By and large, the disciples of Bodhiruci, who remained in the north of Luoyang 洛陽 and were therefore called the Bei Dilun School 北地論宗, argued that the mind is defiled and as such is called *ālayavijñāna* 阿賴耶識, whereas the disciples of Ratnamati, who remained in the south of Luoyang and were called the Nan Dilun School 南地論宗, considered *ālayavijñāna* pure,¹⁸⁸ an idea that recalls the characteristics of the thought of the Shelun School.

Besides being influenced by the Nan Dilun School, Zhiyan also learned from the master of the Shelun School, Fachang 法常 (567–645). Based on its interpretation of Asanga’s 無著 (around 4th century) *She dasheng lun* 攝大乘論 (Skt. *Mahāyānasāṅgraha*), this school regarded the mind as pure. The principal difference between the Shelun School and the Nan Dilun School is that the former considered the pure mind *amala-vijñāna* 阿摩羅識, which is the ninth consciousness after *ālayavijñāna* whereas the Nan Dilun School argued that there are only eight consciousnesses in Buddhism. The eighth consciousness being called *ālayavijñāna*.¹⁸⁹ Regardless of the differences between them, both consider that the mind is pure. Since Zhiyan’s understanding of *Huayanjing* was inspired by the Nan Dilun School and Shelun School, the Huayan School might also tend to consider the ‘mind’ to be pure (Chi. *jing* 淨). However, as I will discuss later, this concept of the pure mind raises a theoretical difficulty.

But first it is necessary to discuss the key term *dharma*. The meaning of *dharma*, which is commonly translated as ‘*fa*’ 法 in Chinese, differs according to context. In the Mahāyāna Buddhism, for instance, *dharma* in the singular means ‘whatever leads to enlightenment’,¹⁹⁰ extending to meanings like ‘the patterns of reality and cosmic law-orderliness discovered by the Buddha(s), Buddhist teachings, the Buddhist path of practice, and the goal of Buddhism,

187 There are different versions about the process of the translation, see *DZJ*, vol. 49, no. 2034, p. 86a, 13; vol. 50, no. 2060, pp. 607b18–608b. In this study, I rely on the version of vol. 25, no. 1509 because it was from an official at the time the translation was undertaken.

188 Liu Ming-wood, ‘The Early Development of the Buddha-Nature Doctrine in China’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 16, no. 1 (1989): 1–36; Kamata Shigeo, *Zhongguo fojiao shi*, note 163, pp. 94–95.

189 Han Tingjie 韓廷傑, *Weishi xue gailun* 唯識學概論 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 1993), pp. 116–121.

190 Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, p. 42

the timeless *Nirvāṇa* 涅槃.¹⁹¹ In the Indian Abhidharma 阿毘達磨 tradition, however, *dharma*s mean the fundamental units which create our impression of a stable world and are regarded as reals.¹⁹² The Indian Madhyamaka 中觀 thinker, Nāgārjuna 龍樹 (150?–250?) noted, by contrast, that *dharma*s are neither absolute ‘non-existence’ (like that of a hare’s horn) nor substantial ‘existence’ (of an independent permanently existing real). Instead, *dharma*s are ‘empty’, that is, they are not non-existent but they are not independent reals.¹⁹³ In the Yogācāra tradition, the understanding of ‘emptiness’ was developed further in relation to the Three Natures theory, as I will discuss below. According to *Dasheng baifa mingmen lun* 大乘百法明門論 (Skt. *Mahāyāna-śatadharma-prakāśamukha-śāstra*; Eng. *The Shastra of the Door to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas*),¹⁹⁴ there are in all hundreds of types of *dharma*s, which can be grouped into five categories: ‘mind dharmas’, ‘mental dharmas’, ‘form dharmas’, ‘dharmas separate from the mind’ and ‘unconditioned dharmas’, the last-named including *tathatā*, or suchness.¹⁹⁵ Apart from these categories, *dharma*s can also be simply divided into two groups: pure *dharma*s and defiled *dharma*s.¹⁹⁶ To sum up, whilst on the whole when it is used in the plural, ‘*dharma*’ carries a more technical meaning, in the singular its meaning is more general. This range of meanings is retained in Huayan as Liu Ming-wood argues that Fazang used the term ‘*dharma*’ in its widest sense to mean teachings, religious practices and methods of instruction.¹⁹⁷ As I will discuss later, however, ‘*dharma*’ in the plural often means ‘phenomena’ in the Huayan tradition, or what Liu Ming-wood refers to in Fazang’s thought as all things, both internal and external as objects of perception and discrimination.¹⁹⁸

As I stated earlier, the question of the pure mind raises a theoretical difficulty. This is because if the mind is pure, as suggested by the Nan Dilun School,

191 Peter Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2.

192 Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, p. 175.

193 Peter Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, history and practices*, note 191, pp. 116–119.

194 *DZJ*, vol. 31, no. 1614, p. 855.

195 For discussion, see Damien Keown, ‘Dharma’, in Damien Keown and Charles S. Prebish ed., *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 271–280.

196 For more discussion about the term ‘*fa*’, see Yinshun 印順, *Yi fofa yanjiu fofa* 以佛法研究佛法 (Taipei: Zhengwen chubanshe 正聞出版社, 1992), pp. 103–130.

197 Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979), p. 432.

198 *Ibid.*, p. 395. Also see Kenneth K. S. Chen, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey*, note 163, pp. 317–318.

this fails to explain why there are defiled *dharmas* in the world, whereas the Shelun School explained the origin of defiled *dharmas* through the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, arguing that it is this eighth consciousness that is responsible for the appearance of defiled *dharmas*. Despite there being defiled *dharmas*, the ultimate stage of the mind, which is the ninth consciousness in the Shelun School tradition, can still be pure. This idea appears similar to that of *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論 (*The Treatise on the Mahayana Awakening of Faith*),¹⁹⁹ another Buddhist text which was influential in Huayan thought.

As I indicated earlier, Huayan also holds the view that the mind is pure. In order to explain why there are defiled *dharmas* in the world, Huayan patriarchs used the idea of *Dasheng qixin lun*,²⁰⁰ arguing that *ālayavijñāna* is the origin of such kinds of *dharmas*. There is much argument about the authorship of *Dasheng qixin lun*. Although it was traditionally attributed to Aśvaghoṣa 馬鳴 (80?–150?) and said to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Paramārtha 真諦 (500–569), *Dasheng qixin lun* is now widely believed in academia to have been originally written in Chinese.²⁰¹ As *Dasheng qixin lun* argues, pure and defiled *dharmas* come from two different aspects of the mind:

The revelation of the true meaning (of the principle of Mahayana can be achieved) by (unfolding the doctrine) that the principle of One Mind has two aspects. One is the aspect of Mind in terms of the Absolute (*tathatā*; suchness), and the other is the aspect of Mind in terms of phenomena (*samsāra*; birth and death). Each of these two aspects embraces all states of existence. Why? Because these two aspects are mutually inclusive.²⁰²

Since both the aspects of the absolute and phenomena derive from the mind, there is no fundamental difference between them. As is further argued, the difference between *dharmas* is only an illusion. This is because if the mind does

199 Liu Ming-wood, 'The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism', *T'oung-pao* 通報 vol. 68, nos. 4–5 (1982): 181–220; Imre Hamar, 'Interpretation of Yogācāra Philosophy in Huayan Buddhism', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 37, no. 2 (2010): 181–197.

200 *DZJ*, vol. 32, no. 1666, pp. 575a–583b; no. 1667, pp. 583b–591c.

201 For more discussion, see Lai Whalen, 'A clue to the authorship of the Awakening of Faith: Siksānanda redaction of word Nien', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* vol. 3, no. 1 (1980): 34–53.

202 The original Chinese is '依一心法，有二種門。云何為二？一者心真如門，二者心生滅門。是二種門皆各總攝一切法。此義云何？以是二門不相離故。' *DZJ*, vol. 32, no. 1666, pp. 576a, 5–7. For the translation, see Yoshito S. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 31.

not attach to such factors as verbalization, description and conceptualization, all *dharma*s are viewed as equal in nature.²⁰³ *Dasheng qixin lun* explains the aspect of the mind in terms of phenomena as below:

The Mind as phenomena (*saṃsāra*) is grounded on the *Tathāgatagarbha*. What is called the Storehouse Consciousness is that in which 'neither birth nor death (*nirvāṇa*)' diffuses harmoniously with 'birth and death (*saṃsāra*)', and yet in which both are neither identical nor different. This Consciousness has two aspects which embrace all states of existence and create all states of existence. They are the aspect of enlightenment and the aspect of non-enlightenment.²⁰⁴

According to the above, the mind as phenomena is grounded on *tathāgatagarbha* (Chi. *rulaizang* 如來藏), which literally means 'womb' of the *Tathāgata*, a doctrine indicating the potential of all sentient beings to become Buddha.²⁰⁵ As I will discuss later, Huayan thought holds the view that the mind as phenomena has facets of both eternality and impermanence. It is eternal because its origin is *tathāgatagarbha*, which is considered to be totally pure. On the other hand, however, the mind of phenomena can be non-awakened, and in this sense it is impermanent. In other words, Huayan thought regards *ālayavijñāna* as a transitional concept while *tathāgatagarbha* is the ultimate mind of humanity.²⁰⁶

Finally, since Huayan is a system of thought which arose after Confucianism and Taoism, it could not entirely ignore these Chinese traditions. For instance, some specific terms such as 'The Ten Mysteries' (Chi. *shi xuan men* 十玄門) of Huayan draw on terms from Taoism and the *Yi Jing*, here the notion of the

203 *DZJ*, vol. 32, no. 1666, p. 576a, 8–13.

204 The original Chinese is '心生滅者，依如來藏，故有生滅心。所謂不生滅與生滅和合，非一非異，名為阿梨耶識。此識有二種義，能攝一切法、生一切法。云何為二？一者覺義。二者不覺義。' *Ibid.*, pp. 576b, 7–11. For the translation, see Yoshito S. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith*, note 202, pp. 36–37.

205 Philosophically, the meaning of *tathāgatagarbha* is largely equivalent to that of Buddha nature and pure mind. Therefore, as I will discuss later, Fazang tended to use the terms interchangeably. For more discussion on the concept, see W. Grosnick, 'The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra', in D. S. Lopez, ed., *Buddhism in Practice* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 92–106; Shih Heng-ching, 'The Significance of Tathāgatagarbha: A Positive Expression of Śūnyatā', *Taida zhexue lunping* 台大哲學論評 vol. 11 (1988): 227–246.

206 For further discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, 'The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism', note 199.

‘profound’ (Chi. *xuan* 玄).²⁰⁷ As traditional Chinese thought stresses the idea of the interconnectedness of various phenomena,²⁰⁸ Huayan thought also incorporates this idea.²⁰⁹ As I will discuss in the following chapters, the point that there is possible communication between Huayan and traditional Chinese thought helps explain why modern Confucian thinkers could appropriate this Buddhist tradition to develop their own theories. However, as the influence of ancient Chinese thought on Huayan is not the focus of this study, I will conclude this discussion of the intellectual background of Huayan thought at this point and move on to discuss the key concepts of this Buddhist tradition.

2.4.3 Key Concepts in Huayan Thought

As I mentioned earlier, Huayan thought is grounded on the ideas of the Nan Dilun School, the Shelun School and *Dasheng qixin lun*, all of which address the concept of the mind. Therefore the mind is the first of the key concepts of Huayan thought that I will consider.

2.4.3.1 The Mind

In principle, Buddhist teaching argues that the existence of all *dharma*s is based on *nidāna* 因緣, which means ‘a chain of causation’. This is the core idea of ‘Dependent Arising’ (Skt. *pratītyasamutpāda*; Chi. *yuānqi* 緣起) that all Buddhist schools follow. In short, the idea means that no *dharma* has an independent nature, but arises on the basis of other *dharma*s. The early Mahāyāna described this by saying that *dharma*s are ‘empty’. Therefore, in Buddhism, ‘emptiness’ does not imply ‘non-existence’ or nothingness, but means no independent essence.²¹⁰ As I noted earlier, Huayan’s concept of the mind is similar to that of *Dasheng qixin lun*, since Fazang argued that pure

207 For a discussion of this, see Oh Kang-nam, ‘The Taoist Influence on Hua-yen Buddhism: A Case of the Sinicization of Buddhism in China’, *Zhonghua foxue xuebao* 中華佛學學報 no. 13 (2000): 277–297; Lai Whalen, ‘The Yijing and the Formation of the Huayan Philosophy: An Analysis of a Key Aspect of Chinese Buddhism’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 36 (2009): 101–112.

208 David Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture* (New York: University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 183–195.

209 T. H. Barrett, ‘Religious Traditions in Chinese Civilization: Buddhism and Taoism’, in Paul S. Ropp ed., *Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization* (Berkeley and California: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 138–163.

210 Li Runsheng 李潤生, ‘Fojia kongyi bianjie 佛家空義辨解’, *Faxiang xuehui jikan* 法相學會集刊 vol. 5 (2003): 59–98; Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, pp. 92–93.

and defiled *dharma*s come from two different aspects of the mind, which is *tathāgatagarbha*.²¹¹ It is due to 'ignorance' (Skt. *avidyā*; Chi. *wuming* 無明) that there is the appearance of defiled *dharma*s.²¹² In Fazang's view, if the mind does not function, all *dharma*s are empty.²¹³ Huayan thought attempts to explain the 'interpenetration' of *dharma*s.²¹⁴

In fact, in order to explain the 'interpenetration' of *dharma*s, Huayan thought firstly needs to explain that there is no real obstruction between *dharma*s. This brings us to Huayan's harmonization of the 'Three Natures' (Skt. *trisvabhāva*; Chi. *san xing* 三性), a theory mainly set out in the *Śaṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* (Chi. *Jie shenmi jing* 解深密經) which interprets 'emptiness'.²¹⁵ The first Nature is called conceptualized nature (Skt. *parikalpitasvabhāva*; Chi. *pianji suozhi xing* 遍計所執性), which is linked with the falsifying activity of language. In the *She dasheng lun*, conceptualized nature is considered the appearance of an object when, in reality, there are only perceptions. That is to say, conceptualized nature is what is experienced by unenlightened persons, since things do not exist independently. The second kind of nature is dependent nature (Skt. *paratantrasvabhāva*; Chi. *yitaqi xing* 依他起性), relating to the dependent origination of *dharma*s. Although beyond language, we might say that dependent nature is the flow of experiences which is a really existing basis for the manifestation of conceptualized nature but is incorrectly divided. The final kind of nature is perfected nature (Skt. *pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*; Chi. *yuancheng-shi xing* 圓成實性), which means the true nature of things that can only be revealed through meditation. It is a single flow of perceptions and is empty of independent entities. Therefore, perfected nature is the complete absence in dependent nature of conceptualized nature. Ontologically, dependent nature is the most important of the Three Natures because it, as fundamental to conceptualized nature, is the basis for *samsāra* 輪迴. On the other hand, as the basis for discovering the true nature of things, however, dependent nature is also the basis for *nirvāṇa*.

Although there is no fundamental contradiction between the Three Natures in Consciousness-Only schools, Fazang stressed the basis of their unity.

211 *DZJ*, vol. 35, no. 1733, p. 440c.

212 *Ibid.*, vol. 44, no. 1846, pp. 254b24–254c3.

213 *Ibid.*, vol. 45, no. 1876, p. 640a, 9–13, 18–20.

214 Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197, pp. 343–344.

215 For the discussion about 'Three Natures' in this paragraph, I mainly draw on Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, pp. 89–92.

In general, he does this by equating the dual aspects of each of the three natures, and in redefining the three natures as *tathāgatagarbha* (perfected), the phenomenal world (dependent) and ignorance (conceptualized).²¹⁶ In *Jin shizi zhang*, Fazang explained the ‘Three Natures’ to the Empress Wu as follows, drawing attention to a gold lion sculpture in her palace as an analogy:

The lion exists because of our feelings. This is called (the nature) arising from vast imagination. The lion seems to exist. This is called (the nature of) dependence on others (gold and craftsman) (for production). The nature of the gold does not change. This is therefore called (the nature of) Perfect Reality.²¹⁷

To Fazang, the ‘Three Natures’ are actually one, from the perspective of the mind as absolute (Chi. *zhenru xin* 真如心), I argue that it is an idea explicitly from *Dasheng qixin lun*.²¹⁸ As Liu Ming-wood notes, Fazang considered that the perspective of *tathāgatagarbha* is the culmination of the whole Consciousness-Only tradition. It is from the perspective of the pure mind, but not that of differentiating consciousness, that there is no distinction between absolute and phenomenon, a point Huayan concerns most.²¹⁹ This dissolution at the level of the mind is essential as it is only from a pure mind that a harmonious world can be viewed,²²⁰ a point vital for comprehending Tang Junyi’s interpretation and appropriation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5.²²¹

216 Liu Ming-wood, ‘The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism’, though in the end (pp. 200–211) he queries the coherence of both these approaches. See note 199.

217 The original Chinese is ‘師子情有，名為遍計。 師子似有，名曰依他。 金性不變，故號圓成。’ *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1880, p. 664a, 6–12. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, p. 409.

218 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1866, p. 499a, 9–16; *ibid.*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 499a25–499b12.

219 Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197 pp. 338–339; Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, pp. 141–144.

220 Guo Zhaoshun 郭朝順, ‘Cong “shi chong weishi guan” lun huayanzong yu weishi sixiang de jiaoshe 從「十重唯識觀」論華嚴宗與唯識思想的交涉’, *Foxue yanjiu zhongxin xuebao* 佛學研究中心學報 vol. 8 (2003): 105–132.

221 For more discussion, see Liu Ming-wood (Liao Minghuo) 廖明活, *Zhongguo foxing si-xiang de xingcheng he kaizhan* 中國佛性思想的形成和開展 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 2008), pp. 305–333.

2.4.3.2 The Dharma Realm

The Dharma Realm (Skt. *dharmadhātu*; Chi. *fajie* 法界) is a concept that has different meanings in different Buddhist texts.²²² In *Huayanjing*, for example, there are at least three meanings, including first, an infinite world; second, the notion that all *dharma*s are fundamentally equal, and third, a kind of classification describing various groups of *dharma*s with different characteristics.²²³ Certainly, there was a great deal of discussion about the Dharma Realm by the Huayan patriarchs.²²⁴ However, the theory of 'Four Dharma Realms' is widely considered the most representative.

Before further discussion, however, I must first mention Fazang's ideas of *dharma* and '*dhātu*' as they help enhance our understanding of the concept of the 'Dharma Realm' that Huayan thought suggests. Fazang defined the meanings of '*dharma*' as follows:

'*Fa*' (*dharma*) has three meanings: 1.) 'That which upholds', for its self-nature does not change; 2.) 'That which regulates', for through its regulation, understanding arises; 3.) 'That which is confronted', for it is cognised by the mind-consciousness.²²⁵

As Liu Ming-wood suggests, 'that which upholds' indicates that 'all things [are] without self-nature except the *Tathatā* or the *Tathagatagarbha*', while 'that which regulates' concerns 'such things as truths, wisdom and teachings, through which right understanding can be achieved'. As for 'that which is confronted', this means the view that 'the "mind-consciousness" is considered in Buddhism as having all things both internal and external as its objects of perception and discrimination, [so] the phrase most probably refers to all modes and elements of existence.'²²⁶ In brief, as we saw in section 2.4.2, the meanings of the term *dharma* or '*fa*' are broad and extensive. Its specific meaning needs to be considered together with other concepts, such as '*dhātu*'.

222 Oh Kang-nam, 'Dharmadhātu: An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism', *Eastern Buddhist* vol. XLL no. 2 (1979): 72–91.

223 Deng Keming 鄧克銘, *Huayan sixiang zhi xin yu fajie* 華嚴思想之心與法界 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 1997), pp. 35–63.

224 For full list, see Yang Zhenghe 楊政河, *Huayan zhexue yanjiu* 華嚴哲學研究 (Taipei: Huiju chubanshe 慧炬出版社, 2004), pp. 323–456.

225 The original Chinese is '法有三義，一持義，謂自性不改故。二軌義，謂軌範生解故。三對意義，是意識所知故。' *DZJ*. vol. 44, no. 1838, pp. 63b, 18–19. For the translation, see Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197, p. 392.

226 Liu Ming-wood, *Ibid.*, p. 393.

According to Fazang, the meanings of '*dhātu*', which is translated as '*jie*' 界 in Chinese, are as below:

As for '*jie*' (*dhatu*), it also has three meanings: 1.) 'Cause', for the holy ways come into being based on it . . . ; 2.) 'Essence', for it is the essence on which all '*fa*' (*dharma*s) are dependent . . . ; 3.) 'Difference', for phenomena [Chi. *xiang* 相] (in the realm of) dependent origination do not mix up with each other.²²⁷

Liu Ming-wood notes that if '*dhātu*' is viewed as 'cause' or 'essence', *dharmadhātu* would mean 'the cause or essence of the Tathata, truths, wisdom, all elements of existence, etc'.²²⁸ If '*dhātu*' is 'understood as 'difference', on the other hand, *dharmadhātu* would mean 'Tathata, truths, wisdom, all elements of existence . . . are different in that they exist together without being entangled with each other'.²²⁹ As Liu further explains, the first meaning of *dharmadhātu* applies to the discussion of 'Dependent arising as viewed in terms of Dharma Realm' (Chi. *fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起), which I will further discuss in the following sections, while the second meaning of *dharmadhātu* is more suitable in the discussion of the theory of 'Four Dharma Realms', which I outline next.²³⁰

In short, the theory of the 'Four Dharma Realms' tends to mean a kind of classification that distinguishes different kinds of *dharma*s with various characteristics.²³¹ To Fazang, the 'Dharma Realm' could broadly be divided into two: the 'dharma realm of events' (Chi. *shi* 事) and the 'dharma realm of principle' (Chi. *li* 理).²³² The former is the realm of phenomena, in which all *dharma*s are regarded as different objects and events while the latter is a realm of the

227 The original Chinese is '界亦有三義，一是因義，依生聖道故...二是性義，謂是諸法所依性故...三是分齊義，謂諸緣起相不雜故。' *DZJ*. vol. 35, no. 1733, pp. 440b, 7-13. For the translation, see Liu Ming-wood, *ibid.*, p. 393.

228 Liu Ming-wood, *ibid.*, pp. 393-394.

229 *Ibid.*, p. 394.

230 For more discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, *ibid.*, pp. 392-394.

231 Garma C. C. Chang, *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism* (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), pp. 141-155; Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, Li Huiying 李惠英 trans., *Zhongguo Huayan sixiangshi* 中國華嚴思想史 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1996), pp. 199-202; Li Kaiji 李開濟, 'Huayan fajie xunyi 華嚴法界尋義', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 399 (Aug 2007): 35-47.

232 *DZJ*, vol. 35, no. 1733, p. 145a, 7.

principle of 'emptiness'.²³³ In Fazang's view, these two realms are not contradictory to each other, but can be comprehended simultaneously,²³⁴ a status which is called the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of principle and events' (Chi. *li shi wuai fajie* 理事無礙法界) in Huayan. As Fazang further argued, the relationship between principle and events is like that of '*ti*' and '*yong*'.²³⁵ To Huayan patriarchs, since the nature of events is empty, there is no real contradiction among them. In this sense, it is not only principle and events which co-exist at the same time, but the relationship between events is also non-obstructive. Chengguan regarded this status as the 'dharma realm of the non-obstruction of events' (Chi. *shi shi wuai fajie* 事事無礙法界).²³⁶ In short, Huayan's using '*li*' or principle to describe the idea of 'emptiness' has a positive connotation,²³⁷ and this dissolution of contradiction among events is considered the most important in the Huayan tradition.²³⁸ As I will discuss in the next chapter, the 'dharma realm of the non-obstruction of events' is one of the central themes which attracted Thom   H. Fang to endorse Huayan thought.

As there is no contradiction between events and principle, what is crucial is how human beings understand this position.²³⁹ This brings us to the discussion about 'Dependent Arising' and 'Nature Arising'.

2.4.3.3 Dependent Arising and Nature Arising

As we noted earlier, all Buddhist schools agree that the *dharma*s exist interdependently in a 'chain of causation' (*nid  na*), an idea at the heart of the notion of 'Dependent Arising'. In elaborating on this, Mah  y  na schools tended to

233 Garma C. C. Chang, *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism*, note 231, pp. 142–143. As Robert M. Gimello argues, phenomena mean 'the empirically available things and events of this world', while principle means 'things and events are indeterminable', which is based on the idea of 'emptiness'. For details, see his 'Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mah  y  na: A Chinese View', *Philosophy East and West* vol. 2, no. 2 (1976): 117–136.

234 Francis Cook, 'Causation in the Chinese Hua-yen Tradition', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 6, no. 4 (1979): 367–385.

235 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1875, pp. 635b, 6–8.

236 *Ibid.*, vol. 36, no. 1737, pp. 707c, 14–15. For more discussion, see Imre Hamar, 'Chengguan's Theory of the Four Dharma-dh  tus', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* vol. 51, no. 1–2 (1998): 1–19.

237 Paul Williams, *Mah  y  na Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations*, note 168, pp. 142–143.

238 Kamekawa Ky  shin   川教信, Yin Hai 印海 trans., *Huayan xue* 華嚴學 (Taipei: Foguangshan zongwu weiyuanhui 佛光山宗務委員會, 1997), pp. 160–165.

239 Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元, *Zhongguo xinxing lun* 中國心性論 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp. 251–266.

regard the nature of all *dharma*s as empty, though they interpreted ‘emptiness’ in different ways. Before suggesting its own theory of ‘Dependent Arising’, Huayan outlines four theories of other Buddhist schools which hold related views.²⁴⁰

First is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of karma results’ (Chi. *yegan yuanqi* 業感緣起) in pre-sectarian Buddhism before the rise of Mahāyāna, which argued that the appearance of a *dharma* is caused by *karma* 業. Based on this view, all human suffering is caused by ignorance. It is due to ignorance that human beings engage in bad *karma* which yields bad *karmic* results, which in turn cause the conditions under which they will again engage in bad *karma*. In this regard, *dharma*s are also affected by *karma*.²⁴¹

Second is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Eight negations’ (Chi. *babu yuanqi* 八不緣起) in *Mādhyamika*. As Nāgārjuna noted, there are eight negations, which are ‘neither birth nor death; neither permanence nor end; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going’.²⁴² Through these negations, concepts and language are shown to be unrelated to reality as it is. The nature of a *dharma* cannot be comprehended through language or concept but only by insight (Skt. *prajñā*; Chi. *bore* 般若) gained through meditation.²⁴³

Third is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of *ālayavijñāna*’ (Chi. *laiye yuanqi* 賴耶緣起) as suggested in the thought of Consciousness-Only. Consciousness-Only considers *ālayavijñāna* a store consciousness, in which good and bad seeds are stored. In this sense, all *dharma*s can be considered to arise from *ālayavijñāna*.²⁴⁴

240 For this discussion, I mainly draw on Takakusu Junjirō, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1956), pp. 29–41; Lai Whalen, ‘Chinese Buddhist causation theories: An analysis of the Sinitic Mahāyāna understanding of *Pratītya-samutpāda*’, *Philosophy East and West* vol. 27, no. 3 (1977): 241–264; Ng Yu-kwan (Wu Rujun) 吳汝鈞, *Zhongguo foxue de xiandai quashi* 中國佛學的現代詮釋 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 1998), pp. 99–102.

241 Lu Cheng 呂澂, *Yindu foxue yuanliu luejiang* 印度佛學源流略講 (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji 上海世紀, 2005), pp. 19–22; Bruce R. Reichenbach, *The Law of Karma* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 24–27.

242 The original Chinese is ‘不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。’ See *DZJ*, vol. 30, no. 1564, p. 1b.

243 Jay L. Garfield, *Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 24–45.

244 Lin Chen-kuo, ‘The Magic of Consciousness—An Inquiry into the Concept of Object in Yogācāra Buddhism’, *Guoli zhengzhi daxue zhexue xuebao* 國立政治大學哲學學報 no. 2 (1995): 21–39.

Fourth is the 'Dependent arising as viewed in terms of *tathāgatagarbha*' (Chi. *rulaizang yuanqi* 如來藏緣起) of *Dasheng qixin lun*, which argues the mind is always pure. Although there are defiled *dharma*s in the world, they are only from *ālayavijñāna*. However, it is the pure mind, not *ālayavijñāna*, which represents the self of human beings. In this regard, the pure mind is the origin of understanding of all *dharma*s.²⁴⁵

In contrast with these ideas concerning 'dependent arising', Huayan begins its discussion directly from the perspective of the functioning of the pure mind.²⁴⁶ As previously discussed, Fazang considered that the world as observed from *tathāgatagarbha* is harmonious, with no contradiction among or obstructions between observed events. As Fazang argued, this functioning of *tathāgatagarbha* is called 'Nature Arising' (Chi. *xing qi* 性起),²⁴⁷ while the 'dependent arising' as viewed from this functioning of *tathāgatagarbha* is the 'Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Dharma Realm' (Chi. *fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起).²⁴⁸ Since the 'Dharma Realm' is based on *tathāgatagarbha*, all *dharma*s are from this viewpoint experienced as pure. Therefore, this 'dharma realm' is also called 'the One True Dharma Realm' (Chi. *yizhen fajie* 一真法界).²⁴⁹ After discussing the achievement of this non-obstructive 'Dharma Realm', Huayan thought further explains the logic behind this achievement through the following concepts.

2.4.3.4 Interpenetration

In order to resolve an incompatibility amongst events not only at a theoretical but also at a practical level, Huayan suggests the idea of 'interpenetration' (Chi. *xiangji xiangshe* 相即相攝), explaining the relationship amongst various events.

As Fazang noted, there is always an element of 'emptiness' in a *dharma* or an event. On the one hand, there is its appearance, on the other its 'emptiness'. So, if only the appearances of *dharma*s are taken into consideration, there appear to be contradictions or incompatibilities between them. In order that a *dharma* can contain other *dharma*s without exclusion, Fazang argued

245 Peter N. Gregory, 'Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* vol. 51, no. 2 (1983), pp. 231–249.

246 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, *Foxing yu bore* 佛性與般若 vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2004), pp. 490–491.

247 *DZJ.*, vol. 35, no. 1733, p. 405a. For discussion, see Shengyan 聖嚴, 'Huayanjing de xingqi sixiang 華嚴宗的性起思想', *Neiming* 內明 vol. 1 (1972): 13–15.

248 *DZJ.*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 503a, 16–21.

249 *Ibid.*, vol. 36, no. 1736, pp. 2b29–3a6.

that, when considering the interaction between *dharma*s, one of them should be regarded as empty. The *dharma* which is viewed as empty is like a ‘force’ (Chi. *li* 力) attracting others. In Huayan, this attraction is named ‘*she*’ 攝. By contrast, since the nature of all *dharma*s is actually empty, they can interpenetrate each other without real contradiction. In other words, a *dharma* can penetrate another *dharma* though their appearance may look contradictory. This is like a ‘force’ allowing a *dharma* to go anywhere it wants and this pushing activity is called ‘*ji*’ 即 in the Huayan tradition.²⁵⁰ These ideas of ‘*she*’ and ‘*ji*’, which help ensure that *dharma*s interact with each other without obstruction in dependent arising, comprise the notion of ‘interpenetration’ or *xianqiji xiangshe*.²⁵¹

2.4.3.5 The Ten Mysteries and The Harmony of Six Characters

Both ‘The Ten Mysteries’ (Chi. *shi xuan men* 十玄門) and ‘The Harmony of Six Characters’ (Chi. *liu xiang yuanrong* 六相圓融) describe the harmonious ‘dharma realm’ from various perspectives.²⁵² Fazang listed the titles of the former as below:

1. [The] gate of simultaneous completion and mutual correspondence
2. [The] gate of full possession of the attributes of purity and mixture by the various storehouses
3. [The] gate of the mutual compatibility and difference between the one and the many
4. [The] gate of mutual identification of all *dharma*s existing freely and easily
5. [The] gate of the completion of the secret, the hidden, and the manifest
6. [The] gate of the compatibility and peaceful existence of the subtle and the minute
7. [The] gate of the realm of Indra’s net

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 503b7–504a1.

²⁵¹ For more discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197, pp. 399–414; Winston L. King, ‘Hua-yen Mutually Interpenetrative Identity and Whiteheadian Organic Relation’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 6, no. 4 (1979): 387–410; Nicholas John Jones, ‘Merelogical Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism’, *Philosophy East and West* vol. 60, no. 3 (July 2010): 355–368; Ng Yu-kwan, *Zhongguo foxue de xiandai quashi*, note 240, pp. 104–113.

²⁵² Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu bore* vol. 1, note 246, p. 519; Charles Wei-hsun Fu, ‘Chinese Buddhism as an Existential Phenomenology’, in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka ed., *Analecta Husserliana* vol. xvii *Phenomenology of life in a dialogue between Chinese and occidental philosophy* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), pp. 229–251.

8. [The] gate of replying on facts in order to explain *dharma*s and create understanding
9. [The] gate of different formation of separate *dharma*s in ten ages
10. [The] gate of the excellent completion through the turning and transformation of the mind only²⁵³

In general, each item helps suggest the idea that no matter where the discussion begins, the result is always harmonious from the perspective of 'Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Dharma Realm' or *fajie yuanti*.²⁵⁴ This idea is also applicable to the discussion of 'The Harmony of Six Characters'. As Fazang argued, in relation to his gold lion analogy:

The lion represents the character of universality. The five sense organs, being various and different, represent the character of specialty. The fact that they all arise from one single cause represents the character of similarity. The fact that its eyes, ears, and so forth do not exceed their bounds represents the character of difference. Since the combination of the various organs becomes the lion, this is the character of integration. And as each of the several organs remains in its own position, this is the character of disintegration.²⁵⁵

In the citation, three pairs of seemingly contradictory concepts are observed: 'the character of universality' and 'the character of specialty', 'the character of similarity' and 'the character of difference', as well as 'the character of integration' and 'the character of disintegration' respectively. Since the nature of all *dharma*s is actually empty, such dualisms as listed above are only created by sentient beings, which represent seeing the lion from different limited perspectives. Being aware of it helps in the resolution of the apparent dualism.

253 The Chinese names of these mysteries are '同時具足相應門', '諸藏純雜具德門', '一多相容不同門', '諸法相即自在門', '秘密隱顯俱成門', '微細相容安立門', '因陀羅網境界門', '託事顯法生解門', '十世隔法異成門' and '唯心回轉善成門' respectively. See *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1881, pp. 669b15–670b6. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, pp. 411–413.

254 Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197, p. 438. Historically, there were some differences in the names of 'the ten mysteries' between Zhiyan and Fazang. For more on this, see Liu, *ibid.*, pp. 438–442.

255 The original Chinese is '師子是總相，五根差別是別相；共從一緣起是同相，眼、耳等不相濫是異相；諸根合會是成相，諸根各住自位是壞相。' *DZJ*, vol. 45, No. 1881, pp. 670b, 7–10. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, p. 413.

Although Fang and Tang did not use the concepts of ‘The Ten Mysteries’ and ‘The Harmony of Six Characters’ directly, I argue that these categories help sharpen our understanding of their appropriations of Huayan in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’, a point I will discuss further in chapters 3 and 4.²⁵⁶

2.4.3.6 Theory of Doctrinal Classification

Based on all the above concepts, Huayan comments on different Buddhist theories and classifies them into various categories to develop its own version of the theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ (Chi. *panjiao* 判教). In brief, a theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ has two aims. The first is to rank the value of different Buddhist theories while the second is to dissolve the apparent contradictions and conflicts amongst various Buddhist theories by arguing that the theories are developed at different times and for different purposes. In other words, Buddhist theories can be classified as both provisional and ultimate.²⁵⁷ In short, a ‘doctrinal classification’ theory aims to harmonize different forms of thought within a system.²⁵⁸

Although there are some differences between the theories of ‘doctrinal classification’ amongst Huayan’s various patriarchs,²⁵⁹ they are largely based on Fazang’s model, which he described as follows:

1. Although the lion is a *dharma* produced through causation, and comes into and goes out of existence every moment, there is really no character of the lion to be found. This is called the Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples.
2. These *dharma*s produced through causation are each without self-nature. It is absolutely Emptiness. This is called the Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle.

256 For more discussion about these two concepts, see Charles Wei-hsun Fu, ‘Chinese Buddhism as an Existential Phenomenology’, note 252.

257 Peter N. Gregory, ‘Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen’, note 245.

258 Huo Taohui 霍韜晦, *Juedui yu yuanrong* 絕對與圓融 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 2002), pp. 340–422. For more discussion, see Qu Dacheng 屈大成, *Foxue lunwen ji* 佛學論文集 (Hong Kong: Xianggang chengshi daxue Zhongguo wenhua zhongxin 香港城市大學中國文化中心, 2013), pp. 11–13; Chiu King Pong 趙敬邦, ‘Lun Moxue zai huanjing lunlunxue zhong de yiyi 論墨學在環境倫理學中的意義’, *Yingyong lunli pinglun* 應用倫理評論 vol. 59 (Oct 2015): 1–24.

259 For various theories, see Peter N. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 115–135; Liu Ming-wood, ‘The P’an-Chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism’, *T’oung Pao* vol. LXVII, 1–2 (1981): 10–47.

3. Although there is absolutely only Emptiness, this does not prevent the illusory *dharmas* from being clearly what they are. The two characteristics of coming into existence through causation and dependent existence coexist. This is called the Final Doctrine of the Great Vehicle.
4. These two characteristics eliminate each other and both perish, and (consequently) neither (the products of) our feelings nor false existence remain. Neither of them has any more power, and both Emptiness and existence perish. Names and descriptions will be completely discarded and the mind will be at rest and have no more attachment. This is called the Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment.
5. When the feelings have been eliminated and true substance revealed, all becomes an undifferentiated mass. Great Function then arises in abundance, and whenever it does, there is surely Perfect Reality. All phenomena are in great profusion, and are interfused but not mixed (losing their own identity). This all is the one, for both are similar in being nonexistent in nature. And the one is the all, for (the relationship between) cause and effect is perfectly clear. As the power (of the one) and the function (of the many) embrace each other, their expansion and contraction are free and at ease. This is called the Rounded (inclusive) Doctrine of the One (all-inclusive) Vehicle.²⁶⁰

In the citation, the 'Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples' or 'Small Teaching' is *Hīnayāna*. The 'Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle' or 'Initial Teaching' is *Mahāyāna*, such as *Mādhyamika* and Consciousness-Only. The 'Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle' or 'Final Teaching' is the system of *tathāgatagarbha*, including that of *Dasheng qixin lun*. The 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' or 'Sudden Teaching' is Chan Buddhism.²⁶¹ The category of '*yuan jiao*' 圓教, which is described as 'Great Function' and

260 The original Chinese is '師子雖是緣生之法，念念生滅，實無師子相可得。名聲聞教。此師子緣生之法，各無自性，徹底唯空。名大乘始教。此師子雖然徹底，唯空不礙，幻法宛然。緣生假有，二相雙存。故名大乘終教。即此二相，互奪兩亡。情偽不存，俱無有力，空有雙泯，名言路絕，栖心無寄。故名大乘頓教。即此師子情盡體露之法，混成一塊。繁興大用，起必全真。萬象紛然，參而不雜。一切即一，皆同無性。一即一切，因果歷然。力用相收，卷舒自在。故名一乘圓教。' See *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1881, pp. 669a11–669b14. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, pp. 410–411. In points 3 and 4, however, I have changed the translation from Chan's 'characters' to 'characteristics'.

261 Liu Ming-wood, 'The P'an-Chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism', note 259.

'Rounded (inclusive) Doctrine of the One (all-inclusive) Vehicle' in the citation and is usually translated as 'Perfect Teaching' in other studies,²⁶² was classified by Huayan into two further types. The first is the thought of Tiantai, which is 'The Common Teaching of the One Vehicle' (Chi. *tongjiao yicheng yuanjiao* 同教一乘圓教). The second type, which is Huayan thought, is called 'The Distinct Teaching of the One Vehicle' (Chi. *biejiao yicheng yuanjiao* 別教一乘圓教).²⁶³ In order to comprehend this classification better, a brief introduction to Tiantai thought, and its theory of 'doctrinal classification' in particular, is needed.

Similar to Huayan, Tiantai's patriarchs also viewed their thought as '*yuan*', though what '*yuan*' designates in these two Buddhist traditions is not exactly the same. In Tiantai's 'doctrinal classification' system, Buddhist theories are classified into four according to the nature of the teaching. The first is primary teaching (Chi. *zangjiao* 藏教), which means the basic teachings of Buddha like the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path. The second is common teaching (Chi. *tongjiao* 通教), which means the thought of *Prajñā*, the idea commonly accepted by all Buddhist schools. The third is distinct teaching (Chi. *biejiao* 別教), which means the thought of Consciousness-Only, *tathāgatagarbha* and the function in becoming Buddha. The fourth is '*yuanjiao*', which stresses the emptiness of the mind. Since the mind is empty, it has no fixed or unchanged characteristics. In this sense, therefore, the mind can communicate with others without any prejudiced views. This mind, which contains all thought theoretically, includes evil and the possibility of multiple worlds being contained in a momentary thought, ideas which were central to

262 There are different translations of the term '*yuan*'. Some studies translate it as 'perfect'. For example, see Liu Jee-loo, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: from Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), p. 409. Since the original word '*yuan*' in Chinese means 'round' or 'circle', it is also seen in some studies that '*yuan*' is simply translated into 'round'. See Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197. Actually, Huayan's idea of '*yuan*' is not quite the same as 'perfect'. Its implication is also more than 'round' or 'circle'. In many Chinese phrases such as '*yuanrong wuai*' 圓融無礙, '*yuan*' means harmony without obstruction. Therefore, '*yuan*' is translated as 'inclusiveness' in individual studies. See Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 26, p. 410. Considering the complexity of the term, I follow Mou Zongsan's idea of not translating it into any single word here. See his *Zhongguo zhixue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1999), pp. 314–316.

263 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 477a–509a4. For the translations of the terms, see Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang—An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 197, p. 159.

the Tiantai's concept of 'One Instant Thought contains the Three Thousand Worlds' (Chi. *yinian sanqian* 一念三千) and 'Evil in the Buddha Nature' (Chi. *foju xing* 佛具性惡). As the mind is all-inclusive, no specific state should be attached to it. Therefore, while the empty characteristic of a *dharma* is noted, at the same time, its other characteristics such as appearance should also be noted. Without being attached to any single characteristic of a *dharma*, the middle way is achieved. However, the Tiantai School stresses that even the middle way should not become a subject of attachment. That means that the emptiness, the appearance and the middle way of a *dharma* are all experienced in a single moment. Meanwhile, one should not be attached to any of them. This idea of Tiantai is called 'Harmony of Three Truths' (Chi. *sandi yuanrong* 三諦圓融). It is due to this inclusiveness that Tiantai claims its thought 'yuan', implying that all Buddhist theories are included in it.²⁶⁴

From Huayan's perspective, however, Tiantai thought is merely a kind of relative truth since it is only comparatively better than other Buddhist theories. The thought of Huayan, on the other hand, is absolute truth as it is based on the 'Dharma Realm' stemming from the function of *tathāgatagarbha*, a state different from other sentient beings by nature.²⁶⁵ As is seen in the citation on Huayan's doctrinal classification theory above, the *tathāgatagarbha* is the ground from which various *dharma*s are regarded to be interpenetrative with each other. All the above help explain the basic ideas of Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification.

Certainly, the complete content of Huayan thought is much more complex than what I have been describing. My intention here is simply to provide a preparatory background for the main study of Fang and Tang. Therefore, the ideas outlined here are mainly those Huayan ideas which Fang and Tang reinterpreted. Before we turn to their interpretations, however, I will first briefly mention some of the other modern developments of the Huayan School in order to show the contrast with the approaches of Fang and Tang.

264 For Tiantai's theory, see *DZJ*, vol. 46, no. 1929, pp. 721a–769a. Also see David W. Chappell ed., *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism: An Outline of the Fourfold Teachings* (Tokyo: Daiichi-Shobo, 1983); Mun Chanju, *The History of Doctrinal Classification in Chinese Buddhism: A Study of the Panjiao Systems* (Maryland and Oxford: University Press of America, 2006), pp. 123–168; Chiu King Pong 趙敬邦, 'Cong 'yiniansanqian' dao 'bukesiyi'—Tiantai Zhizhe dashi youguan zhuti taolun chutan 從「一念三千」到「不可思議」—天臺智者大師有關主體討論初探', *Ehu xuezhi* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 40 (June 2008): 121–152.

265 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1869, pp. 522b3–11. Also see Huo Taohui, *Juedui yu yuanrong*, note 258, pp. 395–396.

2.4.4 *The Modern Development of the Huayan School*

Undeniably, compared with the Huayan School in the Tang Dynasty, the development of Huayan in later periods has attracted little attention in academia. For instance, in *Buddhism in the Sung*, the work which famously discusses that Buddhism was not in decline after the Tang Dynasty, Huayan thought is almost completely ignored.²⁶⁶ Although individual studies discuss the Huayan School and its thought in later periods, the discussion has been rather general.²⁶⁷ In this sense, I argue that any study about the development of Huayan after the Tang Dynasty would be valuable.²⁶⁸ In this study, however, I do not consider the thought of Huayan between the Tang Dynasty and the modern period, as this was not the concern of Fang and Tang. Instead, I consider the Huayan School in early twentieth-century China, as to some extent, this helps explain the circumstances in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought.

As I briefly remarked in Chapter 1, the monk Yuexia set up a 'Huayan University' in Shanghai in the early 1910s, where he attracted more than eighty young monks to study with him. In its school manifesto, it is clearly recorded that the objective of the 'University' was to study Huayan teaching, with *Huayanjing* and Fazang's *Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 (*An Outline of the Huayan Teaching of the One Vehicle*)²⁶⁹ as the core readings. However, due to financial difficulties, the 'University' only lasted until 1916. Although Yuexia is considered the figure who revived the Huayan School in modern times, it is also said that the 'University' he set up was only a place specifically discussing Huayan thought,²⁷⁰ implying that the teachings in the 'University' were not responsive enough to the issues facing the outside world. To a large extent, therefore, the efforts of Yuexia cannot be considered a success.

Amongst the young monks studying with Yuexia, Chisong 持松 (1894–1972) is probably the most important. While most of the works written by Huayan monks in the early twentieth-century were lost, Chisong's *Huayanzong jiaoyi*

266 Peter N. Gregory and Daniel A. Getz, Jr. ed., *Buddhism in the Sung* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

267 For example, see Wei Daoru 魏道儒, *Zhongguo Huayanzong tongshi* 中國華嚴宗通史 (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe 鳳凰出版社, 2008), pp. 193–238.

268 The work by Wang Song 王頌 is an exception which clearly discusses Huayan in the Song Dynasty. See his *Songdai Huayan sixiang yanjiu* 宋代華嚴思想研究 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe 宗教文化出版社, 2008).

269 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 477a–509a.

270 Chen Yongge 陳永革, *Fojiao honghua de xiandai zhuanxing: Minguo Zhejiang fojiao yanjiu, 1912–1949* 佛教弘化的現代轉型：民國浙江佛教研究, 1912–1949 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2003), pp. 58–61.

shimoji 華嚴宗教義始末記 (*The Complete Teachings of the Huayan School*)²⁷¹ is one of the rare works which is extant. In this work, Chisong concentrated on Huayan's doctrinal classification theory, comparing every detail amongst various Buddhist teachings through the eyes of Huayan thought. However, none of the other important concepts of Huayan thought like the Dharma Realm, Dependent Arising, Nature Arising and the Ten Mysteries were discussed, nor was the idea of using Huayan thought to respond to the current challenge of 'scientism'. As Fafang 法舫 (1904–1951), a monk in the time of Chisong, suggested, the method of study at 'Huayan University' was 'old-fashioned'. As a result, the Huayan School at that time has not 'contributed much to the philosophical current in contemporary Buddhism'.²⁷²

In my view, Chisong's work helps support the idea that Huayan studies in early twentieth-century China were not sufficient to handle the difficulties facing the country. Although it is correct to say that Chisong did go back to the origins of Huayan thought, he failed to develop new elements from it. From this point of view, I argue that Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan ideas to develop their theories were definitely a way forward in making this Buddhist tradition more responsive to the current world. As I will discuss in the later chapters, in the eyes of Fang and Tang, Huayan thought is never an 'old' Buddhist tradition lacking vitality. Instead, Huayan thought helps enrich the '*ti*' and complement the '*yong*' of 'Chinese culture', and of Confucianism in particular. This point not only shows the characteristics of Fang's and Tang's thought, but also explains their role in modern Huayan studies, an issue which has not been fully recognised in academia. This, therefore, brings our discussion from the historical context to the field of modern Chinese philosophical discourse.

2.5 Fang and Tang as Models of 'Chinese Hermeneutics'— A Preliminary Discussion

The discussion above has indicated the historical context in which Fang and Tang employed Huayan thought, and has provided an introduction to this Buddhist tradition. However, as I noted in Chapter 1, Fang's and Tang's appropriations of the thought should also be considered in relation to 'Chinese hermeneutics' (Chi. *Zhongguo quanshixue* 中國詮釋學), an issue widely

²⁷¹ Chisong, *Huayan zong jiaoyi shimoji* (Taipei: Kongting shuyuan 空庭書苑, 2008).

²⁷² For discussion, see Chapter 1, notes 25 and 26.

discussed in the field of current Chinese philosophical study. In order to complete this preparatory material, I outline the key issues of this below.

As we all know, the use of the term 'hermeneutics' in the West largely derives from the thought of such influential philosophers as Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002). Instead of studying the thought of these philosophers in Chinese, 'Chinese hermeneutics' discusses the hermeneutic tradition in terms of Chinese philosophy, stressing that it is not simply a kind of limited 'hermeneutics in China'.²⁷³ As I highlight, 'Chinese hermeneutics' mainly describes various methods of interpreting Chinese thought rather than discussing *why* we interpret the thought in such different ways. In other words, metaphysical discussion is not the subject matter of 'Chinese hermeneutics' and the relationship between it and the hermeneutics in the West is, therefore, not as close as their names may suggest.

Among those involved in the discussion, Cheng Chung-ying 成中英 (1935–) is probably the first to use the term 'hermeneutics' to describe his thought, which he calls 'Ontological Hermeneutics' (Chi. *Benti quanshixue* 本體詮釋學). According to Cheng, 'Ontological Hermeneutics' suggests that different parts of the world are inter-related.²⁷⁴ Therefore, Chinese thought should not be discussed from a single view, even that of 'Heart-Mind and Nature' (Chi. *Xinxing* 心性).²⁷⁵ In my view, this suggestion of Cheng is implicitly a response to the academic convention created by Xiong Shili. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, Cheng's idea of 'Ontological Hermeneutics' seems to be inspired by Thomé H. Fang,²⁷⁶ who was a teacher of the former. In this sense, therefore,

273 Tang Yijie 湯一介, *Wo de zhhexue zhi lu* 我的哲學之路 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 新華出版社, 2006), pp. 280–310; also see the discussion among Yu Dunkang 余敦康, Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, Hong Handing 洪漢鼎 and Li Minghui 李明輝, see Hong Handing ed., *Zhongguo quanshixue* 中國詮釋學 vol. 1 (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe 山東人民出版社, 2003), pp. 247–254.

274 Cheng Chung-ying, 'Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics', in Mou Bo ed., *Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 33–59.

275 Cheng Chung-ying, 'An Onto-Hermeneutic Interpretation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Philosophy: Identity and Vision', in Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin ed., *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 365–404.

276 Although without further explanation, Lauren F. Pfister also notes this point. See his 'Hermeneutics: Philosophical Understanding and Basic Orientations', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 33, S1 (2006): 3–23.

Cheng is thus not the first proposing a perspective other than Xiong's in interpreting Chinese thought in modern Chinese philosophical studies.²⁷⁷

Rather than focusing on the method of interpreting Chinese thought, Charles Wei-hsun Fu 傅偉勳 (Fu Weixun, 1933–1996) pays more attention to the function of Chinese thought in the contemporary world, putting forward the idea of 'Creative Hermeneutics' (Chi. *chuangzao quanshixue* 創造詮釋學).²⁷⁸ As Fu argues, there are five levels of interpretation. The first is to study 'What exactly did the original thinker or text say?', which he regards as a kind of philological study of the text. The second is to study 'What did the original thinker intend or mean to say?', which he considers a type of linguistic study of the text. To Fu, both of them help discover the 'original meaning' of a text. The third level of interpretation is to study 'What could the original thinker have said?' or 'What could the original thinker's sayings have implied?', which is to examine the text from a historical point of view. The fourth is to study 'What should the original thinker have said?' or 'What should the creative hermeneutician say on behalf of the original thinker?', which is to study the different interpretations of the text in a more critical way, trying to discover the implications of the interpretations. The fifth is to study 'What must the original thinker say now?' or 'What must the creative hermeneutician do now, in order to carry out the unfinished philosophical task of the original thinker?', which aims to elaborate the ideas of the original thinker so that the ideas can meet current needs.²⁷⁹ In Fu's view, the last type of hermeneutics is the most important, if Chinese thought is to play a role in the contemporary world. In brief, transforming traditional Chinese thought is the focus of Fu's ideas,²⁸⁰ which correlates with the subject matter of this study as Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought are to 'go back to the origin and develop new elements'. In fact, the view that Chinese thought is not creative enough to respond to the current challenges is a main criticism that many scholars make

277 For more discussion about Cheng's ideas, see Lai Xianzong 賴賢宗, *Rujia quanshixue* 儒家詮釋學 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 2010), pp. 1–24.

278 For the questions listed, I refer to Fu's original writings. See his *Cong chuangzao de quanshixue dao dasheng Foxue* 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1990), pp. 9–12.

279 For details, see Fu, *ibid.*, pp. 12–46; Charles Wei-hsun Fu, *Xuewen de shengming yu shengming de xuewen* 學問的生命與生命的學問 (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局, 1993), pp. 220–258.

280 See Charles Wei-hsun Fu, 'Philosophical Reflections on the Modernization of Confucianism as Traditional Morality', in Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegel ed., *Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues: an Analysis and Sourcebook of Development since 1945* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 303–323.

about Chinese philosophy.²⁸¹ However, as I will discuss in Chapter 5, this criticism may be inappropriate.

Although Fu stresses that knowledge in philology, linguistics and history are all important in interpreting Chinese thought, to some scholars, there is a concern that his suggestion of 'Creative Hermeneutics' may be so 'creative' that the 'original meaning' of a thought may be easily misinterpreted.²⁸² To respond to this issue, Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢 suggests that 'Chinese philosophy' should be viewed as an academic discipline but not a recipe for 'national identity' or a kind of 'Chicken Soup for the Soul'. Only in this way can philosophical construction avoid the problems of 'subjectivity' and arbitrariness.²⁸³ However, as many influential thinkers such as Chan Wing-tsit and Lao Sze-kwang emphasise, ancient Chinese thinkers were always active players in society. They put forward their theories not to develop a School but to respond to specific issues in their lifetimes. In other words, their thought cannot be comprehended separately from their lives, situations and feelings.²⁸⁴ As I argue in this study, Fang's and Tang's thoughts are certainly in line with Chan's and Lao's approach, as they seek to respond to the challenge of 'scientism'. In short, there is a close relationship between the historical context in their lifetime and their theories. I therefore doubt whether Fang's and Tang's thought can be properly understood if it is only investigated as an academic subject, and with their daily concerns ignored.

281 As Neville notes, Chinese philosophy needs to be more creative about the issues facing our time, implying that the past philosophical study is not able to meet the current needs. See Robert Cummings Neville, 'New Projects in Chinese Philosophy', *The Pluralist* vol. 5, no. 2 (2010): 45–56; for similar comments, see Yin Lujun, 'The Crisis of Hermeneutical Consciousness in Modern China', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 17, no. 4 (1990): 401–425.

282 See discussion among Liu Shu-hsien, Li Minghui 李明輝, Ye Guoliang 葉國良 and Huang Junjie 黃俊傑. See Huang Junjie ed., *Zhongguo jingdian quanshi chuantong* vol. 1: *Tonglun pian* 中國經典詮釋傳統 (一) 通論篇 (Taipei: Ximalaya yanjiu fazhan jijinhui 喜瑪拉雅研究發展基金會, 2002), pp. 433–454.

283 Liu Xiaogan, *Quanshi yu dingxiang: Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa zhi tanjiu* 詮釋與定向：中國哲學研究方法之探究 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 2009), pp. 2–12. For more discussion, see Carine Defoort, 'Orientational Issues in Textual Interpretation: Editor's Introduction to Essays by Liu Xiaogan', *Contemporary Chinese Thought* vol. 40, no. 2 (2008/09): 3–6; Thomas A. Metzger, *The Ivory Tower and the Marble Citadel: Essays on Political Philosophy in Our Modern Era of Interacting Cultures* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2012), pp. 385–393.

284 See the discussion of Chan Wing-tsit, in H. G. Creel ed., *Chinese Civilization in Liberal Education* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 132–169; Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* vol. 1, note 26, pp. 10–12.

To conclude, three main points can be drawn from the above discussion. First, Chinese thought needs to be transformed so that it can meet current needs more effectively. Second, such transformation should avoid arbitrariness. Third, even though the concept of 'Heart-Mind and Nature' may play a central role in Chinese thought, and Confucianism in particular,²⁸⁵ one needs to avoid being attached to any one specific position. Otherwise, other perspectives may be easily overlooked. I argue that this final point is particularly important in order to comprehend Fang's and Tang's thought, which I go on to discuss in the following chapters.

285 For details, see section 1.2.

Thomé H. Fang and Huayan Thought

In Chapter 1, I mentioned that Thomé H. Fang is generally ignored in studies about ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, and this neglect relates both to his own thought and his interpretations of different intellectual traditions. For instance, after Fang’s death, it was only Tang Junyi who observed that Fang’s *Kexue zhexue yu rensheng* 科學哲學與人生 (*Science, Philosophy and Human Life*), published in 1936, was a response to ‘the polemic on science and metaphysics’ or *ke xuan dazhan* in the 1920s.¹ During a speech in 1974, in fact, Fang criticized ‘scientism’ severely, considering it the cause of Marxism to which human beings must carefully respond.² In this sense, I argue that Fang’s thought did try to deal with the challenge of ‘scientism’. On the other hand, it is only recently that Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought has been critically discussed by individual scholars.³ In this chapter, I link these two elements together, discussing the relationship between his response to ‘scientism’ and his interpretation of Huayan thought.

3.1 Thomé H. Fang’s General Philosophy

3.1.1 *The Life of Fang and Major Characteristics of his Work*

Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899–1977) was born in Tongcheng 桐城, in the Chinese province of Anhui 安徽, to a family famous for its contributions to Chinese scholarship.⁴ Thanks to the excellent private education offered by his family, Fang acquired an outstanding knowledge of literary Chinese.

1 Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian* 中華人文與當今世界補編 vol. 2 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005), pp. 994–996.

2 Thomé H. Fang, *Fang Dongmei xiansheng yanjiangji* 方東美先生演講集 (Taipei: Liming wenhua 黎明文化, 2005), pp. 305–314.

3 Qu Dacheng 屈大成, ‘Lun Fang Dongmei dui huayan sixiang de quanshi 論方東美對華嚴思想的詮釋’, *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 37, no. 12 (2010): 67–81; Chiu King Pong 趙敬邦, ‘Luelun Fang Dongmei xiansheng dui Huayan de quanshi—huiying Qu Dacheng xiansheng 略論方東美先生對華嚴的詮釋—回應屈大成先生’, *Ehu xuezhishi* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 50 (Aug 2013): 243–253.

4 There were numerous influential scholars, such as Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611–1671) and Fang Bao 方苞 (1668–1749), coming from the Fang family of Tongcheng. For more details, see Wan

In 1918, he studied philosophy at the University of Jinling, a university with a Christian background established by an American missionary at that time. In 1921, Fang continued his graduate studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in the United States where he obtained a master's degree by completing a thesis, 'A Critical Exposition of the Bergsonian Philosophy of Life' in 1922. Although it is commonly considered that Fang also gained a doctorate degree from the same university in 1924, this has never been confirmed.⁵ After returning from the United States, he taught in some universities in mainland China, including the Central University (now the University of Nanjing) in 1929 where Tang Junyi was one of his students. In 1948, Fang fled to Taiwan to escape the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and chaired the department of philosophy of the National Taiwan University. He never returned to mainland China but concentrated on his academic life in Taiwan and the United States. He died in 1977 from a combination of lung and liver cancer.

Since Fang was a rather reticent figure, some mysteries about him remain. Apart from being regarded as a PhD graduate, Fang is also considered to have become a Buddhist layman in his last years.⁶ However, the accuracy of this is in some doubt as it is said that he fainted during the related Buddhist ceremony.⁷

Xiaoping 宛小平, *Fang Dongmei yu Zhong xi zhexue* 方東美與中西哲學 (Hefei: Anhui daxue chubanshe 安徽大學出版社, 2008), pp. 17–19.

- 5 Most studies about Fang mention that he held a PhD by finishing thesis 'A Comparative Study of British and American Neo-Realism'. However, this thesis is not recorded in the University library. Although some scholars explained that the thesis was not published due to 'lack of funding', a reply I got from the Department of Philosophy of the University on 28 October 2010 shows that Fang's record as a student there is only up to master level. In this sense, I argue that Fang may not be officially considered a PhD graduate. For the defence of Fang's doctorate status, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing* 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 2007), p. 172. For the reply from the University, see Chiu King Pong, *Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi and the Appropriation of Huayan Thought* (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 2014), Appendix 1. I copy the reply and include it as appendix 1 to this study. Coincidentally, just after the death of Fang, it was Tang Junyi who mentioned that Fang only held a master's degree. See Tang, *ZRDSB* vol. 2, note 1. Tang's query, however, did not raise any attention from academia.
- 6 Zhou Xuande 周宣德, 'Fang Dongmei jiaoshou yu foxue de yinyuan 方東美教授與佛學的因緣', *Neiming* 內明 vol. 66 (1977): 8.
- 7 Xu Ti 許逖, 'Xueti zhongxiao ku xiansheng: dao Dongmei enshi 雪涕終宵哭先生一悼東美恩師', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 4, no. 8 (1977): 64–73.

Together with his being labeled as a 'Contemporary Neo-Confucian',⁸ his core ideas seem to be far from well understood. The following self-portrait of Fang, which was made at the 1964 East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, is seen as a summary of his academic life: 'I am a Confucian by family tradition, a Taoist by temperament, a Buddhist by religious inspiration; moreover, I am a Westerner by training.'⁹

Unlike the cases of Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili who had a long history of studying Buddhist ideas, Fang's interest in Buddhism developed rather suddenly. As Fang himself said, it was under the hardship of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) that he studied Buddhism, of the Huayan School in particular. What he did at that time, as he jokingly described, was 'study Huayan, [and] make poor poetry'.¹⁰ There is no record of his reading Buddhist journals or communicating with Buddhist scholars and monks, though it is said that Fang was deeply interested in Sanskrit in his later years.¹¹ His first writing about Buddhist thought was probably the letter in which he debated Buddhist ideas with Xiong in 1938.¹² Before that, his writings were mainly about Western philosophy, Positivism and the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) in particular.¹³ According to Fang, in fact, it was not until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War that he changed his focus from Western philosophy to Chinese thought.¹⁴ In this sense, Fang seems to be a cultural nationalist. However, as I will discuss in depth later, he never argued that Chinese thought

8 Yao Xinzong, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 255–260; Wen Haiming, *Chinese Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 152; Jesús Solé-Farràs, *New Confucianism in Twenty-First Century China: the Construction of a Discourse* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 123–125.

9 For summary of Fang's life, see his *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981), pp. 525–530; Feng Huxiang, *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing*, note 5, pp. 165–264.

10 Feng Huxiang, *ibid.*, p. 37.

11 Ye Ayue 葉阿月, 'Fang Dongmei jiaoshou yeshi haoxue fanwen de xuezhe—you gou-mai yibu 'fan he dacidian' er zhuisi 方東美教授也是好學梵文的學者—由購買一部《梵和大辭典》而追思', in Executive Committee of the International Symposium on Thomé H. Fang's Philosophy ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue* 方東美先生的哲學 (Taipei: Youshi wenhua 幼獅文化, 1989), pp. 401–405.

12 The letter is reproduced in Thomé H. Fang, *Zhongguo dasheng foxue* 中國大乘佛學 vol. 2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua 黎明文化, 2004), pp. 382–404.

13 See catalogue of Fang's writings, Fang Keli 方克立 and Li jinquan 李錦全 ed., *Xiandai xin rujia xuean* 現代新儒家學案 vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1995), pp. 1119–1128.

14 Thomé H. Fang, *Yuanshi rujia daoia zhexue* 原始儒家道家哲學 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1993), pp. 1–2.

was 'superior' to its Western counterpart, rather believing that the superiority of any thought would contradict his appropriation from Huayan thought. Therefore, I argue that regarding Fang as a cultural nationalist may lead to a misunderstanding of his thought. Rather than defending the value of Chinese thought, his ultimate plan was to write a grand study on the comparative philosophy of life. However, he was unable to finish this before he died and we are now left with only the outline of the project.¹⁵

In a dialogue with Indian philosopher Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) in 1939, Fang showed his unhappiness with the work on Chinese philosophy produced by English academia and he determined to write in English himself.¹⁶ As he himself said, 'I am now appealing to the English-speaking world for a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese mentality'.¹⁷ Introducing his view in English differentiates Fang from other modern Chinese thinkers, not only in his mode of expression but also in the angle from which he viewed the subject. However, this also makes conducting research about him rather difficult within the Chinese academy. Most of his English writings have now been translated into Chinese and, together with his Chinese works, are included in the complete works of Thomé H. Fang, which were published in Taiwan in 2004. This completion of Fang's work has made conducting research about him less difficult than it might otherwise have been.

However, I would argue that several problems remain in studying Fang. First, eight of his thirteen works are edited from lectures and public addresses, causing his style of expression somewhat inconsistent. Although his most important work, *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*, is a well-structured study, some of its ideas are over-simplified. A full understanding of it requires knowledge of his other work and the situation thus created requires some attention.¹⁸ Together with his writing in English, the fact that Fang's works are mostly edited from lectures and public addresses affects our understanding of his thought, as it suggests that his potential audience or readers were mainly Westerners and Chinese students. To a large extent, Fang did not

15 See Appendix 2. For its sources, see Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, pp. 535–538.

16 Thomé H. Fang, George C. H. Sun 孫智燊 trans., *Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan* 中國哲學精神及其發展 vol. 2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005), pp. 240–241.

17 Thomé H. Fang, *The Chinese View of Life* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981), pp. i–iv.

18 For example, 'ji' 即 is a crucial word in Neo-Confucian thought. Fang suggested that there were six explanations of the word and each explanation made various conclusions to the thought. Unfortunately, further comments are not found due to the poor quality of the recording equipment when such lecture was given. See Thomé H. Fang, *Xin rujia zhexue shiba jiang* 新儒家哲學十八講 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1993), pp. 225–227.

aim at convincing his Chinese contemporaries. I surmise that this is because the influence of 'scientism' had been so prevalent in China that he felt it would have been difficult to challenge it.

Second, again partly due to the poor structure of his work, Fang often confused his comments on different intellectual traditions. Unlike some thinkers who wrote commentaries on existing texts, an accepted custom in the Chinese tradition,¹⁹ Fang wrote no commentaries on existing texts but only gave his general view on different intellectual traditions. Though, strictly speaking, his comments on different and distinct traditions and schools is not the same as his own original thought, they are interrelated. The confusion of Fang's own thought with his views on other traditions certainly hinders the gaining of a clear understanding of his thought, and, as I will show below, is one of the main mistakes that scholars who discuss Fang make. Indeed, Fang expressed his own ideas through his interpretation of various intellectual traditions and evaluated them based on his own perspective.

Moreover, in my view, Fang's mode of expression is worth further attention. It is observed that his mode of expression is synthetic rather than analytic,²⁰ and this is regarded by some scholars as an obstacle to understanding his thought.²¹ In fact, I agree that, as a pioneering thinker who discussed both Chinese and Western thought in early twentieth-century China, Fang's vocabulary or use of words is not precise compared with the thinkers of later times. In this sense, the above observation is correct. However, I argue that if we read Fang's works more carefully, he explicitly thinks that an analytic approach is only helpful in investigating a particular issue and does not help produce an adequate understanding of an entire philosophical system. In other words, only by viewing a system within a larger perspective can we obtain a complete view of it and avoid bias.²² Therefore, it should be recognised that there is probably a rationale behind Fang's synthetic writing style. His comments on individual intellectual traditions, on the one hand, help explain his general thought. On the other hand, his general thought helps explain his comments

19 For details, see John B. Henderson, *Scripture, Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison of Confucian and Western Exegesis* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991).

20 Marc Hermann, 'A Critical Evaluation of Fang Dongmei's Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 34, no. 1, (2007): 59–97.

21 Liu Shu-hsien argues that Fang's 'grand style may not suit the current taste'. See his *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 73–88. Also see his *Zhong xi zhexue lunwenji* 中西哲學論文集 (Taipei: Taiwan xue-sheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1987), p. 5.

22 Fang, YRDZ, note 14, pp. 18–19.

on individual intellectual traditions. In this sense, Fang's thought cannot be regarded as clichéd simply because of his apparent lack of analytic argument.²³ On the contrary, I argue that it is like Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) idea of the 'hermeneutic circle', which suggests that the whole obtains its definition from the parts and the parts can only be understood in the light of the whole.²⁴ This aspect of Fang's writing needs to be remembered throughout the following discussion.

In fact, in his important article 'The Alienation of Man in Religion, Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology',²⁵ which was released at the 1969 East-West Philosophers' Conference at Hawaii, Fang reminds the audiences of his characteristic usage of words:

As we shall come to see, every word in the title of this essay carries with it the character of indeterminacy. Modern logic has set its standard of accuracy in meaning for all words to comply with, in order that their users may not commit a semantic or syntactic crime. The concealed supposition is the naïve 'picture-theory' of language, committing itself to the factitious relation of one-to-one correspondence between sign and object. To me, in the realm of metaphysical inquiry as in the kingdom of poetry, words are roamers with wings, enjoying a vagrant life of their own until the disciplined users know how to usher them into the proper range of symbolic significance.²⁶

Many scholars have stressed that 'poetry-like' style is more popular than analytic style in ancient Chinese philosophical discourse.²⁷ Fang is not exceptional in this respect. In my view, on the one hand, the 'indeterminacy' caused by Fang's 'poetry-like' language is rather difficult to analyze, a problem I discussed above. On the other hand, I argue this writing style of Fang is essential

23 Perhaps Fang's synthetic writing style suggests that his ideas are rather like cliché, and some scholars have carelessly judged Fang's ideas 'inferior' to that of other modern Chinese thinkers without sufficient argument. For this criticism of Fang, see Yan Binggang 顏炳罡, *Dangdai xin ruxue yinlun* 當代新儒學引論 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe 北京圖書館出版社, 1998), pp. 271–274.

24 Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 118–121.

25 Thomé H. Fang, *Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection of Philosophical Essays* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983), pp. 65–102.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 66.

27 Lin Tongqi, Henry Rosemont, Jr. & Roger T. Ames, 'Chinese Philosophy: A Philosophical Essay on the "State-of-the-Art"', *The Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 54, no. 3 (1995): 727–758.

to our understanding of his own thought and his interpretation of Huayan, as well as his response to 'scientism',²⁸ which I will discuss further below. In fact, Fang published a collection of poems,²⁹ a case rare amongst his contemporary Confucian fellows. I argue that this point is also important to our later discussion. In what follows, I firstly explain his criticism of 'scientism', as 'scientism' is viewed by Fang as the root of the failure of Western culture.

3.1.2 Fang on 'Scientism' and the Failure of Western Culture

As I discussed in Chapter 2, some Chinese thinkers in the early twentieth century believed that Western culture was in crisis. Fang was one of them. In a speech delivered during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Fang summarized the problem of Western culture thus:

After the establishment of a system of scientific thought, Westerners in recent times take advantage of it to develop technology and control natural resources for human use. The achievements of such technological civilization are therefore remarkable and we should fully recognize them. However, there are also some problems that we cannot ignore. Since science needs to follow the exactness of logic, pursue the flexibility of means and emphasize the truth of objectivity, it only admits the existence of time, space and material in exploiting the content of nature. It obliterates the importance of the mental attributes of human beings. Therefore, beauty as revealed in the arts, the good as shown by moral character, the truth as revealed by philosophy and religion and any other values are all undervalued and considered a sort of subjective fantasy. This represents a huge crisis in terms of cultural development.³⁰

28 As He Lin argues, Fang's poetic style provides us an alternative way of understanding philosophy, implying that it is not necessarily a shortcoming. See his *Wushinian lai de zhongguo zhixue* 五十年來的中國哲學 (Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2012), pp. 59–60.

29 Thomé H. Fang, *Jianbaijingshe shiji* 堅白精舍詩集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 2013).

30 The original Chinese is '科學思想系統確立之後，近代西洋人更據以發揮權能，產生技術，控制自然界之質力以為人用，於是工業文明的成就因之而大顯。這二三兩點都是我們今日應當誠心嚮往的。但是此中亦有根本困難我們不能置而不辯。近代科學因為要確守邏輯的謹嚴，追求方法的利便，重視客觀的真實，乃遂剝削自然界之內容，只承認時空數量物質之存在。而抹殺人類心理屬性之重要。因此藝術才情所欣賞之美、道德品格所珍重之善、哲學宗教所覃思之真，以及其他種種價值，都失其根據而流為主觀的幻想。這是文化發展上一種極大的危機。' Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 258.

From this, it is obvious that Fang acknowledged the contribution of science. However, he was worried about the fact that the emphasis on science alone could lead to 'scientism', in which other values such as beauty and morality are rejected.³¹ As I will argue in section 3.2, Fang criticized 'scientism' fiercely while discussing Huayan thought, a phenomenon rarely seen during his discussion of various intellectual traditions. In my view, this is because Fang considered that Huayan thought helps construct a response to the challenge of 'scientism', which I will further discuss in the last chapter.

To Fang, the trend of the negation of beauty and the good had been significant in China from the late eighteenth century.³² This trend, however, was even earlier and particularly apparent in the West from the sixteenth century, the time which Fang considered to be the beginning of the development of modern science.³³ In his view, human culture in general was in decline and Western culture was further along this path. To follow the West blindly would only bring China misfortune.³⁴ In this sense, Fang may be considered a cultural pessimist.³⁵ However, Fang did not simply point out the problem but gave a solution to it by developing a new philosophy. In his *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*, Fang said explicitly that his purpose was 'to challenge the Western segregational mode of thought, beset with difficulties in antipathetic duality, by the Chinese wisdom of comprehensive harmony'.³⁶ This so-called 'Western segregational mode of thought', as he argued, was to be healed by means of his idea of 'the correlative structure of men and the world' or 'blueprint', a formula I will explain in section 3.1.4. Before further discussion, an introduction to Fang's idea of metaphysics is needed, as this plays an essential role in his general philosophy.

31 Cheng Shiquan 程石泉, *Zhong xi zhexue helun* 中西哲學合論 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 上海古籍出版社, 2007), p. 406; He Xiuhuang 何秀煌, 'Zhezue de zai fansi: zhezue wang hechu qu 哲學的再反思：哲學往何處去?', in Executive Committee of the International Symposium on Thomé H. Fang's Philosophy ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue* 方東美先生的哲學, note 11, pp. 213–220. In a conversation with Xu Fuguan in the late 1950s, Fang expressed a similar view, saying that Westerners only understand those that are 'visible'. See Qiang Rixin 江日新, 'Zhang Junmai yu 'Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie' xuan yan—qi xiangfa ji suqiu 張君勱與「中國文化與世界」宣言—其想法及訴求', *Ehu xuezhì* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 40 (2008): 130.

32 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, pp. 36–37.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 304–308.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 277–282.

35 For more discussion of this, see Jiang Guobao, 'Traditional Chinese Culture: Contemporary Developments—Profound Selections from the Works of Fang Dongmei', *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1990–91): 63–85.

36 Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. i.

3.1.3 *Fang on the Purpose of Philosophy and the Characteristics of Metaphysics*

In a series of radio broadcasts released just before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Fang argued the purpose of philosophy was as follows:

Philosophy does not teach us how to live because living is our primary instinct and therefore it is not necessary for philosophy to teach it. It is how to live meaningfully and truthfully, that is philosophy's key concern.³⁷

Throughout his writings, Fang stressed that philosophy must be based on the real situations human beings face.³⁸ One of these real situations, Fang suggested, is that our life consists of both rational and emotional characteristics. If philosophy has to explain or deal with the real world effectively, philosophical theory should be able to address both these elements.³⁹ In fact, 'emotion' (Chi. *qing* 情) is always an important issue in Chinese intellectual history, from the time of Confucius (551 BC–479 BC) to the Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties.⁴⁰ In this sense, I argue that Fang's emphasis on 'emotion' is not exceptional from the perspective of Chinese intellectual history, though it does distinguish him from many of his philosopher contemporaries, who considered philosophy purely a product of human reason.⁴¹

In order to deal with both the rational and emotional characteristics in *one* theory, Fang introduced his own classification of metaphysics. According to Fang, there are in general two types of metaphysics within intellectual history:

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- 37 The original Chinese is '哲學不僅僅教我們生活，因為生活是我們的本能要求，用不著哲學來教導，但如何生活纔能取得意義，如何生活纔能實現價值，這卻是哲學上重大的問題。' Thomé H. Fang, *Zhongguo rensheng zhexue* 中國人生哲學 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005), p. 46.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- 39 As Li Chenyang argues, 'life' is the main concern of Fang. See Li Chenyang, 'Fang Dongmei: Philosophy of Life, Creativity and Inclusiveness', Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin ed., *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 263–280.
- 40 For a discussion of 'emotion' in the Chinese intellectual tradition, see Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元, *Qinggan yu lixing* 情感與理性 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 2002).
- 41 When Fang studied in the University of Wisconsin at Madison, it is said that the learning atmosphere there was mostly neo-realistic and anti-Hegelian. In order to know more about Hegel, Fang studied at Ohio State University for a year. See Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, pp. 526–527.

‘praeternatural metaphysics’ and ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’.⁴² The former he explained and critiqued as below:

Judged in the light of their imagined visions, the world is shot through with two irreconcilables. The Absolute Being is set in sheer contrast with the Not-Being. Existence is sharply divided into the authentic and the illusory. Life is disjoined from its natural conditions in the world. Values in the eternal forms of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, and Justice are severed from all the defiled disvalues, namely, the False, the Evil, the Ugly, and the Unjust. The Chinese have taken this stand not so much for the reason that praeternatural metaphysics lays great stress upon the supreme ideals of value, which we do all the more, as for the reason that it has the tendency, explicitly, to impair the concordance and continuity of Nature with Supernature and, implicitly, to hurt the integrity of the human individual which is a healthy soul merged in a sound body so as to form a unified personality or wholesome character.⁴³

It can be seen that the reason for Fang’s dissatisfaction with ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ is that it always divides the world into separate fragments. As a result, Fang argued that it fails to observe the wholeness of the ‘Absolute Being’.⁴⁴ From a praeternatural metaphysical point of view, as Fang suggested, the world is divided into different kinds of dualism, with one side usually in a superior, and the other side an inferior, position. This kind of dualism helps make various concepts contradictory to each other. The pairs of concepts like ‘man and nature’, ‘reason and emotion’, ‘ideal world and actual world’ as well as ‘soul and body’ are some typical examples of the product of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. However, Fang considered that the world does not consist of fragments. Therefore, ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’, a kind of metaphysics emphasizing the wholeness of the world, is more preferable.⁴⁵ He explained this kind of metaphysics as below:

I shall entitle the transcendental metaphysics as a characteristic Chinese doctrine of reality, whatever it may be—a kind of being, a form of existence, a mode of life, or a genus of value—which, on the one hand, cannot be considered as a transcendent object, in abstraction from all

42 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

44 Fang never gave ‘Absolute Being’ a clear definition, which brings several difficulties to his whole theory. I will further discuss this point later.

45 Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. 23.

other natural entities and processes so as to enjoy, in and by itself, the surreptitious prerogative of complete independence; and, on the other, must not be rigidly pinned down to the realm of mere actualities or matters of fact, denuded of the importance for energizing ideality. It rejects neat bifurcation as a method; it disowns hard dualism as a truth. From its viewpoint, both the world and the individual therein are alike considered to be a sort of architectonic unity in which all the relevant basic facts are taken for a solid foundation on which to build up different layers of superstructure, ascending from below till the coping stone is set over them all. Thus a system of transcendental metaphysics is a kind of ideal realism or, what amounts to the same thing, a kind of real idealism.⁴⁶

In short, based on a transcendent-immanent metaphysical point of view, Fang argued that the world is a unity and not to be divided. Both humanity and nature are components of this world. Dualism, therefore, is not applicable in the case of 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics'. Concepts considered contradictory to each other in 'praeternatural metaphysics' are not in opposition within 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics'. According to Fang, 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics' is not only theoretically possible but is observed in such ancient Chinese traditions as Confucianism and Taoism.⁴⁷ An ideal person in this kind of tradition should be a combination of prophet, poet and sage, which implies that different varieties of value can be found in human beings.⁴⁸ This point is important to our discussion of Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought and his response to 'scientism' as it suggests, in Fang's mind, that an ideal person should not have scientific knowledge alone, but needs to possess different values. This ideal personhood, which can be achieved through the following 'correlative structure of men and the world' or 'blueprint', further shows the limitations of 'praeternatural metaphysics'.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 19. The last sentence of the citation may look rather abstract at this stage. However, its meaning will be clearer after the discussion of the following sections.

47 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, pp. 76–82.

48 When mentioning the combination of prophet, poet and sage as the ideal personhood, Fang admitted that he was inspired by F. M. Cornford's *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 90–102. See Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. 29. For further discussion of Fang's idea, see also Thomas A. Brennen, 'Congenial Congruence: Thomé Fang's View of the Philosopher-Poet-Sage', in Executive Committee of the International Symposium on Thomé H. Fang's Philosophy ed., *Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang* (Taipei: Youth Cultural, 1989), pp. 103–117.

3.1.4 *Introduction to the 'Correlative Structure of Men and the World' or 'Blueprint'*

As Fang argued that the world should not be divided into fragments, he further suggested that this does not mean that human beings can only focus on the actual world, no matter how many evils and miseries it contains, and avoid pursuing an ideal world. According to Fang, there are actual and ideal elements in our world. The actual world and the ideal world are not separated but dependent on each other.⁴⁹ Although Fang did not provide definitions of the actual world and the ideal world, based on the discussion in the following sections, I consider that his descriptions of the actual world and the ideal world mean the world of physical, biotic and psychic lives and that with 'transcendental value' respectively. Saying that the two worlds are not separated but dependent on each other implies, on the one hand, that the achievement of the ideal world should be based on actual reality. On the other hand, the actual world should be filled with ideal values. As Fang explained:

Our aim of life consists in the realization of supreme Good which, however, is not to be attached merely to the other world. . . . Our ideal world is just the actual world transmuted by the magic of spiritual exaltation. Our virtues are just the enthusiastic endeavours actually accomplished in this real but idealized world.⁵⁰

In Fang's view, we human beings are the key for filling the world with ideal values:

All schools of Chinese philosophy accept the fact that human beings have different kinds of ability. However, these abilities are only the raw material of our life. It is the fact of humanity and we accept them. After that, we need not to denounce or appreciate such abilities. We should, based on the actual situation that human beings have certain kinds of ability, look into the essence of our life and pursue change and development. Through self-knowledge, we can achieve self-development; through self-development, we have self-discipline and self-culture. From the perspective of considering different human abilities as raw material, good can be developed by means of the cultural ideal; both beauty and

49 Thomé H. Fang, *Kexue zhexue yu rensheng* 科學哲學與人生 (Taipei: Hongqiao shudian 虹橋書店, 1965), p. 35.

50 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, p. 61.

truth also lead to relevant accomplishments. We can then achieve a self-ideal.⁵¹

In fact, as many studies have argued when discussing the idea of 'self', several elements were identified by ancient Chinese thinkers, including: a) a body which has biological desires such as the appetites of hunger and sex; b) the capacities for perception and cognition; c) emotion; and d) the capacity for making moral reflection.⁵² In this sense, Fang's argument that there are various abilities of humanity obviously is in line with the ideas of ancient Chinese thinkers. In other words, Fang's idea is not new in Chinese intellectual history. To Fang, there is no doubt that human beings have various kinds of ability, including the ability to move, to create and to think, and all of them help constitute the actual reality human beings inhabit. However, humanity should not be satisfied with this fact but also needs to develop the values hidden within these abilities. In my opinion, the following example may help explain this idea. By employing the capacities to think and create, for instance, we can build an apartment. The product can be regarded as an achievement of our intellect. However, this intellect can do both good and harm to our society. On the one hand, we can employ our intellect to build an apartment. On the other hand, however, we can also employ it to make a weapon. If we only concentrate on the abilities to think and create, the ideal side of the world is not necessarily noted. Fang stressed that the abilities always contain values and it is through developing good values that the actual world can become ideal. Let us go back to the previous example. Through building an aesthetic and safe apartment, we can show the values of beauty and morality, and there are always values hidden in our abilities. By developing such values, human beings can improve themselves from a lower level, which consists of various kinds of ability with utilitarian values, to a higher level, as Fang argues:

51 The original Chinese is '中國各派的哲學家，承認人類有知能才性，而這只是做人的一種資具及原料，我們把它接受。接受了之後，從來不在價值上面貶抑它，也不在價值上面歌頌它！這是人類的現實，接受人類的現實，就人類的知能才性來觀察他的本性，再求其變遷、發展，經 self-knowledge，產生 self-development，經 self-development 產生 self-discipline，self-culture，如此把人類的知能才性當做一種原料，以文化的理想培養出來向善的發展；美的方面，引導向美的修養；真的方面，引導向真的修養。這樣產生「自我理想」(self-ideal)。' See Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 116.

52 Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexue shi* 新編中國哲學史 vol. 1 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005), p. 109; Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 26–37.

We should develop our life by increasing the value level by level—from the material world to the sphere of original life, then the sphere of mind, the sphere of art, the sphere of morality and the sphere of religion.⁵³

This process of progression is further explained in the following 'blueprint', which explains the 'correlative structure of men and the world':⁵⁴




FIGURE 1 *The correlative structure of men and the world. Source: Thomé H. Fang, Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection of Philosophical Essays, 1983, p. 84.*

53 The original Chinese is '我們要把人的生命領域，一層一層地向上提昇，由物質世界—生命境界—心靈境界—藝術境界—道德境界—宗教境界'. Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 276.

54 For its source, see Fang, *CMN*, note 25, p. 84.

As can be seen, some terms in the figure are in Latin. In fact, in order to explain his ideas to different audiences and readers, Fang not only employed various languages such as Chinese, English and even Latin intermittently in his works, but also cited the works of different Western scholars, including literary authors, wherever he felt necessary. Perhaps because he used diverse languages and materials, Fang is generally considered a thinker who is adept at comparative philosophy.⁵⁵ However, in my view, Fang tended to consider that the ideas as suggested in the 'blueprint' are universally shared by various ancient civilizations, including China, India and Greece.⁵⁶ Employing Latin, to some extent, helps support his implicit claim that ideas in the 'blueprint' *did* exist in the ancient civilizations, including those in the Latin tradition. This explains why Fang used Latin in his 'blueprint' without giving a detailed explanation of individual terms. This principle seems to apply to his interpretation of Huayan thought, in which he employed Sanskrit, a point I will further discuss later in this chapter. In brief, I think that Fang's use of various languages in his works aims to show the universality of his ideas, that is, to develop a 'world philosophy'.⁵⁷ In this sense, as I mentioned before, we should not consider Fang as simply a cultural nationalist.

As set out in his 'blueprint', Fang explained the various states that an individual human being can achieve. At the bottom is the 'Natural Order', which includes the spheres of physical life, biological life and psychic life. Fang argued that each sphere reflects a key ability that human beings possess. However, the abilities in the 'Natural Order' are regarded as utilitarian, implying that they can cause both good and bad in our lives. The sphere of physical life, for example, reflects the human ability to use materials. In this sphere, a human being is called '*Homo faber*'⁵⁸ or '*xing neng de ren* 行能的人',⁵⁹ which is only a kind of animal with an intellect. Fang argued that 'creativity' is revealed in, for instance, the processes of using material to make tools. This 'creativity'

55 Sandra A. Wawrytko, 'Thomé H. Fang as Comparative Philosopher', in *Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang*, note 48, pp. 35–55.

56 As Fang stated, his ideas in the 'blueprint' are applicable to both the West and China. See Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 48.

57 George C. H. Sun and James W. Kidd, 'Philosophical Anthropology: Ernst Cassirer, Max Scheler and Thomé Fang', in *Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang*, note 48, pp. 25–34.

58 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, pp. 52–53. Fang admitted that the Latin terms he used were inspired by Ernst Cassirer's *An Essay on Man, An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1944).

59 Thomé H. Fang, *Sheng sheng zhi de* 生生之德 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005), p. 413. The Chinese translations of the terms in this study are cited directly from Fang's Chinese works.

helps human beings to advance from the sphere of physical life to biological life, where the human beings are called '*Homo dionysiacus*'⁶⁰ or '*chuangzao xing neng de ren* 創造行能的人'.⁶¹ However, in Fang's view, by only using tools human beings cannot achieve a high level of civilization. Therefore, 'creativity' must also be guided by reason and not led by desire. Fang called the human beings who can employ 'creativity' in a rational way '*Homo sapiens*' or '*zhishi heli de ren* 知識合理的人'.⁶² These three spheres constitute the 'Natural Order', in which such values as beauty and morality are not yet overtly involved.

According to the example of building an apartment, however, values are actually hidden. Fang suggested that our awareness of the existence of such values as beauty, morality and religion is the beginning of our 'metaphysical' life,⁶³ and the pursuit of them contributes to the achievement of the 'Transcendental Order'. For example, if an architect shows passion in designing an aesthetic apartment, the value of beauty will be demonstrated. Human beings who show such value are called '*Homo symbolicus*' or '*yishu de ren* 藝術的人'.⁶⁴ Similarly, the apartment designed should be solid enough, or it will become a danger to the dwellers. To avoid accidents, therefore, the architect should not only design an aesthetically pleasing apartment, but also a safe structure. The intention of keeping the dwellers safe from any potential harm is a manifestation of moral value. Human beings with such value are called '*Homo honestatis*' or '*daode de ren* 道德的人'.⁶⁵ Furthermore, following Fang's argument, once the architect shows the values of beauty and morality, his or her horizon broadens and this horizon is no longer limited to a single individual's interests. According to Fang, any extension of our concerns to other values rather than our own interests is a demonstration of the spirit of religion. Human beings who are in this state are called '*Homo religiosus*' or '*zongjiao de ren* 宗教的人'.⁶⁶ In the 'blueprint', the values of beauty, morality and religion represent three spheres respectively, which are the 'sphere of artistic life', the 'sphere of moral life' and the 'sphere of religious life'. These spheres altogether constitute the 'Transcendental Order', a level superior to 'Natural Order' in terms of the values it contains.⁶⁷

60 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 53.

61 Fang, *SSD*, see note 59.

62 *Ibid.*

63 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 57.

64 Fang, *SSD*, see note 59.

65 *Ibid.*

66 *Ibid.*

67 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 60.

Above the 'Transcendental Order' of the 'blueprint' are '*Homo nobilis*' or '*gaogui de ren* 高貴的人',⁶⁸ 'Divinity' or '*shenren* 神人'⁶⁹ and '*Deus absconditus*' or '*shenwei aomiao* 深微奧妙'.⁷⁰ As Fang claimed, the main difference between '*Homo nobilis*' and 'Transcendental Order' is the extent of the values human beings pursue. Human beings in the 'Transcendental Order' must show a form of such 'transcendental' values as beauty, morality and religion. However, the extent and duration of the values shown in this state are not certain. This means human beings can only show a very limited degree of the values and can stop showing them at any time. '*Homo nobilis*', on the other hand, indicates those human beings who can show the values continuously.⁷¹ Up to this point, I consider that the process of self-exaltation, a term I will expand on later, appears to be an achievement only possible for humanity. However, if we remember the point that Fang argued that both humanity and nature are parts of the world, it is reasonable to assume that nature also plays a role in Fang's 'blueprint'. As noted, Fang did not explain the terms 'Divinity' and '*Deus absconditus*' until this stage, and I argue that it is because these two states cannot be fully understood unless elements beyond the sphere of human beings are involved. I will consider this again below.⁷²

As a matter of fact, many thinkers in both the West and the East such as Samuel Alexander (1859–1938),⁷³ Taixu⁷⁴ and Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969)⁷⁵ also shared Fang's idea of evolution from the physical to the spiritual spheres. However, I consider it is the reason behind the evolution that Fang suggested which makes his idea distinguishable from other thinkers, a point I will discuss below.

68 Fang, *SSD*, see note 59.

69 *Ibid.*

70 *Ibid.*

71 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, pp. 60–61.

72 Pfister argues that Fang did not develop the idea of the relationship between individual beings and comprehensive 'Tao'. I will, however, argue later that this view is not correct. See Lauren Pfister, 'The Different Faces of Contemporary Religious Confucianism: An Account of the Diverse Approaches of Some Major Twentieth Century Chinese Confucian Scholars', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 22, no. 1 (1995): 5–79.

73 Samuel Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (New York: Crowell, 1968).

74 Taixu, 'Rensheng Fojiao yu cengchuang jinhua lun 人生佛教與層創進化論', in Taixu dashi quanshu bianzuan weiyuanhui 太虛大師全書編纂委員會 ed., *Taixu dashi quanshu* 太虛大師全書 vol. 5 (Taipei: Taixu dashi quanshu yingyin weiyuanhui 太虛大師全書影印委員會, 1970), pp. 223–233.

75 Yin Haiguang, *Xueshu yu sixiang* 學術與思想 vol. 3 (Taipei: Guiguan tushu 桂冠圖書, 1990), pp. 1431–1438.

3.1.5 *The Force behind Self-Exaltation—Creative Creativity*

Although, as set out in the previous discussion, humanity and nature are components of the world, the role of the latter is not, in my view, clear. In Fang's works, the words 'nature' and 'universe' are used alternately, and he defined 'universe' as follows:

The Universe, in our regard, is not merely a mechanical field of physical actions and reactions, but also a magnificent realm of the concrescence of Universal Life. Such a theory may be called Organicism as applied to the world at large.⁷⁶

As Fang argued, the universe is not mechanical but organic, since 'creativity' is observed in it:

The Universe, as it is, represents an all-comprehensive Urge of Life, an all-pervading Vital Impetus, not for a single moment ceasing to create and procreate and not in a single place ceasing to overflow and interpenetrate.⁷⁷

'Creativity' (Chi. *chuangzao li* 創造力 or *chuangsheng* 創生) is widely regarded as an idea of *Yi Jing* 易經 (*The Book of Changes*) in the Chinese intellectual tradition.⁷⁸ As its first hexagram 'Qian' 乾 means 'to create' and its last hexagram 'Wei ji' 未濟 means 'not yet finished', the implication is that the creative process is never complete.⁷⁹ Therefore, Fang explicitly stated that the key idea of *Yi Jing* is its thought of endless creativity, which he called 'creative creativity'.⁸⁰ Since Fang seldom mentioned Henri Bergson but stressed the importance of *Yi Jing* throughout his work, I argue that his idea of 'creativity' is probably based on his interpretation of the latter rather than on the philosophy of the former, though Bergson was once valued by Fang and 'creativity' is also emphasised

76 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, p. 30.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

78 Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011), pp. 49–55; Peter D. Herschok, 'The Structure of Change in the Yijing', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, supplement to vol. 36 (2009): 48–72.

79 For further discussion, see Hellmut Wilhelm and Richard Wilhelm, *Understanding the I Ching: the Wilhelm lectures on the Book of Changes* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 20–32.

80 Fang, *CMN*, note 25, p. 14. For discussion, see Vincent Shen, 'Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)', in Antonio S. Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 249–252.

by the French philosopher.⁸¹ As noted above, in discussing the 'Natural Order' of the 'blueprint', Fang considered that employing materials and making tools are signs of the function of 'creativity'. In fact, this 'creativity' has a close relationship with 'Divinity' and '*Deus absconditus*' as identified in the 'blueprint'.

As shown in the 'blueprint', '*Deus absconditus*' is described as 'God-head', 'God the most High' and 'the Mysteriously Mysterious Mystery', which Fang summarized as '*xuanzhiyouxuan de "huang ye shangdi"*' 玄之又玄的「皇矣上帝」, a term generally meaning 'such a mysterious Divinity'. In this context, I would say that a certain kind of divinity seems to play a role in Fang's thought. The question that remains now is what does 'divinity' mean? The answer may be found elsewhere in Fang's writing:

God is in no way a thing; He is a power, a creative force; He is a spirit, the very spirit of infinite love, merging all beings in a wave of love.⁸²

From this, it is clear that the divinity Fang suggested is a force but not a personal god. This force is creative and shared by all beings. Fang summed this up as the 'divine immanent in all things',⁸³ a kind of pantheism.⁸⁴ Since there is divinity everywhere, humanity should treat all things in a reverential manner.⁸⁵ In my view, this idea of Fang follows the spirit of Confucianism, as in *The Analects* it is said that Confucius once remarked, 'What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?',⁸⁶ a statement commonly regarded as Confucius' admiration of the divinity of nature.⁸⁷ All this helps explain the idea of 'Divinity', which Fang called 'spirit of infinite love', an example of his 'poetry-like' language to describe the positive effect of this impersonal divinity on humanity. Although Fang suggested that such a 'Divinity' pervades the

81 Although Fang published a short Chinese essay 'Bergson's Philosophy of Creativity' (柏格森「生之哲學」) in 1920 and obtained a master's degree by submitting a thesis about Bergson in 1922, he seldom mentioned Bergson after that. For Bergson's idea of 'creativity', see Rex Gilliland, 'Bergson on Free Will and Creativity', in Paul Ardoin, S. E. Gontarski, and Laci Mattison ed., *Understanding Bergson, Understanding Modernism* (New York: Continuum, 2013), pp. 308–310.

82 Fang, *CMN*, note 25, pp. 69–70.

83 Thomé H. Fang, *Huayan zong zhexue* 華嚴宗哲學 vol. 2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1992), p. 435.

84 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, pp. 62–63.

85 Fang, *SSD*, note 59, p. 343.

86 For this translation, see D. C. Lau, *Confucius: The Analects* (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 146.

87 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 47.

world, he stressed that humanity would not be able to obtain any knowledge of the ultimate origin of it.⁸⁸ What human beings could know at most, in Fang's view, is that the world keeps on changing without any sign of stopping. Since this 'creativity' is unlimited, it is called 'creative creativity'.⁸⁹ In this sense, Fang claimed that 'Divine' is equal to 'creativity' and there is no difference between the two:⁹⁰

Man takes his origin from the Divine which, as a primordial source of infinite power, embraces all heaven and earth as the interlacing hierarchy of orders wherein the ever-going and never-ceasing of creation solemnly exhibits itself.⁹¹

Since the ultimate origin of such 'Divinity' is unknown to human beings, '*Deus absconditus*', which is at the apex of Fang's 'blueprint', also holds the name of 'Mysteriously Mysterious Mystery'. With this, the whole 'blueprint' seems finally complete.

As 'creativity' is in all beings, it is in humanity as well. In fact, as the idea of 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics' suggests, both human beings and nature are parts of the world. Therefore, the concepts of 'Divinity' and '*Deus absconditus*' in the 'blueprint' not only explain nature but also human beings. As I mentioned earlier, human beings can advance to the state of '*Homo nobilis*' without considering the role beyond the sphere of the human. However, Fang stressed that human beings should always think of other spheres during the process of self-exaltation:

Our philosophers have told us to strive after our utmost to abide by the fundamental Root of Tao; to trace back to what has been conferred on us by Heaven; and to feel perfectly identified with the divine will to live, with a view to understanding thoroughly all that there is, and all that there can be, in the Universe in respect of the magnificent creative spirit of life; partaking fully [in] what is great in the noble sentiments of compassion, benevolence, and love; and extirpating completely what is most perilous in the dark practice of selfishness, partiality, and prejudice before we can display in a grand manner the all-embracing vastness, the inexhaustible profundity, and the exalted illuminancy that pertain to the nature of our being. The great men and sages, so inspiring to the

88 Fang, *KZR*, note 49, pp. 35–36; also see *SSD*, note 59, pp. 184–185.

89 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, p. 45.

90 Fang, *SSD*, note 59, p. 333.

91 Fang, *CMN*, note 25, pp. 16–17.

Chinese people, are the most ideal personalities, being identical in attributes with Heaven and Earth, coextensive with the wondrous infiltration of Tao, and conducive to the eminent deeds of universal love.⁹²

He even stated that:

The Universe represents for us the perpetual augmentation of value. The meaning of human life consists in the exaltation of value. The Universe and human life are the concurrent processes of creative values.⁹³

It should be noted that Fang used the word 'exaltation' here, which he translated in almost all his other works as '*chaosheng*' 超昇,⁹⁴ a term rather uncommon in the Chinese intellectual tradition. In fact, as I will explain later, Fang's use of the word 'exaltation' may be due to his emphasis on 'creativity' rather than 'humanity' in the process of progression. The above citations, to some extent, explain this point as they clearly show that exaltation is not only a process concerning human beings but also all other beings, an idea which considers that creation is not relevant to a specific god, as in the Christian tradition, but is a natural phenomenon of the universe.⁹⁵ Both humanity and nature, which are components of the world, affect each other but are not caused by each other. Through interaction between the two, the process of creation endures. This view of cosmology, therefore, is also described as 'co-creation' by one scholar.⁹⁶ Only by thinking of the role of nature can humanity achieve full self-exaltation. That is to say, nature provides the opportunity for self-exaltation through the striving of the individual, who in turn takes part in the creativity of the nature.

In fact, as shown in figure 1, human beings who achieve the level of '*Deus absconditus*' need to go back to the 'inferior' levels, as human beings are not separate from nature. Although a person may be cultivated and divine, the 'Natural Order' is not to be depreciated. In short, any self-exaltation is based

92 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, p. 92.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

94 As recorded in a speech in Chinese, Fang argues that '*chaosheng*' is equal to 'exaltation'. See Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 106.

95 Robert Neville, 'From nothing to being: The notion of creation in Chinese and Western thought', *Philosophy East and West* vol. 30, no. 1 (Jan 1980): 21–34; N. J. Girardot, *Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (hun-tun)* (California: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 56–64; Tu Weiming, 'Creativity: A Confucian View', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 6, no. 4 (Dec 2007): 115–124.

96 Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, note 78, pp. 241–255.

on the 'Natural Order'. Therefore, even human beings at the stage of '*Deus absconditus*' are always engaged in but not aloof from worldly affairs.⁹⁷ Only by first being exalted upwards and then going downwards is the entire process of self-exaltation completed. As I will discuss below, this notion of exaltation comprises the core idea of Fang's thought and plays an important role in his evaluation of various intellectual traditions in human history, including Huayan thought, which is used by Fang as a response to 'scientism'.

3.1.6 '*Comprehensive Harmony*' as a Criterion for Evaluation

Fang considered that the idea of 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics' allows dualism to be dissolved; by dissolving dualism, contradiction is to be avoided; by avoiding contradiction, a state of harmony is to be reached. In brief, the ultimate goal of Fang's theory is to achieve a state of 'comprehensive harmony' or '*guangda hexie*' 廣大和諧,⁹⁸ which Fang explains as follows:

[The] Chinese mentality is best characterized by what I call the cultivated sense of comprehensive harmony, in unison with which man and life in the world can enter into a fellowship in sympathetic unity so that a bliss of peace and well-being may be enjoyed by all. The only condition essential to its actual working is that we should conceive man in particular, and the universe at large, in terms of the principle of creative creativity.⁹⁹

In my view, the 'blueprint' is exactly the route to achieve 'comprehensive harmony'.¹⁰⁰

In fact, the idea of 'harmony' (Chi. *hexie* 和諧) has been recently promoted by the Chinese Government as the core spirit of Chinese culture. While discussion about the idea is mainly restricted to an introductory level,¹⁰¹ Fang was one of the first thinkers who considered 'harmony' an idea with profound

97 Li Anze 李安澤 argues that Fang ignores the material world. This is obviously a misunderstanding of Fang. See his *Shengming lijing yu xingershangxue: Fang Dongmei zhexue de chanshi yu piping* 生命理境與形而上學：方東美哲學的闡釋與批評 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 2007), p. 126.

98 Vincent Shen, 'Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)', note 80.

99 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, pp. i–ii.

100 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

101 For example, see Yao Xinzong and Zhao Yanxia, *Chinese Religion: A Contextual Approach* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), pp. 94–97.

philosophical meaning.¹⁰² In Chinese, both the terms ‘*he*’ 和 and ‘*tong*’ 同 are translated as ‘harmony’.¹⁰³ Although the terms are interrelated, their meanings are different. In general, when various values are in balance, it is called ‘*he*’; where different values are unified, it is called ‘*tong*’.¹⁰⁴ According to the previous discussion, I argue that Fang’s idea of ‘comprehensive harmony’ is closer to the meaning of ‘*tong*’, as all values are unified under Fang’s idea of the ‘blueprint’, but difficult to be regarded as ‘*he*’, as various values seem not to be in balance. This is because, in Fang’s ‘blueprint’, values in the ‘Transcendental Order’ are clearly ‘superior’ to that in the ‘Natural Order’, which constitute a main difference between Fang’s and Tang’s responses to ‘scientism’ and even a potential difficulty in Fang’s response, a point I will further explain in Chapter 5.

Although Fang discusses different intellectual traditions, it should be remembered that his comments are always from the perspective of ‘comprehensive harmony’, an idea which initially stemmed from ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, I suggest that ‘comprehensive harmony’ is actually a criterion which Fang uses to evaluate and interpret different intellectual traditions. Only by acknowledging this point can we make sense of some of his controversial comments. For example, Fang considered that *The Analects* is not so important in Confucianism, as the work does not pay enough attention to ‘creativity’.¹⁰⁶ He also had some harsh criticisms on Mencius and the Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming Dynasties because he considered that they failed to see the unity and wholeness of the world.¹⁰⁷ In fact, as is well-known in Chinese academia, the relationship between Fang

102 Lao Sze-kwang is another thinker who regards ‘harmony’ as a philosophical idea in the Confucian tradition. See his ‘On Harmony: The Confucian View’, in Liu Shu-hsien and Robert E. Allinson ed., *Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspectives, East & West* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 187–209. The name Lao used in the article is Lao Yung-wei.

103 Li Chenyang, ‘The Confucian Ideal of Harmony’, *Philosophy East and West* vol. 56, no. 4 (2006): 583–603.

104 For a discussion of these terms, see D. W. Y. Kwok, ‘*Ho* and ‘*T’ung*’ in Chinese Intellectual History’, in Richard J. Smith and D. W. Y. Kwok ed., *Cosmology, Ontology, and Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 1–10.

105 As Fang argued, he used a metaphysical approach when discussing Chinese philosophy. See Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. 13.

106 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, pp. 212–251. It is said that Qian Mu, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan were unhappy with Fang’s attitude towards *The Analects*. See Qin Ping 秦平, *Dajia jing-yao Fang Dongmei* 大家精要方東美 (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe 雲南教育出版社, 2008), pp. 132–134.

107 Fang, *XRZSJ*, note 18, pp. 225–227.

and Mou Zongsan was rather fraught. As Liu Shu-hsien recalls, once, when Fang and Mou welcomed Tang Junyi at the airport, they sat back-to-back, saying nothing to each other.¹⁰⁸ I estimate that this was partly because of Fang's discontent with Mou's paying almost no attention to the idea of 'creativity' as Fang understood it, but concentrated on the idea of the 'Mind'. To a large extent, all the above comments, including the attitude of Fang seem unusual in the Confucian tradition. However, in considering his criterion for evaluating different intellectual traditions, these comments become more understandable. Certainly, this criterion also applies to his interpretation of Huayan thought. Before discussing his view of Huayan, however, it is necessary to examine Fang's thought critically, as this directly relates to the effectiveness of his theory in responding to 'scientism', which I will discuss in the final chapter.

3.1.7 *A Discussion of Fang's Thought*

Since most of the studies of Fang's thought are descriptive rather than explicatory,¹⁰⁹ in my opinion, they are not thorough enough for fulfilling the objective of this study, which is to study the relationship between Fang and Huayan thought, an issue for which a deep understanding of Fang's thought is needed. In fact, Fang's thought deserves a much more thorough critical review since this will help to inform our understanding of its impact on other modern thinkers, such as Tang Junyi.

There are both insights and limitations within Fang's thought. His emphasis on openness in a system is probably his major strength. He was not interested in a closed system since this would be unfavourable to the functioning of 'creativity'.¹¹⁰ In short, 'creativity' helps ensure a system works continuously. For Fang, the state of 'comprehensive harmony' is replete with various values, a point which is important to our understanding of his appropriation of Huayan thought. As noted above, Fang argued that ideal personhood must be a combination of prophet, poet and sage.¹¹¹ In this sense, theoretically, there is no

108 Liu Shu-hsien, *Xiandai xin ruxue zhi xingcha lunji* 現代新儒學之省察論集 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo 中央研究院中國文哲研究所, 2004), p. 245.

109 For examples, see Liu Shu-hsien, *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 73–88; Jiang Guobao 蔣國保 and Yu Bingyi 余秉頤, *Fang Dongmei sixiang yanjiu* 方東美思想研究 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe 天津人民出版社, 2004); Ye Haiyan 葉海煙, 'Fang Dongmei de xin rujia zhexue 方東美的新儒家哲學', *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 no. 309 (2001): 21–28; Wan Xiaoping, *Fang Dongmei yu Zhong xi zhexue*, note 4; Li Chenyang, 'Fang Dongmei: Philosophy of Life, Creativity and Inclusiveness', note 39.

110 Fang, *SSD*, see note 59, pp. 349 and 396.

111 For details, see the discussion in note 48.

single rigid condition that humanity must achieve, and no single fixed form of personhood that humanity must pursue, though, in practice, Fang considered that the 'blueprint' he put forward is a suitable model, in which the faculties of perception and cognition obviously play an inferior role. In my view, this position of Fang contains a certain degree of inconsistency, a point I will further mention in Chapter 5. In general, however, the specific forms of the ideal world and ideal personhood depend on particular situations:

Although they are such in antiquity, they have, in moments, personal inclination towards one special character in the combination. Some are more of the prophet than the other two; some, more of the poet; and some, more of the sage.¹¹²

In my view, this openness in Fang provides a kind of flexibility, which allows people to develop their own characteristics. Thus, in different times there are different sorts of people. Therefore, no unchanging standard should be assumed. Since there is no unchanging standard, varying values can be incorporated into the concept of ideal personhood so long as they are required.¹¹³ As different cultures may be better for particular values, in a way, all cultures are more or less equal. In my view, this openness provides a chance for different cultures to communicate.¹¹⁴ As I will explain in Chapter 5, this underlies Fang's main argument in his response to 'scientism'.

The relationship between the limitations of Fang's theory and his appropriation of Huayan thought may not be that direct. However, in my opinion, it is better to point out the limitations here, as they help evaluate the status Fang should enjoy in modern Chinese philosophy. I argue that the first challenge to Fang, at least according to his own words, is that human beings appear to be compelled to progress. Fang's views on the relationship between humanity and nature help explain this idea:

Hence we come to the consciousness that the universe cannot go on without the presence of my moral being. If I, as a creative personality, had not come into existence, that would indicate the defect of the universe, that would show that life is not comprehensive enough, and that would betoken that the supreme moral values are grievously arrested in

¹¹² Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. 31.

¹¹³ Vincent Shen, 'Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)', note 80.

¹¹⁴ Lewis E. Hahn, *Enhancing Cultural Interflow between East & West: Collected Essays in Comparative Philosophy & Culture* (Mobile: Thomé H. Fang Institute, 1998), pp. 88–98.

development. I, as an individual, cannot live for a single moment without the universe. If the cosmic order were not well established, I should have nothing to rely upon, my life would be an idle dream, and the idea of the good pertaining to human nature would be a floating idea no better than illusion.¹¹⁵

As an organic unity, both humanity and nature are components of the world. Therefore, the two are always interactive. According to the citation, on the one hand, there would be a flaw in nature if human beings were absent. It is because this would imply that nature was not comprehensive. On the other hand, human beings could not achieve self-exaltation if the role of nature was ignored. As I mentioned in section 3.1.5, Fang suggested that ‘creativity’ is incorporated into the world, though the origin of it is unknown to human beings. This predominant role for ‘creativity’ assures the world is always changing. If either human beings or nature were not employing such ‘creativity’, it would mean that ‘creativity’ would not be fully incorporated as predominant in the world. Taking human beings as the example, I outline Fang’s argument thus:

[Premise 1:] Human beings not employing ‘creativity’ implies ‘creativity’ is not incorporated into the world;

[Premise 2:] ‘Creativity’ is always incorporated into the world;

[Conclusion:] Human beings not employing ‘creativity’ is not possible.

According to this argument, human beings should always employ ‘creativity’. In short, the self-exaltation of human beings seems to be compulsory. In fact, even though the world is always changing, from our daily experience, human beings can stop progressing but stay in a specific level.¹¹⁶ Without providing further reasons for human beings to progress themselves, Fang’s idea that human beings should self-exalt simply because the world is always employing ‘creativity’ seems problematic, as it overlooks the role of human responsibility. As I will discuss in the following chapters, a major difference between Fang and Tang and their appropriations of Huayan thought is exactly that Tang emphasised the autonomy of each individual, which is important to understand in relation to Tang’s response to the challenges of ‘scientism’.

There are other limitations within Fang’s theory. Most of them stem from the theoretical difficulty I listed above. As I discussed, Fang argued that the

¹¹⁵ Fang, *CVL*, note 17, p. 107.

¹¹⁶ Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, *Zhongguo renxing lun shi. XianQin pian* 中國人性論史·先秦篇 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館, 2003), pp. 218–219.

world will change endlessly due to the existence of 'creativity'. However, he viewed the origin of such 'creativity' as a mystery. Since the origin of 'creativity' is not known, simply assuming that 'creativity' will go on endlessly seems too optimistic. In fact, there should be a reason guaranteeing that 'creativity' will continue. Otherwise, there is a possibility that the world would one day cease to change. Fang's refusing to discuss the origin of 'creativity' is probably because he thought that the infinite 'creativity' could not stem from a limited origin. Therefore, the issue is beyond the knowledge of humanity.¹¹⁷ However, as already mentioned, the result caused by his refusal to discuss its origin further is unsatisfactory. The reason guaranteeing that the world must keep on changing is obviously a question that Fang fails to consider.

In fact, there is another reason to show that Fang should consider the origin of 'creativity' more thoroughly, which is the need for a clear definition of 'creativity'. What does 'creativity' mean? In my view, the content of it appears rather vague. Can all creations be regarded as good and beautiful? If 'creativity' is part of both humanity and nature, are the 'creativities' they hold the same? There are thus many questions remaining about the concept of 'creativity'. For example, there are many creations in the natural world, such as mountains and oceans. In a sense, such creations are viewed as aesthetic and even morally good, because they encourage a variety of lives. However, there are also some natural creations that may not be considered aesthetic or good. The eruption of a volcano which kills lots of people is one such example. In this case, 'creativity' is not necessarily suitable for humanity to employ. Nature, though full of 'creativity', is not necessarily suitable for humanity to follow either.

In my view, Fang's argument about the employment of 'creativity' is a typical case of circular reasoning. The following argument helps explain this:

[Premise 1:] Nature and human beings are not separate.

[Premise 2:] Since nature is always employing creativity, human beings are also employing creativity.

[Premise 3:] Human beings are employing creativity.

[Conclusion:] Nature is always employing creativity.

Although this argument is not directly used in Fang's work, we *do* find this form of argument if we read his work carefully. Since the premises and conclusion are the same, Fang's argument about the 'creativity' in nature and

117 Fang, *CVL*, note 17, pp. 12–13; Fang, *KZR*, note 49, pp. 35–36.

humanity may be less convincing.¹¹⁸ This problem, like much of the preceding discussion, cannot be solved unless there is a stronger reason supporting the function of 'creativity'. As I will explain later, it is a point influencing the nature of Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought and even its effectiveness in responding to 'scientism'.

In fact, the process of exaltation as suggested in Fang's 'blueprint' develops in a positive way, which is from the 'Natural Order' to the 'Transcendental Order' and the states of '*Homo nobilis*' etc. In many of his other remarks, Fang also indicated that the behaviour of human beings should follow a moral principle or a moral direction.¹¹⁹ Therefore, individual scholars argue that Fang implicitly holds a 'good-nature' theory.¹²⁰ In the 'blueprint', Fang also stressed that human beings need to be down-to-earth. In my view, the suggestion of the 'good-nature' of human beings is a more reasonable notion than 'creativity' for explaining this phenomenon of regressing, since human beings are unwilling to abandon worldly affairs. This point, paradoxically, is what Fang emphasised throughout his interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in section 3.2. In fact, virtue (Chi. *de* 德) plays a critical role in almost all of the important Confucian theories of self-cultivation,¹²¹ which stem from self-consciousness but not from the values observed from a changing nature.¹²² Although Fang's identity as a Confucian may be rather debatable, the role of virtue deriving from self-consciousness certainly needs more consideration. Fang's potential 'good-nature' theory cannot override the fact that he paid almost no attention to the role of human nature, an idea closely relevant to the construction of 'self' in humanity. As I will discuss in the final chapter, this point is crucial to the achievement of the world of 'comprehensive harmony' Fang suggested.

Perhaps it is hard to credit that Fang, one of the leading Chinese thinkers in modern times, ignored the importance of human nature but focused on the

118 To my astonishment, no study of Fang mentions the problems of his arguments. Instead, it is a book on logic that suggests that his arguments are potentially fallacious. See Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic* (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2002), p. 173.

119 Fang, ZRZ, note 37, pp. 86 and 116.

120 Marc Hermann, 'A Critical Evaluation of Fang Dongmei's Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony', note 20; Shen, 'Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)', note 80.

121 Philip J. Ivanhoe, *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation* (Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2000), pp. ix–xvii.

122 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, *Zhouyi zhexue yanjiang lu* 周易哲學演講錄 (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 2003), p. 25; Mou Zongsan, *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1999), pp. 69–85.

different abilities of humanity. In my opinion, Fang seems purposely to weaken the role of human nature in his theory because he thought that focusing the discussion on it alone would easily overlook the wholeness of the world, an idea directly related to his 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics'. More specifically, he rejected the dominant role of the Confucian view of human nature in Chinese culture, regarding that both Taoism and Chinese Buddhism are as important as Confucianism.¹²³ Therefore, he denied the idea of the Confucian orthodox line of transmission (Chi. *daotong* 道統), which is to stress the importance of the Mind (Chi. *Xin* 心) in Confucianism, as emphasized by several modern Confucian thinkers, particularly Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan. However, there is clearly a dilemma here. On the one hand, a theory of self-exaltation needs to avoid the over-dominance of human nature otherwise the wholeness of the world is neglected. On the other hand, the function of 'creativity' needs a broader explanation, to allow humanity to play a role. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Fang implicitly redefined the 'ti' of Chinese culture so that the 'yong' of it can be more responsive to the problem of 'scientism'. In my view, Fang's lack of emphasis on the dominant role of human nature is critical in the redefining process, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5. Below, I turn to his interpretation of Huayan thought, as it helps explain why he employed that thought to develop his response to 'scientism'.

3.2 Thomé H. Fang's Interpretation of Huayan Thought—A Critical Review

3.2.1 Fang's Overall Interpretation of Huayan Thought

Amongst Thomé H. Fang's works involving Buddhism, his discussion of Huayan thought, which he called the 'culmination' of Chinese Buddhism,¹²⁴ plays a central role. In fact, in his complete works, there are in total six volumes mentioning Buddhist thought, but the Huayan School is the only school Fang discusses in detail.¹²⁵ In his interpretation of this body of thought, the first point is his emphasis on the role of the *Huayanjing*.¹²⁶ As I discussed in Chapter 2, Huayan patriarchs considered that Huayan thought was developed from the

123 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 172.

124 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 181.

125 The six works are *Huayanzong zhexue* vol. 1 and 2, *Zhongguo dasheng foxue* vol. 1 and 2 and *Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan* vol. 1 and 2. The last work is a translation of Fang's English work *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*.

126 Qu Dacheng, 'Lun Fang Dongmei dui Huayan sixiang de quanshi', note 3.

Huayanjing, though in fact many of the key concepts of the thought are never found in that text.¹²⁷ Regardless of this dispute, Fang explicitly confirms that the *Huayanjing* plays a central role in Huayan thought.

In general, while explaining the role of the *Huayanjing*, Fang repeatedly stressed the following scenarios in the text:

- i.) There are countless lights released from Vairocana, a symbol of Buddha in the *Huayanjing*, and these lights reach the other Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* without any obstruction.
- ii.) After being reached by the lights, all Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* in different locations and different times go to meet Vairocana.
- iii.) Sudhana, a clever boy, visited the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī, the symbol of wisdom. Mañjuśrī asks Sudhana to learn from the other forty-one *bodhisattvas*.
- iv.) After experiencing various difficulties, Sudhana learns the ways of practice and the importance of being concerned with other sentient beings. Samantabhadra, the symbol of practice, accepts Sudhana's effort and takes Sudhana to meet Maitreya, the next Buddha after Śākyamuni in Buddhist tradition.
- v.) Maitreya shows Sudhana numerous pearls and jewels. From the reflection of the lights of the pearls and jewels, the world seems infinite and all phenomena co-existent.¹²⁸

Summarizing the content of the above, I argue that three points can be observed. First, the *Huayanjing* describes a perfect and a harmonious state (i), without explaining the cause of such a state. There are no obstacles among Buddha and phenomena, regardless of various locations and times (ii); these are a part of the harmonious state and therefore, the scope of the state is unlimited. Second, attaining this perfect state is not only an issue about wisdom but also about practice (iii and iv). That is to say, a person with wisdom should also have personal experiences in real life, the experience of suffering for instance. A wise person, in this sense, does not exclude him- or herself from other beings. Third, only with both wisdom and personal experience can one get the taste of the fruit of Buddha (v). This links back to the way for entering the perfect state suggested in (i). Certainly, the content of the *Huayanjing* is greater than the above synopsis. Fang, however, concentrated mainly on these

127 For details, see section 2.4.2.

128 Fang's discussing of these points is recorded throughout his two volumes of *Huayan zong zhexue*.

points. Fang even considered the *Huayanjing* is the best introduction to philosophy in the world because it explains how a person grows through reflecting on his or her own experience.¹²⁹ In this sense, we can see how important the above synopsis is in Fang's view.

According to Fang, the style of *Huayanjing* is story-telling, and this understanding of the text is important to comprehend Huayan thought, as it provides readers with a method for reading the text.¹³⁰

As with the content of the *Huayanjing*, we should not consider it a depictive language but a metaphorical language or a poetical language instead.¹³¹

He further explained:

The language of the *Huayanjing* is not that of common poetry since it is not depicting certain 'phenomena' but the 'principle' behind them. When the 'principle' attains the ultimate realm, which is holy and marvelous, it is beyond thought. Only artistic, musical and symbolic language can help depict it.¹³²

The task of Huayan's patriarchs, in Fang's view, is to provide such symbolic language with a philosophical explanation:

If we do not comprehend the sentences [of the *Huayanjing*], we will not understand the patriarchs of the Huayan lineage, who rationalize the religion and make the religion into a kind of profound philosophy.¹³³

129 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 130.

130 For a discussion of the relationship between story and philosophical thinking in the Chinese tradition, see Wu Kuang-ming, 'Chinese Philosophy and Story-Thinking', *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. IV, no. 2 (2005): 217–234.

131 The original Chinese is '就其所描寫的內容來說，應該先要把這種方塊字所使用的這一種 depictive language (記述的語言) 點化掉，成為 metaphorical language (隱喻的語言)、poetical language (詩的語言)'. Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 227.

132 The original Chinese is '華嚴經所旁述的文字，並不是尋常散文的詩歌體材，因為它所記載的不僅僅是「事」，而是從「事」的領域中所烘托出來的一種極微妙的「理」。當這個「理」達到極神聖的微妙的境界時，它是不可思議的，它是不容以常理去理解的，於是便祇好拿藝術上面的形容法，拿富於音樂性的文字或富於象徵性的文字來形容。' *Ibid.*, p. 254.

133 The original Chinese is '如果我們無法瞭解這一段文字的話，那麼就根本不能體會華嚴宗的那幾位祖師們，把這一套宗教的教義點化，而成為深含哲學理念的高深哲理。' *Ibid.*, p. 237.

As I discussed in Chapter 1, Lao Sze-kwang reminds us that 'philosophy' in Chinese intellectual tradition aims at achieving 'self-transformation' and 'transformation of the world'.¹³⁴ Based on this understanding, Lao further suggests that there are two types of philosophy: 'orientative philosophy' and 'cognitive philosophy'. While the aim of the latter is to establish objective and reliable knowledge, the aim of 'orientative philosophy' is to inspire others to transform themselves.¹³⁵ In my view, Fang's considering the *Huayanjing* a metaphorical language or a poetical language appears to suggest that the *Huayanjing* is a kind of 'orientative philosophy', which is to inspire or encourage others to improve. In fact, as I noted in section 3.1, Fang considered his use of language as 'poetry-like'. Together with his idea that the style of the *Huayanjing* is also story-telling, I argue that his own answer to 'scientism' is also a kind of story-telling, a point I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5.

According to Fang, the *Huayanjing* is not a strict philosophical work written in logical language. What it provides is a vision of a perfect state, which inspires the confidence of human beings about self-cultivation. The task of the Huayan patriarchs is to provide a philosophical explanation to the *Huayanjing* so that the perfect and harmonious Buddha realm, as suggested in the text, can be achieved in principle.¹³⁶ This exposition of the *Huayanjing* by Fang is the first thing to remember in his interpretation of Huayan thought.

Given his view that the content of the *Huayanjing* is not merely a story but has philosophical implications, Fang went on to explain such implications. As I mentioned earlier, there are three points of the *Huayanjing* on which Fang particularly concentrated. First is the perfect state. Second is the significance of both theory and practice in the process of achieving such a perfect state. Third is the concern for the world. Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought matches these three points.

In section 3.1, I mentioned that Fang held the view that the understanding of an intellectual tradition requires a macro-perspective. This principle also applies to his understanding of Huayan thought since he said that only by viewing the thought as a whole can it be understood.¹³⁷ In my view, the whole is the perfect state as suggested by Huayan's patriarchs. In order to show the perfection of such a state, Fang stressed the role of Dushun amongst Huayan's patriarchs, a view very uncommon in the studies of the Huayan tradition. In fact, except the *Huayanjing*, the works under the name of Dushun are what

134 For details, see section 1.2.

135 Lao Sze-kwang, *Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wenhua* 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp. 149–150.

136 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 352–353.

137 Fang, *HZ* vol. 2, note 83, p. 216.

Fang discussed most in his interpretation of Huayan. Dushun, who is considered the first patriarch of the Huayan School by many scholars, is something of a mystery in the history of Chinese Buddhism. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, his life is largely unknown. His relationship with the *Huayanjing* is also unclear.¹³⁸ The works under his name are only mentioned in passing in the works of other Huayan patriarchs. However, Fang did not worry about the historical accuracy of Dushun's life, as he said:

Among the five great Buddhists of this school during the Tang dynasty I have great admiration for Tu-shun [Dushun] whose ingenious mind had brought to the light of day almost all elements of truth in the metaphysical philosophy of Hua-yen [Huayan] although Fa-tsang [Fazang] and Cheng-kuan [Chengguan] surpassed him in detailed erudition. What was fully elaborated and elucidated in later generations with reference to the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* had been anticipated by him excepting, perhaps, the theory of dependent-causation upon the *dharmadhātu* as to details for which the credit should be given to Chih-yen [Zhiyan], Fa-tsang [Fazang] and Cheng-kuan [Chengguan], and especially the latter two.¹³⁹

As Fang argued, the scope of Huayan thought was determined in the time of Dushun. He considered the works of the later Huayan patriarchs as just footnotes to Dushun's thought, which help to make his thought more precise. According to Fang, *Huayan wujiao zhiguan* 華嚴五教止觀 (*Huayan's Contemplation of Five Teachings*), the work claimed to be from Dushun, describes the perfect and harmonious state and explains the rationale making such perfection possible, which Fang explained as below:

All *Dharmas* are interlaced like Indra's network of pearls mutually radiating images of reflection unto one another dovetailed into a system of interpenetrative infinity. This, I think, is the first manifesto of the philosophy of Hua-yen [Huayan] to be further developed by Tu-shun [Dushun] himself and by those who followed him for two hundred years in the Tang dynasty.¹⁴⁰

138 For the life of Dushun, see *DZJ*, vol. 50, No. 2060, pp. 653b15–654a13.

139 Fang, *CPSD*, note 9, p. 310.

140 *Ibid.*, pp. 312–313.

Fang indicated that *dharma*s here are phenomena.¹⁴¹ The Buddha realm as suggested in *Huayan wujiao zhiguan*, like the one in the *Huayanjing*, consists of all *dharma*s co-existing with each other harmoniously. Dushun, in Fang's view, explains the rationale for the *dharma*s co-existing, which is the principle of 'interpenetration' that I have discussed in section 2.4.3. In fact, by regarding Dushun as the most important patriarch in the Huayan School, the logic behind Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought seems obvious. As I stress throughout, the possibility of making the world harmonious plays a significant role in Fang's thought. Any concepts irrelevant to this play a less important role in Huayan thought for Fang. For example, Huayan's doctrinal classification theory, which is considered important by almost all other Buddhist scholars, does not play a central role in Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought, as he gave it only a brief consideration in his works.¹⁴² This characteristic of Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought is essential to our understanding of his appropriation of the thought to respond to the challenge of 'scientism', which I will further discuss in Chapter 5.

Besides the emphasis on the harmonious state suggested by Dushun, Fang traced the origin of realizing such a state to the pure mind (Chi. *Qingjingxin* 清淨心) of humanity. In Chapter 2, I briefly explained that Huayan's idea of 'dharma realm' depends on the state of the mind. A perfect state is a manifestation of the pure mind, in which no conflicts amongst *dharma*s are found, as all of them co-exist with each other without obstruction through the principle of 'interpenetration'. In this sense, the mind is the cause of the process of achieving the harmonious state while the realization or attainment of 'dharma realm' is the result of it. After showing interest in the result suggested by Huayan, Fang immediately concentrated on the cause. In a letter to Xiong Shili in 1938, the earliest extant source in which Fang discussed Buddhism, he commented on Xiong's view of Buddhism, arguing that not only the Buddha realm but also the origin causing such a realm needs to be considered. Otherwise, the claimed Buddha realm would be subjective.¹⁴³ As I will discuss below, in fact, Fang's

141 *Ibid.*, p. 312.

142 Qu Dacheng's argument that the theory of doctrinal classification plays a main role in Fang's interpretation of Huayan is obviously incorrect. See his article as stated in note 3. In fact, in Fang's *Zhongguo dasheng foxue*, the doctrinal classification theories of Tiantai, Consciousness-Only and Huayan are all covered. In this sense, Huayan's doctrinal classification theory seems not to play a special role in Fang's interpretation of Chinese Buddhism. See Fang, *ZDF* vol. 1, note 12, pp. 266–320.

143 For the letter, see Fang, *ZDF* vol. 2, *ibid.*, pp. 382–404. Interestingly, the letter appears never to have been discussed in academia, though there are many studies concerning Xiong's idea of Buddhist thought.

emphasis on the mind in the letter is inconsistent with his interpretation of Huayan in which his discussion of the characteristics of the mind appears rather limited. To some extent, it makes his response to 'scientism' somewhat assertive and unconvincing, as I will discuss in Chapter 5.

In short, Fang did not provide the concept of the 'mind' or the 'pure mind' in a clear definition. When considering the characteristics of the mind which assist the achievement of the harmonious state, Fang suggested that:

This Buddha is not merely an external ideal but rather the internal reflection and experience of each person, [and allows one] to transform one-self [right] from the [very] centre of one's life to the highest center of spiritual perception and wisdom. In this way, the existential subjectivity of each person can all be described as spiritual subjectivity, equal in importance to the spiritual subjectivity of the Buddha (*fāshen*).¹⁴⁴

As Fang further argued, this transformation moves from the material sphere to that of the spirit.¹⁴⁵ Thus, when considering Fang's 'blueprint' as introduced in figure 1, this idea of transformation matches his general idea of 'self-exaltation'. In brief, I argue that Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought is from his own philosophical point of view. According to Fang, the real spirit of Buddhism should be developed in such a perfect and pure mind:

[I am] to reject the error of 'arising from conceptualized nature' as suggested in the thought of Consciousness-Only and to discuss the issue directly from the perspective of 'dependence on others'. However, this 'dependence' should not be based on mistake (defilement) but on the spiritual subject of Buddha (pure mind). It changes 'dependence on others' to 'perfect reality'. 'Perfect reality' is a spiritual subject with perfect values, which is also the ultimate cause. From this ultimate cause [human beings] can develop wisdom with reason, develop ideal with wisdom and develop value with ideal. Only by that can *Mahāyāna* be transformed into Buddha vehicle. In Buddhism, therefore, if human beings consider the world disappointing, negative, pessimistic, suffering and cursed, they are not real Buddhists, nor do they understand the

¹⁴⁴ The original Chinese is '這個佛，不僅僅是一個外在的理想，而是每一個人，都根據他內心的反省、體驗，把自己從生命的中心，變作為最高的精神主體與智慧中心。在這種情況下，那麼個人的生命主體都可以說是精神主體，而這個精神主體，同佛的精神主體（法身）同樣重要。' See Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 33.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

real spirit of Buddhism. What they understand is the wrong spirit of *Hīnayāna*.¹⁴⁶

As Fang argued, the achievement of a perfect state depends on a perfect mind, which is pure and non-obstructive. Only the *Mahāyāna* which develops based on this pure mind can be regarded as the culmination of Buddhist thought. Perhaps this idea of Fang is debatable but, if we remember that he had his own criteria for classifying different intellectual systems, there is a reason for this view. In fact, Fang showed his discontent with *Hīnayāna* throughout his work, considering its worldview negative.¹⁴⁷ In Fang's view, Huayan thought is the best amongst *Mahāyāna*, since Huayan develops its thought based on the function of the pure mind. With the pure mind functioning, all *dharma*s are non-obstructive and as a result, the harmonious state is achieved. Other forms of thought like Tiantai and Consciousness-Only, Fang suggested, do not totally comprehend the role of the pure mind. Therefore, a perfect state cannot be achieved through the thought of these Buddhist traditions.¹⁴⁸

In addition to emphasizing the formation of the perfect state, Fang also stressed the importance of practice. As will be immediately apparent, Fang's discussion of practice is rather simple, as he failed to give any definition of it. In my view, his suggestion of the idea is to remind us that Huayan thought is not only a philosophical theory or conceptual game but also a kind of religion which needs our participation. Therefore, he tended to classify philosophical theory and religious practice into two categories without further explanation elsewhere in his work. In a sense, Fang seems to over-simplify the issues of philosophy and religion. However, this simplification helps sharpen the characteristics of his interpretation of Huayan thought. Based on his understanding of the experience of Sudhana in the *Huayanjing*, Fang argued that both rationality and practice are important for human beings in reaching the perfect state.¹⁴⁹

146 The original Chinese is '把佛學唯識中三性三無性說法裡面的「徧計所執性」的錯誤去掉，而從「依他起性」來說。但是這個「依他」並不是依錯誤（染污），而是依佛的精神主體（清淨心）。於是把依他起性變成圓成實性。圓成實性是一個價值美滿的精神主體，是一個根本原因，由這個根本原因，才能從理性上面產生智慧，從智慧裡面產生理想，從理想裡面把握價值，這樣才能點化為大乘，點化為佛乘。所以在佛學裡面，凡是對這個世界持着失望、消極、悲觀、痛苦、詛咒態度的人，都不能算是真正的佛教徒，或瞭解真正的佛教精神，而只是小乘佛教的錯誤精神。' *Ibid.*, p. 38.

147 Fang, *FDXY*, note 2, p. 51; Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 37–39.

148 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 380–381.

149 Fang, *ibid.*, pp. 127–129.

Fang's emphasis on practice in Huayan thought makes his interpretation obviously different from those of other scholars who pay little attention to this.¹⁵⁰

In consideration of the role practice plays in Huayan thought, Fang suggested that the whole Huayan system should be comprehended via four steps. First is faith in Vairocana, which is a symbol of the perfect state.¹⁵¹ Without faith in the perfection of the world, any thought remains a mere theory.¹⁵² Second is the understanding of the rationale behind Huayan thought and its different concepts. Third is the religious practice of the teachings of Huayan thought and fourth, only by following the previous steps can humanity obtain the fruit of the perfect state.¹⁵³ Fang summarized these four steps in four words: faith (Chi. *xin* 信), understanding (Chi. *jie* 解), practice (Chi. *xing* 行) and enlightenment (Chi. *zheng* 證).¹⁵⁴ In my view, most of the studies about Huayan are mainly concerned with the categories of understanding and enlightenment. However, according to Fang's model, comprehension of the thought is incomplete if the roles of faith and practice are overlooked. As I will mention in the next chapter, Tang Junyi discussed the role of practice through his interpretation of Huayan's doctrinal classification theory, a theory largely neglected in Fang's interpretation of Huayan. Ironically, though Fang stressed that both theory and practice are important for human beings in reaching the perfect state, in his interpretation of Huayan thought, it is only philosophical theory that is the main subject of discussion. This point is also essential to understanding his response to 'scientism', as I will further discuss in Chapter 5. Regardless of this inconsistency in Fang's interpretation, I consider that his suggestion about the roles of faith and practice are still remarkable, compared with many of the studies about Huayan.¹⁵⁵

150 For example, see Wei Daoru, 'A Fundamental Feature of the Huayan Philosophy', in Imre Hamar ed., *Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), pp. 189–194.

151 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 57–58.

152 *Ibid.*, pp. 64–67.

153 As Fazang described, the fruit of Buddha should be 'perfect, clean and full of praise'. See Fazang, *Huayan youxin fajie ji* 華嚴遊心法界記, *DZJ*, vol. 45, no. 1877, pp. 646b, 8–12.

154 Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 53–84.

155 Fang's suggestion of the role of practice helps explain his attitude towards Li Tongxuan 李通玄 (635–730), a layman stressing practice and faith in the Huayan tradition. Unfortunately, Fang did not further explain Li's ideas but only mentioned his name. For further discussion about Li's idea, see R. M. Gimello, 'Li Tung-hsuan and the Practical Dimensions of Hua-yen', in R. M. Gimello and P. N. Gregory ed., *Studies in Chan and Hua-yen* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 321–389.

A further point also requires attention. In section 3.1, I noted that, in his own thought, Fang argued that an ideal person needs to be concerned with others. This principle applies to his interpretation of Huayan thought. As well as emphasizing the perfect state and practice, Fang also focused on Huayan's idea of the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena' or *shi shi wuai fajie*, considering it to indicate that the ideal person should be down-to-earth and should not isolate him- or herself from other beings.¹⁵⁶ As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Huayan's idea of the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena' holds the view that there are no real conflicts amongst *dharma*s. Therefore, different *dharma*s can co-exist without obstruction. Fang extended this idea, arguing that it is similar to the situation of a person who is already enlightened needing to consider others.¹⁵⁷ Perhaps this interpretation by Fang of the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena' is 'creative' in terms of Charles Wei-hsun Fu's idea of 'Creative Hermeneutics'. However, I also believe Fang's ideas may be too far from the 'original meaning' of Huayan thought, a view I will consider again at the end of this chapter. Regardless of the possible disputation, Fang's criterion in ranking various Buddhist theories is now clear, that is the extent to which they contribute to the achievement of harmony.

3.2.2 *Fang's Criterion in Ranking Buddhist Theories—The Extent of Harmony*

From the previous discussion it is now clear that the focus of Fang's thought is the perfect state which Huayan thought helps suggest. The perfection of such a state is also the criterion for Fang's ranking of various Buddhist theories. Amongst the different potential characteristics of such a perfect state, 'non-obstruction' is stressed by Fang:

We can summarize the content [of Huayan's thought] in a word, that is *apratihata*. What is *apratihata*? It is to see the diverse realms through an ultimate category so that an integral structure can be seen. Then the differences among diverse worlds can be transformed as an organic unity. In this organic unity, whole and part as well as part and part can be mutually absorbed.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ This idea of Fang is seen repeatedly throughout the two volumes of *HZ*, note 83.

¹⁵⁷ For discussion, see *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 492–496; *HZ* vol. 2, *ibid.*, pp. 352–360.

¹⁵⁸ The original Chinese is '我們可以把它們的含義歸結到一個字上來說明，這一個字就叫做 *apratihata* (無礙)，就是所謂「無礙」，這個「無礙」是什麼呢？就是拿一個根本範疇，把宇宙裡面千差萬別的差別境界，透過一個整體的觀照，而彰顯出一個整體的結構，然後再把千差萬別的這個差別世界，一一化成一

In section 3.1.4, I mentioned Fang's use of various languages to show that his ideas are shared by different ancient civilizations. His using *apratihata* 無礙 here is a good example of it. As the citation implies, Fang considered that *apratihata* helps make the diverse worlds into an organic unity. In Huayan thought, there is no real obstacle among *dharma*s. Fang argued that this 'non-obstruction' is precisely the advantage of Huayan, which he considered the dissolution of dualism. As I explained in section 3.1, dualism is Fang's main criticism of 'praeternatural metaphysics'. The 'interpenetration' of Huayan thought, according to Fang, therefore, is a method to avoid the disadvantages caused by 'praeternatural metaphysics'. Fang explained this idea thus:

Under the thought of Huayan, the universe is totally an organic unity. . . . this wisdom of all-inclusiveness, from my point of view, can help cure the schizophrenia of Greek thought, modern Western thought and even Indian Buddhism.¹⁵⁹

As I will discuss later, it is exactly this characteristic of Huayan thought that Fang regarded as a response to the challenge of 'scientism'.¹⁶⁰ However, Fang's view of Huayan's perfect state as an organic unity does not imply that there is no classification or ranking in Huayan thought. To Fang, the advantage of Huayan thought is the interpenetration amongst different *dharma*s:

Huayan's thought is not to deny the various levels caused by dualism, but to solve the separation among different levels. . . . that is to say, for two levels, they are not separated but mutually penetrated.¹⁶¹

In brief, it is this capacity of Huayan thought to help develop a harmonious world which makes Fang consider it the best theory within Buddhism.

個機體的統一。並且在機體的統一裡面，對於全體與部分之間能夠互相貫注，部分與部分之間也能互相貫注。' See Fang, *HZ* vol. 2, *ibid.*, p. 3.

159 The original Chinese is '在華嚴思想的籠罩下，宇宙它才徹始徹終、徹頭徹尾是一個統一的整體。..... 這一個具足整體的智慧，從我的觀點上看來，是可以醫治希臘人的心靈分裂症、也可以醫治近代西洋心物能所對立的分裂症，甚至還可醫治佛學在印度方面所產生的心靈分裂症。' *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

160 As Wang Hui 汪暉 argues, dualism is a characteristic of 'scientism'. See his '“Kexue zhuyi” yu shehui lilun de jige wenti '科學主義'與社會理論的幾個問題', *Tianya* 天涯 (June 1998): 132–160.

161 The original Chinese is '華嚴宗的哲學，並不是要否認這個二元論所存在的不同層次，而是要解決任何相對的層次的隔絕性。..... 換句話說，在兩種相對的境界裡面，它並不是隔絕的關係，而是通透的關係。' Fang, *HZ* vol. 2, note 83, p. 354.

While discussing Huayan thought, in fact, Fang employed many terms specifically used in his own ‘blueprint’ of ‘the correlative structure of man and the world’. As he said explicitly, Huayan’s Buddha realm is a good example of ‘comprehensive harmony’,¹⁶² a point unusual in his interpretation of different intellectual traditions, including Confucianism and Taoism. The following table shows some of the similarities between the world of Huayan and that as suggested in Fang’s ‘blueprint’:

TABLE 1 *Comparison between Fang’s blueprint and Huayan thought*¹⁶³

Fang’s Blueprint		Huayan Thought
Biological sphere	=	World of sentient beings
Psychological sphere		
Mysteriously mysterious	=	Vairocana
mystery		
God the most high		

In section 3.1, I indicated that Fang classified the world into various levels, including the natural order, the transcendental order, ‘*Homo nobilis*’, ‘Divinity’ and ‘*Deus absconditus*’. In the natural order, which is in the lowest position of the five worlds, there are spheres of physical life, biological life and psychic life. Interestingly, Fang also used the terms biological world and psychological world to describe the world of living beings of Huayan thought, in which the sentient beings hold no religious, moral and artistic value in Fang’s opinion.¹⁶⁴ Through practice, however, sentient beings can progress and the summit of the process of self-exaltation is ‘*Deus absconditus*’, which Fang called ‘Mysteriously mysterious mystery’ and ‘God the most high’. As observed, Fang considered that these terms also fit the state of Vairocana, a symbol of the perfect state in the tradition of Huayan. Therefore, from Fang’s point of view, Huayan thought is conceptually similar to his own ‘blueprint’. Although he did not explicitly say

162 Fang, *CMN*, note 25, pp. 56–59.

163 For Fang’s employment of specific terms to describe Huayan thought, see Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, pp. 14–17, 292 and 319.

164 *Ibid.*, pp. 13–17.

that Huayan thought is equivalent to his 'blueprint', I argue that Fang's employing specific terms in his 'blueprint' to describe Huayan thought is not a coincidence. When Fang discusses other Buddhist schools, in fact, he does not make such comparisons.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, though the comparison may be rather rough, Fang's comparing Huayan to his own 'blueprint' is clearly intentional. In Fang's view, as I mentioned earlier, Huayan thought is a state which can be regarded as 'comprehensive harmony'. Hence, while discussing Huayan thought, he was actually discussing his own philosophy. Therefore, to conclude, the degree of reaching 'comprehensive harmony' is the criterion employed by Fang for ranking various Buddhist theories. This point certainly helps explain his response to 'scientism', which I will discuss in detail in the final chapter.

3.2.3 *Insights and Limitations in Fang's Interpretation of Huayan Thought*

The system of Huayan thought is complicated. Therefore, having a comprehensive understanding of it is always difficult. From the discussion above, we have obtained a basic idea about Fang's interpretation of the thought. His interpretation has its own insights which may contribute to the study of this Buddhist tradition but it may also have limitations and raise other questions as well. In this section, I will discuss both these aspects of his interpretation.

For the insights, first, Fang provides a new angle to comprehend Huayan thought, which I consider particularly rare and commendable in Chinese academia. As suggested in his 'blueprint', the material, which consists of the actual world, is at the lowest level in Fang's idea of 'comprehensive harmony'. By comparing Huayan thought with his own 'blueprint', Fang suggested that the material also plays a role in Huayan. In fact, Huayan thought is widely regarded as a kind of idealism by many scholars,¹⁶⁶ in which all *dharma*s are merely a manifestation of the mind though not actually existing independently. In terms of Fang's interpretation, however, Huayan thought does not reject the existence of the material. Instead, what humans should do is to progress from the material sphere to an ideal world, as he clearly said:

165 As I check *Zhongguo dasheng foxue*, *Huayanzong zhexue* and *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*, the works in which Fang interpreted Buddhist thought, such comparison is only seen in his discussion of Huayan.

166 For example, see Fang Litian 方立天, *Sui Tang fojiao* 隋唐佛教 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 2006), pp. 433–436; Liu Jee-loo, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: from Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 248–276; Karyn L. Lai, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 257–259.

It [Huayan thought] believes that the 'One True Dharma Realm' is an object full of existences of material, forms of life, and states and destinations of spirit. It is not from an epistemological point of view, arguing that the world full of objects is the transformation of the subjective mind. Although the *Huayanjing* admits that there is an objective world, this world needs to develop itself from a material world to the worlds of life, spirit and holiness. Only in this way can it be claimed an ideal world. Since the objective world is full of life and holiness, and it will finally turn to spiritual glory, from this point of view, I call the Huayan philosophy the philosophy of ideal-realism.¹⁶⁷

From the citation, it is obvious that Fang denied the idea of 'idealism', which suggests that the existence of the material is dependent on the human mind. In Fang's view, the world is concrete or what he called 'objective'. The task of the mind is to transform the values of the material, making it full of 'holiness' and 'glory'. Although this interpretation of Fang may not totally match the Huayan thought discussed in Chapter 2, together with his emphasis on Dushun but not other Huayan patriarchs, he certainly provides a new angle to understand the thought.

Second, similar to the previous point, Fang's suggestion of faith, understanding, practice and enlightenment as the steps for comprehending Huayan thought may be viewed as an alternative framework for the study of the thought. Based on Fang's classification, most of the studies about Huayan only covered the categories of 'understanding' and 'enlightenment' with the categories of 'faith' and 'practice' being ignored. In fact, theory and practice cannot be separated completely in a religious tradition. Taking Fang's view into account, philosophical discussion alone cannot help human beings develop from the material world to the spiritual world. On the other hand, practice needs to embrace theoretical discussion. As I will discuss in Chapter 5,

167 The original Chinese is "它承認「一真法界」本身就是一種客體，而在這個客體的裡面，包含了一切物質的存在、一切生命的形式、一切精神狀態和一切精神的歸宿。而且它也不從知識論的立場去看，而把客體的世界領域化成主觀的心靈狀態。雖然華嚴經承認有一個客觀的世界，但是這個客觀的世界裡面是要從物質世界發展到生命世界，生命世界發展到精神世界，精神世界再發展到最高的神聖領域去，才可以說是一個 ideal world (理想的世界)。而客體的世界裡面，因為它含藏了生命，含藏了生命世界上面的一切莊嚴世界，同時在這個生命世界上面的一切莊嚴領域，最後又都變成了 spiritual glory，變成了精神上的莊嚴。所以從這麼一個觀點上看起來，華嚴宗的這一套哲學，我們可以叫它做 philosophy of ideal-realism (理想實在論的哲學—倡即事即理)。" See Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 259.

this idea of Fang points out a difficulty facing the development of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which is the need of a theory of practice.

Alongside his insights, limitations of Fang's interpretation also require consideration. First, Fang's view on the role of the pure mind in the Buddhist tradition is debatable. In his own works, Fang doubted whether the subject, since it is not totally pure in nature, can ultimately achieve an ideal world. As he argued:

If we look back to the original issue of human nature, [we find that] human nature extends from perceptual activity, from the five consciousnesses to the sixth consciousness, the seventh consciousness (the root of idea of self) and the eighth consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), which comprises good and bad, as well as defilement and pureness. If human nature comprises both good and bad, can human beings develop themselves to an eternal and spiritual world as suggested in *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*? It is certainly in doubt.¹⁶⁸

To Fang, the thought of Consciousness-Only should abandon the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, which Fang considered impure.¹⁶⁹ In my view, Fang's comments on Buddhist thought are entirely based on his own criterion, which is the achievement of a comprehensive harmonious world. This position of Fang, however, may not be so convincing given that the pure mind is only one of the concepts explaining the possibility of achieving the perfect state. Historically, the pure mind never plays a dominant role in Buddhism.¹⁷⁰ Theoretically, on

168 The original Chinese is '如果我們回顧人性的根本問題時，那麼人性是從感性的知識活動所延伸，由前五識，第六意識，再講到第七識（自我為意根）、第八識（阿賴耶識）而來。在第八識裡面是善惡糾纏在一起的，為染淨同住的。假使人性是如此，而應該地要受到善惡糾纏不清的話，那麼人類是否有可能昇到大般涅槃經所說的那一種永恆的精神世界的上去呢？這當然是一個大問題。' Fang, *HZ* vol. 1, note 83, p. 380. Please note that the translation is only a summary of Fang's sentences.

169 Fang, *ZDF* vol. 2, note 12, pp. 274–280.

170 For a good discussion about the appearance and prevalence of different concepts in Buddhism, see Akira Hirakawa, Paul Groner trans., *A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śakyamuni to Early Mahāyāna* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); Liu Mingwood, *Madhyamaka Thought in China* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1994); Lu Cheng 呂澂, *Yindu foxue yuanliu lüejiang* 印度佛學源流略講 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2005).

the other hand, the impure character, which Fang called bad character,¹⁷¹ as appearing in *ālayavijñāna* is not the end of the thought of Consciousness-Only. The aim of the system of Consciousness-Only, instead, is to change the impure character stored in *ālayavijñāna* into a pure character.¹⁷² In this sense, Fang's conclusion that only if Buddhism develops a philosophy based on the idea of the pure mind can it achieve a 'comprehensive harmony' may be premature. In short, Fang's discussion of Buddhism seems to be arbitrary, as both the historical fact and theoretical argument of the religion are deliberately misinterpreted.

Second, ironically, Fang's interpretation also overlooks the characteristics of the pure mind as discussed by Huayan's patriarchs. In Chapter 2, I briefly explained that, in the Huayan tradition, there should be no contradiction amongst different concepts at the mind level. Only a mind without obstacles can achieve a harmonious world. I argue that the contribution of Fazang, Huayan's third patriarch, is to revise the content of the pure mind and make such harmony possible at the mind level by revising the three natures' theory of Consciousness-Only. Although Fang acknowledged the role of the pure mind, he failed to realize the significance of the works of Fazang but concentrated on the contribution of Dushun directly. As a result, Fang appeared to admit the role of 'perfect reality' only. In other words, he ignores Fazang's idea that the three natures are actually penetrating each other. To Fazang, 'perfect reality' is also 'arising from conceptualized nature' and has 'dependence on others' by nature. There is no real difference amongst these three. Unlike *ālayavijñāna*, which helps explain the appearance of phenomena, the pure mind is like an assumption explaining the possibility of attaining the perfect state. Therefore, the functions of *ālayavijñāna* and the pure mind, are in essence, different. However, Fazang combined the two in one concept, considering that the pure mind is not only the origin making the perfect state possible but also the explanation of the appearance of all phenomena. In this sense, Fazang made his own contribution to Huayan and even to Chinese Buddhism.¹⁷³

171 Literally Fang seemed to assume that impure character is morally bad, a point not particularly discussed in Huayan thought. Since Fang did not further explain his choice of words in his works, I guess he may want to stress that impure character is not good for achieving 'comprehensive harmony'. However, this guess is rather difficult to prove given his limited discussion of this area.

172 Li Runsheng 李潤生, 'Zhuanshichengzhi kunnan de bianjie 轉識成智困難的辨解', *Faxiang xuehui jikan* 法相學會集刊 vol. 6 (2008): 1–45.

173 For a good discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, 'The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism', *T'oung-pao* 通報 vol. 68, nos. 4–5 (1982): 181–220.

Without his dissolution of the potential contradiction amongst different *dharma*s at the mind level, the completion of ‘comprehensive harmony’ as suggested by Dushun would have been theoretically impossible. In this sense, I argue that Fang’s emphasis on the role of Dushun rather than that of Fazang is not convincing. The impression that Huayan thought is subjective cannot be improved using Fang’s interpretation on its own. As I mentioned earlier, though Fang stressed that the way Xiong discussed Buddhism from the perspective of the perfect state directly was problematic, in my view, Fang seems to make the same mistake.

In fact, as I noted in Chapter 2, Fazang’s suggestion that the pure mind is both the origin of the perfect state and phenomena stems from *Dasheng qixin lun*. Unfortunately, and for unknown reasons, Fang neglected the role the text played in Huayan thought as a whole, not to mention the Nan Dilun School and the Shelun School. All these make his interpretation of the thought incomplete. First, as I have argued, Fang failed to explain why the pure mind can achieve ‘comprehensive harmony’. Second, he also failed to account for the appearance of defiled *dharma*s if the mind is pure. In brief, by contemporary academic standards, his works can only with difficulty be regarded as sufficiently scholarly, and this helps explain why Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought has gained little attention within academic circles.

Admittedly, in terms of the main theme of this study—the consideration of both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’—it is not essential that Fang’s interpretation needs to address all these issues about Huayan. This section only aims to point out the potential insights and limitations of Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought so that the characteristics of his appropriation of this Buddhist tradition can be better understood, while a more thorough discussion will be undertaken in Chapter 5.

3.3 Conclusion

At first sight, the discussions in this chapter seem to be about Fang’s own thought and his interpretation of Huayan. However, I would argue that they are actually about Fang’s redefining the ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ of Chinese culture and that of Huayan thought. In fact, Fang tends to consider that aspects of Huayan thought represent the characteristics of ‘Chinese philosophy’ as a whole,¹⁷⁴ in which, employing the terms of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’, ‘comprehensive harmony’ is its

174 For discussion, see Fang, *CVL*, note 17, pp. 1–26.

'*ti*' while harmonization of various values is its '*yong*'. In Fang's view, both Confucianism and Taoism are representations of the kind of 'Chinese philosophy' that offer 'comprehensive harmony'.¹⁷⁵ Amongst the schools in Buddhism, Huayan shares this characteristic the most.¹⁷⁶ In section 3.2, I explained why Fang considered that Huayan belongs to a philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' and how Huayan thought helps harmonize various values. That is to say, Fang defined the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of Huayan thought, considering that the thought shares the '*ti*' and '*yong*' with Confucianism and Taoism. In Chapter 2, I mentioned that modern Confucian thinkers' appropriation of Buddhist ideas are to 'enrich the Confucian '*ti*' with the Buddhist '*ti*' and to complement the Confucian '*yong*' with the Buddhist '*yong*'. While here I raise Fang's idea of Chinese philosophy's '*ti*' and '*yong*' in relation to Huayan thought, I will in Chapter 5 discuss how the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of Huayan thought subsequently helped enrich and complement the '*ti*' and '*yong*' of Chinese thought in return, so that the latter was more able to respond to the challenge of 'scientism'.

175 *Ibid.*

176 Fang, *CMN*, note 25, pp. 56–59.

Tang Junyi and Huayan Thought

Unlike Thomé H. Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought, which is largely ignored in academia, Tang Junyi's relationship with Huayan thought is widely recognized, particularly among Chinese academics. To my astonishment, however, there is a lack of serious study about this issue.¹ In fact, as early as 1980s, Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought was criticized by Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生 (1934–), a famous historian, as being a 'confusion of ideas',² implying that Tang's appropriation of the thought is a failure. As Tang confessed in a letter to Carsun Chang, the thinker who actively engaged in the 'polemic on science and metaphysics' in the early 1920s, his thought basically followed the direction of the latter, implying that 'scientism' is always the concern of Tang's philosophy.³ In this sense, I argue that Tang's relationship with Huayan thought, including the role of the thought in responding to 'scientism', has not been properly comprehended. Like the case of Fang in Chapter 3, discussion about Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought also needs, in my view, to think of his own general thought, as it is from his own perspective that Tang interpreted this Buddhist tradition and appropriated it. In this chapter, therefore, I first critically assess Tang's own ideas and their characteristics, and then discuss his view of Huayan.

- 1 Most studies about this issue are only at an introductory level, which tend to repeat what Tang said about Huayan thought. For example, see Zhang Yunjiang 張雲江, *Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi yu Huayanzong* 心通九境：唐君毅與華嚴宗 (unpublished MA dissertation, Sichuan: Sichuan University 四川大學, 2005); Jing Haifeng 景海峰, *Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang* 新儒學與二十世紀中國思想 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 2005), pp. 243–252; Xu Jia 徐嘉, *Xiandai xin rujia yu foxue* 現代新儒家與佛學 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe 宗教文化出版社, 2007), pp. 162–171.
- 2 See his 'Miandui weilai de zhongji guanhui 面對未來的終極關懷', *Zhongguo luntan* 中國論壇 vol. 15, no. 1 (1982): 21–24. For a similar view, see Li Zehou 李澤厚, *Shuo ruxue si qi* 說儒學四期 (Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 上海譯文出版社, 2012), p. 44. However, Lin's idea was also criticised by individual scholars. See Yang Zuhan 楊祖漢, 'Guanyu Lin Yusheng shi dui Tang Junyi xiansheng de pinglun 關於林毓生氏對唐君毅先生的評論', *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 no. 93 (1983): 0–1; Lau Kwok-keung (Liu Guoqiang) 劉國強, 'Shui shi yixiangqing yuan de lejie—dui Lin Yusheng jiaoshou piping Tang Junyi xiansheng de zhexue zhi queding kanfa 誰是一廂情願的了解—對林毓生教授批評唐君毅先生的哲學之確定看法', *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 no. 104 (1984): 28–35.
- 3 Tang Junyi, *Shujian* 書簡 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990), p. 19.

4.1 Tang Junyi's General Philosophy

4.1.1 *The Life and Works of Tang Junyi*

Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) was born in Yibin 宜賓, in the Chinese province of Sichuan 四川. His father, Tang Difeng 唐廸風 (1886–1931), was a scholar in the late Qing Dynasty and a student of the then famous Buddhist scholar, Ouyang Jian. His mother, Chen Zhuoxian 陳卓僊 (1887–1964), was a teacher in primary and secondary schools.⁴ With this family background, Tang Junyi was introduced to cultural issues from an early age. During his teenage years, he became interested in Western philosophy and considered traditional Chinese thought hackneyed.⁵ However, his view of Chinese thought changed gradually with age and experience. In 1925, Tang studied philosophy at Peking University. Becoming tired of the atmosphere of rivalry amongst the scholars there, he moved in 1927 to the Central University in Nanjing, where he met Thomé H. Fang and Tang Yongtong. After graduation in 1932, Tang taught in several universities and secondary schools in China and rapidly developed a strong reputation in academia.⁶ In 1940, he met Mou Zongsan and the two became lifelong friends.

When the Chinese Communist Party took control of China in 1949, Tang Junyi, Qian Mu and Zhang Pijie moved to Hong Kong, where they established New Asia College 新亞書院, insisting that the values of traditional Chinese culture had international significance.⁷ In 1958, Tang Junyi, together with Carsun Chang, Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan, published the declaration 'A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese Culture—Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook', arguing that

4 For more on Tang's parents, see Tang Junyi, *Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu* 年譜；著述年表；先人著述 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990).

5 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

6 It is said that *Daode ziwo zhi jianli* 道德自我之建立, a work of Tang written in his thirties, was selected for the top academic prize by the Government at that time. *Han Wei Liang Jin Nanbeichao fojiao shi* 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史, the influential work about Buddhist history written by Tang Yongtong, came second. Since Tang Yongtong once taught Tang Junyi, it is said that Tang Junyi declined the prize out of modesty. This story helps highlight that Tang Junyi, as a young scholar, enjoyed a good reputation. See Zhou Fucheng 周輔成, 'Ji Junyi xiansheng ruogan shi 記君毅先生若干事' in *Tang Junyi quanji* 唐君毅全集 vol. 30 紀念集 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp. 78–89.

7 Thomas Fröhlich, 'The Exilic Prism of Modernity: New Perspectives on the Post-War Philosophy of Tang Junyi', *Oriens Extremus* vol. 52 (2013): 37–82; Chiu King Pong, "'Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie" xuanyan ji shijie zhexue 中國文化與世界 宣言及世界哲學', *Ehu xuezhì* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 55 (Dec. 2015): 1–18.

'Heart-Mind and Nature' (Chi. *Xinxing* 心性) was the central value of Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular.⁸ Although this declaration is jointly signed by several thinkers, it was drafted by Tang and therefore, the declaration is widely considered to represent his ideas.⁹

In 1963, New Asia College, together with Chung Chi College 崇基學院 and United College 聯合書院, became the founding colleges of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In the same year, Tang became the first professor in the Philosophy Department and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts of the University. The colleges were at first granted autonomous powers but in the 1970s, the Hong Kong Government decided to assert administrative authority over them. Worried that the ideal of New Asia College would not survive, Tang Junyi, Qian Mu and the other seven college governors resigned in protest at the Government's decision in 1977. In the following year, Tang died of lung cancer in Hong Kong.¹⁰ Since Tang spent his whole life within education, his potential audiences and readers were mainly adolescents, a point highly relevant to our understanding of a key characteristic of his thought, the emphasis on 'practice', which I will discuss below.

Shortly after Tang's death, a series of comments were made by some of his former colleagues and that of Mou Zongsan is probably the most relevant to this study.¹¹ At once acknowledging Tang as a 'giant in the universe of cultural consciousness',¹² Mou Zongsan went on to suggest that Tang's scholarship did not develop greatly after his thirties. This raised questions and even doubts, especially amongst younger scholars, about the status of Tang in modern

8 For details, see section 1.2.

9 Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, *Xueshu yu jingshi: Tang Junyi de lishi zhixue ji qi zhongji guanhua* 學術與經世：唐君毅的歷史哲學及其終極關懷 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2010), pp. 479–505.

10 For the life of Tang, I refer to the chronicle edited by Tang Duanzheng 唐端正, a close disciple of Tang Junyi, in Tang Junyi, NZX, note 4, pp. 1–241. For a brief version, see Lau Kwok-keung, 'Life Chronology of Tang Junyi', in Wm. Theodore de Bary ed., *Confucian Tradition and Global Education* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press and New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 101–104.

11 Xu Xu 徐訐 (1908–1980), a famous author and a friend of Tang, for instance, suggested that Tang had no political sense and that the education of New Asia College was by and large a failure. See his 'Yi Tang Junyi xiansheng yu ta de wenhua yundong' 憶唐君毅先生與他的文化運動, in Mou Zongsan et al., *Tang Junyi huainian ji* 唐君毅懷念集 (Taipei: Mutong chubanshe 牧童出版社, 1978), pp. 147–158; also see his "Ping Xu" yu "Dao Tang" 「評徐」與「悼唐」, in *Tang Junyi huainian ji*, *ibid.*, pp. 159–187.

12 See section 1.1.

Chinese thought.¹³ Although this dispute has subsided in recent years, thorough study of Tang remains rare.¹⁴ Most aspects of his thought have not been fully explored, nor has his significance within the academy. This study therefore seeks to address these issues.

If Thomé H. Fang's interest in Buddhism, and Huayan thought in particular, during the Second Sino-Japanese War was rather sudden, Tang Junyi's interest in Buddhism could be considered a mystery. Although it is clearly recorded that Tang Junyi studied with Tang Yongtong, a well-known scholar of Buddhist history, during his undergraduate years, no further mention of this teacher-student relationship can be found. The only record indicating Tang Junyi's relationship with important Buddhist figures was probably his visit to Ouyang Jian in 1940, when he refused to be a private student of the latter and said he would like to learn more than Buddhism.¹⁵ In fact, as shown in his early writings, Tang expressed his discontent with the Buddhist idea of impermanence (Skt. *anitya*; Chi. *wuchang* 無常), insisting that his desire of pursuing a perfect world was 'real'.¹⁶ Tang insisted it was this rather than the impermanence of the world that he valued.¹⁷ In this context, I argue that Tang's use of Huayan in his thought seems rather unlikely and therefore something which can only be understood after considering his general view of philosophy.

4.1.2 *Tang on the Purpose of Philosophy*

In Tang's view, the purpose of philosophy cannot be separated from his understanding of the ultimate goal of humanity, which is to achieve an 'infinite life' (Chi. *wuxian zhi shengming* 無限之生命). He explained this idea thus:

What is the real existence (Chi. *zhenshi cun zai* 真實存在) of our life? It is the impossibility of a being not to exist. This is the real existence. This life of its being impossible not to exist means an infinite life, which is forever

13 For details, see Li Tu 李杜, 'Tang Junyi xiansheng yu Taiwan ruxue 唐君毅先生與台灣儒學', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 24, no. 8 (1997): 710–724.

14 Li Zehou 李澤厚, for example, ignores Tang while discussing modern Chinese thought. See his *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun* 中國現代思想史論 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 1996).

15 Tang Junyi, *NZX*, note 4, pp. 41–42.

16 This point will be clearer after the discussion in section 4.1.2.

17 Tang Junyi, *Daode ziwo zhi jianli* (Hong Kong: Rensheng chubanshe 人生出版社, 1963), pp. 74–81. The discussion between Tang and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897–1964), a disciple of Ouyang Jian, also suggests a similar view of Tang. See Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian* 中華人文與當今世界補編 vol. 1 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005), pp. 355–357.

lasting and universal. For the world of common mortals, this life is normally considered the life of heaven or god. Ordinary men may consider it impossible for them to obtain. However, I will argue that it is obtainable for all human beings. A life truly penetrating innumerable lives means this infinite life.¹⁸

According to Tang, philosophy should help a human being achieve an 'infinite life' by means of penetrating the lives of others, so that the life of a human being can be 'forever lasting and universal'. This point is important to our understanding of Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought, as this Buddhist tradition emphasises the interpenetration of various phenomena, a view I have discussed in earlier chapters. Tang argued that any knowledge or theory not germane to this ultimate purpose, the penetration of the lives of others, is only a conceptual game.¹⁹ Therefore, Tang considered that philosophy covers not only certain types of thought but certain kinds of teaching, which help human beings expand their mind and therefore have the opportunity of reaching other beings in practice. As Tang said:

The purpose of philosophy is to become a teaching.²⁰

As I have stressed throughout this study, 'philosophy' in the Chinese tradition aims to achieve 'self-transformation' and 'transformation of the world'.²¹ In the Chinese tradition, the word 'teaching' (Chi. *jiao* 教) is not restricted to religion, but also refers to the thought which helps achieve the above transformations.²² Obviously, Tang accepted this idea, considering the word 'teaching' a method which helps achieve these transformations. And because transformations are involved, it is important to remember that practice plays an essential role in Tang's thought. I argue that this emphasis on practice probably stemmed from Tang's personal experience, as he explicitly indicated:

18 The original Chinese is '何謂吾人之生命之真實存在? 答曰: 存在之無不存在之可能者, 方得為真實之存在; 而無不存在之可能之生命, 即所謂永恆悠久而普遍無所不在之無限生命。此在世間, 一般說為天或神之生命。世人或視為此乃人所不可能有者, 然吾將說其為人人之所可能。吾人之生命能真實通于無限之生命, 即能成為此無限之生命。' See Tang Junyi, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1986), p. 26.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 24–36.

20 The original Chinese is '哲學之目標在成教' *Ibid.*, p. 33.

21 For discussion, see section 1.2.

22 Huang Jinxing 黃進興, *Huangdi, rusheng yu Kongmiao* 皇帝、儒生與孔廟 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 2014), p. 26.

As I generally say, some ideas derive from your character from youth onwards. There are many genuine experiences, which provide the background for thinking about an issue. Sometimes, your thought and knowledge may not match your genuine experiences. But no matter how circuitously they develop, they eventually match genuine experiences. the most important part of my thought develops from genuine experience.²³

To a large extent, Tang's pursuit of philosophy can be regarded as a response to his own experience (Chi. *jingyan* 經驗),²⁴ and this is why I stress that Tang's thought cannot be understood separately from his own experience.²⁵ In fact, Tang emphasised some of his experience throughout his writings, so for example:

- 1) While seeing the land split due to drought during his childhood, Tang worried that the earth would soon end.
- 2) During his teenage years, while watching a movie about Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925), the founder of the Republic of China, Tang wondered how little a human being was, compared with the whole universe. At the same time, he appreciated how much a human being could achieve.
- 3) When separating from his parents, Tang genuinely felt sadness.²⁶

From them, Tang eventually concluded:

I hence realize that there is a sincere and compassionate benevolence (Chi. *ren* 仁) in my life. The heart of compassion as suggested by Buddhism is also inherent in me. Although this Humanity has manifested itself only occasionally since my teenage years, no matter how circuitously, my

23 The original Chinese is '我時常說，年青的時候，好些觀念是從性格裡面出來的。這裡面有很多真經驗，真經驗是思想問題的背景。有時候，你的思想學問未必與你的真經驗配合，但思想學問的發展，彎來彎去的發展了，最後還是與你的真經驗配合。 我思想中最高的那一部份都是環繞那些真經驗。' See Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian* 中華人文與當今世界補編 vol. 1 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005), p. 357.

24 Tang Junyi, *scxyj* vol. 2, note 18, p. 466.

25 For similar idea, see Lao Sze-kwang, *Siguang renwu lunji* 思光人物論集 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001), pp. 81–89; Liu Shu-hsien, *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), p. 93; Gong Pengcheng 龔鵬程, *Ruxue xinsi* 儒學新思 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009), pp. 320–321.

26 Tang, *scxyj* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 466–467.

philosophical thought has developed along with the direction of explaining the existence of such Humanity. This is not for mere intellectual interest but for helping myself and others better to manifest Humanity in order to save the world.²⁷

According to Tang, manifestation of this benevolence is not a mysterious process but a real personal experience.²⁸ This idea is similar to that of Xiong Shili in his famous dialogue with Fung Yu-lan, to which I referred in Chapter 2. Perhaps it is this similarity between the two that has caused the so-called teacher-student relationship between Xiong and Tang to be stressed in academia, an issue I will further discuss in section 4.2. To Tang, philosophy is not only a theoretical but also a practical issue, in which how to be a moral being is the core concern. In terms of ancient Chinese thought, this is called the 'scholarship of becoming moral' (Chi. *chengde zhi xue* 成德之學). In brief, I argue that it is the achievement of an 'infinite life' through becoming moral which is the ultimate purpose of Tang's thought. And it is by means of this kind of thought that Tang responded to the challenges of 'scientism'. Any topics unrelated to this are secondary in Tang's thought.²⁹

4.1.3 *The Existence of Mind as a Theoretical Prerequisite*

Since Tang's task is to explain the existence of benevolence in humanity, the concept of mind (Chi. *Xin* 心) is mentioned throughout his writings, as is shown below:

The aim [of the work] is to indicate a direction of philosophical thought that raises the place of the human mind in the universe.³⁰

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- 27 The original Chinese is '吾即以此而知吾之生命中，實原有一真誠惻怛之仁體之在，而佛家之同體大悲之心，亦吾所固有。吾之此仁體，雖只偶然昭露，然吾之為哲學思辨，則自十餘歲以來，即歷盡種種曲折，以向此一物事之說明而趨，而亦非只滿足個人之理智興趣，而在自助、亦助人之共昭露此仁體以救世。' *Ibid.*, p. 467.
- 28 Tang Junyi, *Rensheng zhi tiyan xubian* 人生之體驗續編 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1996), p. 95.
- 29 Lao Sze-kwang, 'Yi Tang Junyi xiansheng ji qi chengde zhi xue 憶唐君毅先生及其成德之學', *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 8 *Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu* 中國哲學與文化 no. 8 唐君毅與中國哲學研究 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2010), pp. 1–2.
- 30 The original Chinese is '其用意則在指示一「提高人心在宇宙中之地位」之哲學思想方向。' See Tang Junyi, *Xin wu yu rensheng* 心物與人生 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002), p. 4.

It should be remembered that most of Tang's early works were written in the 1940s, the period when Communism prevailed in China and the Chinese Communist Party began to take control of the country. It is under this atmosphere that Tang tried to confirm that the mind, not material considerations, plays the most fundamental role in human activities. As he said:

We do not deny the existence and reality of matter (Chi. *wuzhi* 物質). Like all materialists, we are also convinced of this. What we want to argue is that the existence of matter is only a kind of existence and existence is not completely matter.³¹

Although Tang provided many arguments to illustrate the existence of the mind,³² I consider that the simplest but also the most convincing one is that, when one denies the existence of the mind, it is the mind reflecting on the issue and drawing this conclusion. That means, saying that the mind does not exist is paradoxically a proof of its existence.³³ Following this understanding, Tang developed many arguments supporting the view that the mind is more fundamental than the material in human life, though he did not reject the idea that human beings can consider our minds a kind of 'object'.³⁴ Amongst numerous arguments, I argue that his theory of death helps explain the issue in a rather original way. As Tang noted, human beings not only live to fulfil their bodily needs but there are always other goals for them to achieve. For example, human beings need to fulfil their bodily needs by eating or drinking. However, having food or water is simply a means whereby human beings sustain themselves. After supporting their lives, human beings can then pursue other goals, like improving the lives of their families and contributing to society. In this sense, in Tang's own terms, there are always spiritual (Chi. *jingshen de* 精神的) needs beyond human beings' pursuit of the material. Tang considered that the mind is the origin of all spiritual activities.³⁵ Therefore, it is more fundamental than the material in human life. As Tang argued, the material will eventually be destroyed but the spirit can remain alive. The achievement of 'infinite life'

31 The original Chinese is '物質的存在與實在，我們一點亦不否認。我們同一切唯物論者，一樣的堅信。我們只是要說明，物質的存在只是一種存在，而存在者不全是物質。' *Ibid.*, p. 165.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 7–163.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 90.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 89–126.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 188.

is, in short, through our continuously enhancing the spirit.³⁶ The more human beings develop concern, the larger their spirit will be.³⁷ Tang's definition of life, in this sense, is spiritual rather than physical.³⁸

In my view, this relationship between an 'infinite life' and the mind touches the central theme of Tang's thought. As previously discussed, Tang's understanding of the ultimate goal of humanity is the achievement of an 'infinite life'. The purpose of philosophy is to help human beings achieve this ultimate goal through penetrating the lives of others, meaning as we have observed, enhancing concern for others. Therefore, the mind, which is the origin of all spiritual activities, is a theoretical prerequisite of Tang's entire thought. It immediately brings our discussion to a crucial stage: the consideration of the characteristics of the mind, and its relationship with other beings.

4.1.4 *The Characteristics of the Mind*

In Chinese intellectual traditions, Confucianism for instance, there are many terms which help describe different characteristics of the human self. While 'mind' often refers to the capacity for moral reflection, 'sentiment' (Chi. *qing* 情) and 'desire' (Chi. *yu* 欲) are other examples, which respectively describe feelings such as emotion towards others and the sexual impulse. In brief, 'mind' means the mental activity of humanity.³⁹ However, Tang tended to express all these meanings with one word '*xin*', a characteristic which makes his thought

36 Tang's idea of death is mentioned separately in his works. See *ibid.*, p. 80–88; Tang, *RZTX*, note 28, pp. 97–112; Tang Junyi, *Zhi Tingguang shu* 致廷光書 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1986), p. 49. For a general discussion, see Chiu King Pong 趙敬邦, 'Tang Junyi xian-sheng zhi siwang guan 唐君毅先生之死亡觀', *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 no. 381 (March 2007): 24–29.

37 Tang, *SCYXJ* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 27–28.

38 Chan Sin Yee considers that Tang's theory is a failure because there is always a limit to the concern of humanity. Therefore, an infinite life is impossible. However, the aim of Tang's theory appears to be to encourage people to develop their concern as far as possible and not only to focus on themselves. In this sense, Chan may miss the optimistic spirit which Tang tried to express in his works. For Chan's comment, see her 'Tang Junyi: Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture', in Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin ed., *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 305–326.

39 Shun Kwong-loi, 'The Self in Confucian Ethics', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 18, no. 1 (1991): 25–35; also see Hans-Rudolf Kantor, 'Ontological Indeterminacy and its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909–1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538–597) Tiantai Buddhism', *Philosophy East and West* vol. 56, no. 1 (2006): 16–68.

sometimes difficult to understand.⁴⁰ While 'xin' is widely translated as 'mind', it is also translated as 'Heart-mind' in some literature.⁴¹ This is because the term Tang used is closely related to his thought in most of his writings, including his last work 生命存在與心靈境界 (*The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind*), where Tang, unusually, used 'xinling' 心靈, a term with almost the same meaning as 'xin' in daily Chinese, rather than 'xin' to express his ideas. Tang explained his rationale thus:

The 'xin' in the term 'xinling' is mainly used inwardly while 'ling' refers to vacuity and the ability to reach outward. The nimbleness and the ability for reaching outward imply the meaning of 'empathic penetration'.⁴²

While the word 'xin' normally refers to a mind with tangible characteristics and functions, such as capacities for moral reflection and thinking, which I call the 'concrete' side of the mind, Tang argued that 'ling' 靈 describes the 'vacuous' (Chi. *xu* 虛) side of it. In fact, in Taoism, emphasizing 'vacuity' is common as in the *Laozi* 老子, it is remarked that 'While vacuous, it is never exhausted. When active, it produces even more.'⁴³ The concept of 'vacuity', to a large extent, means something not substantial or immaterial.⁴⁴ Although the face of 'vacuity' is particularly stressed in Taoism, it is also noted in Confucianism. Xunzi 荀子 (340BC–245BC), for example, emphasised this aspect of the mind when he discussed ways of learning. As he said, 'How does a man understand the way? Through the mind. And how can the mind understand it? Because it is empty [vacuous], unified, and still. The mind is constantly storing up things,

40 In fact, Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1193), an influential Confucian thinker in the Song Dynasty, also shared this characteristic of Tang, while both of them tended to express different meanings related to subjectivity with one word 'xin'.

41 For more discussion of this, see Wu Yi, *Chinese Philosophical Terms* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 15–17; John Berthrong, 'Xin (Hsin): Heart and Mind', in Cua Antonio S. ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 795–797; Mou Bo, *Chinese Philosophy A–Z* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 164.

42 The original Chinese is '心靈之「心」，偏自主于內說，「靈」則言其虛靈而能通外，靈活而善感外，即涵感通義。' See Tang, *SCXJ* vol. 1, note 18, p. 10.

43 The original sentences are '虛而不屈，動而愈出' See *Laozi*, Chapter 5. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 141–142.

44 For further discussion, see Liu Xiaogan, 'Xu (Hsu): Emptiness', in Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, note 41, pp. 809–811.

and yet it is said to be empty [vacuous]. The mind is constantly marked by diversity, and yet it is said to be unified. The mind is constantly moving, and yet it is said to be still'.⁴⁵ In my view, this idea of Xunzi helps explain Tang's idea of the mind.

According to Tang, the mind is not rigid. On the contrary, there is always room in it to absorb new ideas and reach a new phase.⁴⁶ While the 'concrete' side of the mind helps explain various human abilities, including the abilities to feel and to think,⁴⁷ the 'vacuous' side of it explains the possibility of interacting with others without any obstacle. Both sides of the mind help constitute Tang's idea of 'empathic penetration' (Chi. *gantong* 感通),⁴⁸ a concept literally meaning feeling and penetrating and originally drawn from the famous statement of *Yi Jing*: 'Change has neither thought nor action, because it is in the state of absolute quiet and inactivity, and when acted on, it immediately penetrates all things'.⁴⁹ In short, the term means 'one's ability to feel and know an object or a situation and to penetrate it with one's empathetic response'.⁵⁰ However, the absence of either side of the mind makes the constitution of

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- 45 The original Chinese sentences are '人何以知道? 曰: 心。心何以知? 曰: 虛壹而靜。心未嘗不臧也, 然而有所謂虛; 心未嘗不兩也, 然而有所謂壹; 心未嘗不動也, 然而有所謂靜。' See *Xunzi*, chapter 21. For the English translation, see Burton Watson, *Basic writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 127. Watson uses emptiness but not vacuity to translate 'xu'.
- 46 As Li Runsheng 李潤生 argues, the Buddhist idea of emptiness also includes similar functions. See his *Shenghuozhong de fofa: Shanzhai xuyu* 生活中的佛法: 山齋絮語 (Taiepi: Quanfo wenhua 全佛文化, 2000), pp. 202–205. As I will further discuss in section 4.3, the characteristics of emptiness are probably a reason that attracted Tang to employ Buddhist ideas in his thought.
- 47 Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 26–37.
- 48 There are many translations of the term. In this study, I follow the translation of Donald J. Munro, as he exactly discusses Tang's idea of '*gantong*', but not the '*gantong*' of other Chinese thinkers. See his 'Empathy—Comments at the Unveiling of the Statue of Tang Junyi on 20 May 2009', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua no. 8 Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu*, note 29, pp. 3–5.
- 49 The original sentences are '易無思也, 無為也, 寂然不動, 感而遂通天下之故。' See *Appended Remarks of Yi Jing* 周易繫辭 part 1, chapter 10. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, note 43, p. 267.
- 50 William Yau-nang Ng, 'Tang Junyi's Spirituality: Reflections on its Foundation and Possible Contemporary Relevance', in Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker ed., *Confucian Spirituality* vol. 2 (New York: Crossroad, 2004), pp. 377–398. For further discussion, see Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 29–47.

the idea of 'empathic penetration' impossible.⁵¹ As I argue later, the odds of achieving 'empathic penetration' is one of Tang's criteria for judging different intellectual traditions, and needs to be considered together with his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind' (Chi. *xinling jiu jing* 心靈九境).

Tang's discussion of the mind, however, does more than emphasise its two sides. In fact, Tang further classified the characteristics of the mind as '*ti*' or substance, which I consider a better translation of the word as Tang tended to use '*ti*' to describe the unchanged nature of a being, '*xiang*' 相 or appearance and '*yong*' or function, two of which I have discussed in Chapter 2. In general, the word '*xiang*' is used as the Chinese translation of the Buddhist term '*lakṣaṇa*', which primarily means the appearance or attributes of things.⁵² In China, the employment of '*xiang*' is usually discussed together with '*ti*' and '*yong*'. A stone, for example, is grey and hard. The colour and quality are the appearances, attributes or '*xiang*' of the stone. On the other hand, a stone can be used for building a house, which can be considered its '*yong*'. Since there are '*xiang*' and '*yong*' of the stone, in terms of the analysis of '*ti*' and '*yong*' in Chapter 2, there should be a '*ti*' of the stone. To sum up, all beings, no matter whether sentient or not, have their own '*ti*', '*xiang*' and '*yong*'. According to Tang, the mind is not exceptional. This idea helps establish his famous theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', which I will now discuss.

4.1.5 Introduction to the Theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind'

Among Tang's wide-ranging ideas, the theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', which is set out in his final work, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie*, is essential. As indicated in the name, two components play a central role in the theory, 'mind' (Chi. *xinling* 心靈) and 'horizon' (Chi. *jingjie* 境界).

Although the word '*jing*' 境 is seen in some Taoist texts in the period of Wei, Jin, and the Southern and Northern Dynasties (220–589),⁵³ it was probably after the prevalence of Consciousness-Only in China, during the Tang Dynasty, that the term became technical. '*Jing*' is primarily used to translate the word '*viśaya*' from Consciousness-Only, meaning 'sphere' or 'field'. Different from its

51 Liang Yancheng 梁燕城, 'Method and Methodology in Tang Chun-i's Philosophy', in Huo Taohui 霍韜晦 ed., *Tang Junyi sixiang guoji huiyi lunwenji* 唐君毅思想國際會議論文集 vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Fazhu chubanshe 法住出版社, 1992), pp. 149–164.

52 Wu Ming 吳明, 'Cong fojiao ti yong yi zhi hengding kan tang mou zhi fenpan ru fo 從佛教體用義之衡定看唐、牟之分判儒佛', *Xinya xuebao* 新亞學報 vol. 28, no. 1 (2010): 89–109; also see Zhang Dainian, Edmund Ryden trans., *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 240–257.

53 For example, see *Guo Xiang's Commentary on the Zhuangzi* 郭象莊子注.

employment in Consciousness-Only, however, in the Chinese tradition, '*jing*' is usually linked with the word '*jie*' 界, which helps constitute the term '*jingjie*' 境界, which is similar to the meaning of 'mental status' or 'horizon'. In this sense, therefore, it can be considered that there is a close relationship between '*jingjie*' and the mind. In fact, '*jing*' is commonly used together with '*xin*' or the mind and it helps constitute another term '*xinjing*' 心境, which is used in daily Chinese to mean 'state of mind'.

In Tang's view, however, the meaning of '*xinjing*' is more than just a state of mind. As I mentioned earlier, Tang argued that there are both concrete and vacuous sides to the mind. He also argued that all things in the world, including the mind of humanity, contain these two faces. While the word 'object' tends to indicate the concrete side of a thing, including the human mind, it fails to denote its vacuous side. It implies that the mind is not only an object but more than that, an idea that will be clearer after the discussion in section 4.1.7. As Tang himself stated, '*jing*' is better translated as 'horizon' or 'world' in his thought, because the word helps contain the core meaning of object, while at the same time, lessening the meaning of the concrete side which the word 'object' may imply.⁵⁴ Based on Tang's own definition, the term '*xinjing*' suggests a relationship between the mind and horizons. Since '*jing*' or 'horizon' is not an object, Tang considered that it is not opposite to the subject. Furthermore, mind and horizon are not obstructive but interactive. The mind perceiving a horizon indicates that the latter is to be perceived by the former. In this sense, the horizon exists in the mind. On the other hand, the way the mind perceives is altered by different horizons.⁵⁵ The theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind' recognises nine relationships between the mind and horizons, in which the interaction between the two is stressed. This interaction, in Tang's own words, is called 'empathic penetration' or *gantong*, a term I have explained briefly above.⁵⁶

The question now remaining is how this 'empathic penetration' functions. As discussed, Tang argued that there are three characteristics of all things, '*ti*', '*xiang*' and '*yong*'. In his view, the interaction with horizons is, for example, only a '*yong*' of the mind. To fully comprehend a thing, however, various horizons are needed. Tang considered that our understanding of a thing always follows a particular order, which is perception first, like the reception of sense data, followed by cognition, such as the categorization of that data. This method of comprehension via a specific order is called 'sequential observation' (Chi. *shun*

54 Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 11–12.

55 *Ibid.*, pp. 12–14.

56 Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 268–276.

guan 順觀), by which the 'yong' or function of a thing is understood. Besides, 'xiang' or appearances of various things are all the same from an axiological point of view, since they are the reflection of the 'ti' or substance of the things. Observing the identity of 'xiang' is called 'horizontal observation' (Chi. *heng guan* 橫觀). Although 'xiang' are all the same from an axiological perspective, the 'ti' of the thing can be different. Comprehending a thing via its 'ti' is called 'vertical observation' (Chi. *zong guan* 縱觀).⁵⁷ Tang considered these three ways of comprehending the world comprise the whole activities of the mind. Admittedly, the relationships between and among 'ti', 'xiang' and 'yong' as Tang argued so far are not clear. However, I argue that the key point of Tang's argument is not to explain these relationships, but to suggest that all things, including the mind of humanity, can be comprehended via the dimensions of 'ti', 'xiang' and 'yong'. In other words, the absence of any dimension makes our comprehension of a thing incomplete. This point is essential to our understanding of Tang's response to 'scientism', as I will discuss further later.

For Tang, a comprehensive understanding of a thing involves observing its 'ti', 'xiang' and 'yong' through the three methods of comprehension. These methods of comprehension correlate to the understanding of object, subject and the relationship between the two. As Tang noted, human understanding of the world is at first outwardly directed, since it starts from the observation of the object. However, the direction then turns inwards, from the observation of object to the subject, which is responsible for comprehending the object. Along with the enhancement of the extent of self-cultivation, eventually, the distinction between object and subject is dissolved. In brief, the Tang's 'nine horizons' discuss the spheres of object, subject and the state without distinction between them.⁵⁸ In general, the construction of Tang's theory of the 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind' can be summarized in the following table:

57 For details of the three different ways of comprehending a thing, see Tang Junyi, *SCYXJ* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 12–17.

58 For the translations of the terms of the nine horizons, I mainly refer to Li Tu, 'Tang Junyi (T'ang Chun-i)', in Cua ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, note 41, pp. 712–716. Also refer to Liu Shu-hsien, *Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, note 25, pp. 89–105; Anja Steinbauer, 'A Philosophical Symphony: Tang Junyi's System', *Yi Pu* 毅圃 vol. 8 (December 1996): 59–66; William Yau-nang Ng, *T'ang Chun-i's Idea of Transcendence: with special reference to his Life, Existence, and the Horizon of Mind-Heart* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1996), pp. 64–71; Tan Sor-hoon, 'Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy', in Mou Bo ed., *History of Chinese Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 539–608.

TABLE 2 *Summary of Tang Junyi's Theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind'*⁵⁹

	Substance (<i>Ti</i> 體)/ Vertical Observation	Appearance (<i>Xiang</i> 相) / Horizontal Observation	Function (<i>Yong</i> 用)/ Sequential Observation
Objective Horizon (客觀境界)	Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things (萬物散殊境)	Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus (依類成化境)	Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations (功能序運境)
Subjective Horizon (主觀境界)	Horizon of Interpenetration of Perceptions (感覺互攝境)	Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void (觀照凌虛境)	Horizon of Moral Practice (道德實踐境)
Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon (超主觀客觀境)	Horizon of Conversion to the one God (歸向一神境)	Horizon of the Void of Self and that of Existent Things (我法二空境)	Horizon of Embodiment of Heavenly Virtues (天德流行境)

In short, the first three horizons help describe, respectively, the '*ti*', '*xiang*' and '*yong*' of objects, which Tang summarized as the 'Objective Horizon' (Chi. *keguan jingjie* 客觀境界).⁶⁰ The first horizon is the 'Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things' (Chi. *wanwu sanshu jing* 萬物散殊境), which consists of numerous unconnected and individual units. In this horizon, each unit, including human beings, does not recognize the existence of other beings. That means each unit exists independently and no connection between them can be drawn. For Tang, what concerns human beings in this horizon is only the individual unit. The existence of the individual unit is regarded as objective. Tang considered that all worldviews concerning the individual, like

59 Table 2 is revised from Tan Sor-hoon's 'Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy', *ibid.*, p. 552.

60 Tang, *scyxj* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 47–49.

individualism and even knowledge of individual objects, should be categorized under this horizon.⁶¹

The second horizon is the 'Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus' (Chi. *yilei chenghua jing* 依類成化境), which consists of the classification of various individuals in terms of their common characteristics. In the 'Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things', as just mentioned, there is no relationship between individuals. However, in fact, there are different and common characteristics amongst them. By sorting the differences and commonalities among individuals, they can be categorized into various groups. For instance, by knowing the common characteristics of a dog and a cat, both can be categorized into the group of animals. By knowing the differences between them, however, they can be seen as different kinds of animal. In brief, in this horizon, the '*xiang*' of the objects is observed.⁶²

The third horizon is the 'Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations' (Chi. *gongneng xuyun jing* 功能序運境), which consists of causal connections between individuals. In this horizon, the functions of individuals and groups are focused on. Amongst different functions, Tang stressed the relationship of cause and effect in particular. Tang argued that after considering the existence and appearances of individuals, the causal correlation between them should be analyzed. Any knowledge concerning the investigation of correlations among individuals and groups is classified in this horizon.⁶³

As the 'Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things' describes the existence of an individual thing but not its '*xiang*' or '*yong*', Tang regarded it as a horizon for describing the '*ti*' or substance of a thing. Besides, the 'Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus' describes the common characteristics of various things. These common characteristics, in Tang's view, are the '*xiang*' of the things. Therefore, it is a horizon for describing the appearance of a thing. Likewise, the 'Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations' describes the '*yong*' of different kinds of thing. As I mentioned earlier, Tang considered that these three horizons help describe the '*ti*', '*xiang*' and '*yong*' of objects respectively, which he summarized as 'Objective Horizon'. In the sphere of 'Objective Horizon', humanity pays attention to the object only and neglects the existence of the subject. However, along with the increase of daily experience, human beings should realize that there must be the existence of a perceiving and cognitive subject, otherwise comprehension of the object would be impossible. Therefore, after discussing the 'Objective Horizon', Tang

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 57–152.

62 *Ibid.*, pp. 153–230.

63 *Ibid.*, pp. 231–344.

immediately introduced the horizons related to subject, which he summarized as 'Subjective Horizon' (Chi. *zhuguan jingjie* 主觀境界).⁶⁴

The first of these horizons is the 'Horizon of Interpenetration of Perceptions' (Chi. *ganjue hushe jing* 感覺互攝境). In this horizon, Tang argued that the relationship between subject and object begins from the perception of human beings. For instance, the fact that an object can be observed by me is because I have the ability to see. If I did not have such ability, the relationship between me and the object might change. In Tang's view, perception is the first step for human beings to link themselves with others. By reflecting on the ability of perception, a human being begins to realize the existence of self. Such existence of self, as Tang considered, is the substance of subject.⁶⁵

The horizon which follows is the 'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void' (Chi. *guanzhao lingxu jing* 觀照凌虛境). In the previous horizon, the ability of perception is emphasised. Except this ability, however, the subject of human beings can also act like a mirror which lets the objects and even subjects manifest themselves as they actually are. In brief, this is the ability of abstract contemplation. By achieving this, the universal characteristics amongst different kinds of thing are to be reflected. Such universal characteristics, according to Tang, are the '*xiang*' or appearance of the things.⁶⁶

The next horizon is the 'Horizon of Moral Practice' (Chi. *daode shijian jing* 道德實踐境). There are obviously various abilities in humans, including the abilities to perceive and to conceive abstract ideas, as indicated in the previous two horizons. Amongst these different abilities, however, Tang stressed the ability for moral practice, considering it the most significant function of human beings. Without acknowledging this function, the understanding of the subject is not comprehensive. All moral philosophy stems from the moral reflection of the subject.⁶⁷

The above horizons are relevant to the '*ti*', '*xiang*' and '*yong*' of the subject respectively and all of them are summarized as 'Subjective Horizon'. However, Tang's ultimate goal of the 'Theory of Nine Horizons' is not to introduce the characteristics of object and subject but to dissolve the distinction between the two. This ideal is explained in the three horizons which Tang categorized as 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon' (Chi. *chao zhuguan keguan jing* 超主觀客觀境).⁶⁸

64 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 345–439.

66 *Ibid.*, pp. 441–604.

67 *Ibid.*, pp. 605–688.

68 Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 2, note 18, p. 3.

The first of these horizons is the 'Horizon of Conversion to the one God' (Chi. *guixiang yishen jing* 歸向一神境). In this horizon, Tang argued that only a transcendent god is the ultimate 'ti' or substance of the universe. Subject and object are not the concern of human beings, as the faith of them is put in God but not in anything else. Christianity, as Tang argued, is an example of this horizon.⁶⁹

The next horizon is the 'Horizon of the Void of Self and that of Existent Things' (Chi. *wo fa er kong jing* 我法二空境). In this horizon, Tang discussed the idea of emptiness in Buddhism, considering that there is a state in which all beings, including self and any other phenomena, are empty in nature. That the self is empty means there is no unchanged nature in subject. Similarly, that all existent things are empty implies there is no independent nature of object either. In this regard, the distinction between subject and object is only a '*xiang*' or appearance. There is no real contradiction or conflict amongst them. Therefore, the apparent contradiction between subject and object can in principle be dissolved.⁷⁰

The last horizon is the 'Horizon of Embodiment of Heavenly Virtues' (Chi. *tiande liuxing jing* 天德流行境), a state, according to Tang, belonging to Confucianism. Although Confucianism is considered by some scholars not open to other intellectual traditions,⁷¹ Tang argued that in the 'Horizon of Embodiment of Heavenly Virtues', human beings will extend their moral consideration to others consciously, helping transform the world with virtues. In this horizon, there is no difference between subject and object from an axiological point of view, implying that Confucianism is actually very inclusive. Tang considered that this idea is the 'Unity of Heaven and the Human' (Chi. *tian ren heyi* 天人合一), a key notion of Confucianism.⁷²

As Tang explicitly argued, the main characteristic of the horizons belonging to the 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon' is their emphasis on practice and experience.⁷³ These horizons are certain kinds of teaching rather than theoretical thought. As I will further discuss in the last chapter, this point is related to Tang's interest in Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification. Tang explained his idea of the 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon' as follows:

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 3–73.

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 75–154.

71 Li Chenyang, *The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 156–157.

72 Tang Junyi, *scxyj* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 155–252.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 3–12.

In these three horizons, knowledge needs to be transformed into wisdom, or attributed to wisdom, in order to function in life and help human beings achieve the real existence of life with value. It is different from other learning in the world, which distinguishes knowing from doing as well as existence from value. The philosophy of it [Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizons] is not only knowing but the teaching in our living and life.⁷⁴

As I will discuss in section 4.1.7, the dimension of practice is a key issue in Tang's thought, and is even regarded as being one of his most important contributions to the thought of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'.⁷⁵ Before discussing this, however, I stress that Tang considered that observing a thing from various angles involves different horizons. The choice of observation is dependent on the individual. There is no universal principle requiring all human beings to reach certain horizons. Observing vertically, horizontally and sequentially are three ways humans have of viewing the world. Since each observation has its own perspectives on discussing subject, object and the dissolution between the two, each constructs its own worldview in a relatively comprehensive way. Therefore, Tang summarized them as 'universal observation' (*Chi. pian guan* 遍觀),⁷⁶ which is different from those perspectives taken only from certain particular perspectives like individual disciplines, such as economics and physics. This point is essential to our understanding of Tang's response to 'scientism', as science, based on the above analysis, is only regarded as a particular angle but not as a 'universal observation'.

Although the nine horizons have been briefly mentioned above, they are not the whole of Tang's theory. In fact, the most important aspect of his theory is an understanding of how the horizons function together and it is this that I now wish to consider.

74 The original Chinese is '在此三境中，知識皆須化為智慧，或屬於智慧，以運于人生活，而成就人之有真實價值之生命存在；不同于世間之學之分別知與行、存在與價值者。其中之哲學，亦皆不只是學，而是生活生命之教。' see Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 1, note 18, p. 51.

75 Lao Sze-kwang, 'Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai 從唐君毅中國哲學的取向看中國哲學的未來', *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 8 *Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu*, note 29, pp. 15–26.

76 Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 1, note 18, p. 17.

4.1.6 'Universal Observation' on Universal Observations

Although Tang presents the horizons deriving from sequential, horizontal and vertical observation as comprehensive, he emphasised that humans should not stick solely to one of them:

No matter how good a single horizon of the mind is, if we consider it complete and feel content with it, it becomes the fetter of the mind.⁷⁷

In Tang's view, each observation employs only a part of the entire function of the human mind. None of the observations permanently applies to all situations, which means their application depends on particular individuals in particular circumstances.⁷⁸ The most important point to recognise is that every kind of observation is from the human mind. As Tang argued, the spirit of human beings towards God, the pure mind of Buddhism and the moral consideration of others as Confucianism suggests are actually all from the same origin but with various names.⁷⁹ It is in this sense that Tang confirmed the value of all important intellectual traditions, as he explained:

All words with meaning are reasonable from a certain perspective. If classifying them in terms of types and levels, making clear which orders we refer to and saying them at the right time, all words can be of benefit to the audience and can be considered ultimate truth from certain perspectives.⁸⁰

Although the term 'order' (Chi. *cixu* 次序), which means sequence in the context of the above citation, is common in daily Chinese, it plays an important role in Tang's thought. It is because it states that the interaction amongst different horizons and observations needs to follow a particular sequence. In fact, as mentioned previously, Tang considered that human beings firstly comprehend the object and then turn the attention to the subject. In my view, this

77 The original Chinese is '無論什麼好的心靈境界，當我們視之為完成而自足於其中時，他便成為我心靈本身之桎梏。' See Tang Junyi, *Rensheng zhi tiyan* 人生之體驗 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), p. 58.

78 I will give examples for this point in Chapter 5 as it is closely related to Tang's response to 'scientism'.

79 Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 353–354.

80 The original Chinese is '一切說不同義理之語，無不可在一觀點之下成立。若分其言之種類層位，而次序對學者之問題，而當機說之，無不可使人得益，而亦皆無不可說為最勝。' *Ibid.*, p. 481.

already shows an 'order' of comprehending the world. At the very beginning of this study, I mentioned Lao Sze-kwang, who argued that Tang's philosophical method is Huayan's 'All is One, One is All'.⁸¹ However, as I will discuss further at the end of this chapter, Tang's emphasis on 'order' proves Lao's idea incorrect. In my view, Huayan's influence on Tang is not its logic of 'All is One, One is All', but its theory of doctrinal classification, an idea I will further discuss in Chapter 5.

But, to return to the discussion of 'universal observation', although one intellectual tradition may be better than another in terms of certain criteria, no single intellectual tradition is supposed to be entirely superior to others. Therefore, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism and any other kind of intellectual tradition and thought are actually forms of 'relative truth'. The 'absolute truth', as Tang argued, is harmonization amongst different 'relative truths', as he explained:

That we feel dissatisfied with relative truths is only because there are usually contradictions and conflicts among them. The ways of interdependence, inter-justification and harmony are always neglected. The pursuit of absolute truth simply means the dissolution of the contradictions among relative truths so that a harmony can be achieved.⁸²

In consideration of the fact that there are numerous 'relative truths' in the world, practically harmonizing all of them and reaching 'absolute truth' is impossible. In fact, Tang explicitly stated that he realized the complexity of this task. However, as 'absolute truth' can never be obtained, this implies the mind should not stop at any particular stage but must continue to pursue 'absolute truth'. Otherwise, the 'absolute truth' would be a fetter of the mind, preventing it from further improvement.⁸³ In this sense, in Tang's view, the human mind is always dynamic in Tang's view.⁸⁴

Applying this idea to the three methods of observation, Tang concluded that human beings should always reflect on their insights and limitations, and not adhere to any of them permanently. Even though one particular viewpoint may

81 See section 1.1.

82 The original Chinese is '我們所以不安於相對真理，唯由於相對真理之有矛盾衝突互相對待，而不見其互為根據互相證明而相貫通和諧。求絕對真理之心所求者，只此矛盾衝突對待之銷除融化以得一貫通和諧。' See Tang Junyi, *XWYR*, note 30, p. 154.

83 Tang Junyi, *SCXYJ* vol. 1, note 18, p. 17.

84 Tang Junyi, *XWYR*, note 30, pp. 148–149.

be employed, human beings need to reflect on the value of it from time to time, and not ignore the value of other perspectives. It is because, in many instances, the relationship amongst various types of thought is mutually supplementary.⁸⁵ Therefore, I argue that employing sequential, horizontal and vertical observation to construct a worldview is not the end of Tang's thought but only a process which a person, ceaselessly pursuing philosophical questions, needs to follow. To view various observations critically, according to Tang, is called 'Universal Observation on universal observations'. Without such 'Universal Observation on universal observations', the mind will become rigid and, as a result, the achievement of an 'infinite life' will become impossible. As he said:

If [viewing an issue from certain kinds of universal observation] is inevitable in principle, the oneness of the world of philosophical truth will be split. Each philosophy can only achieve a certain kind of universal observation. None can achieve a universal observation on the universal observations. The human activity of the mind also fails to achieve a universal observation on the universal observations via philosophy. . . . the life of existence on which the activity of mind relies, as a result, fails to reach or achieve an infinite life of existence either.⁸⁶

To sum up, Tang's model is thus of a never-ending process, in which all the 'relative truths' are to be harmonized.⁸⁷ As I will discuss in section 4.2, Tang harmonized Fang's thought based on this idea. The key to achieve this ideal is the human mind, since various forms of observation actually stem from it. Whilst this discussion helps reveal Tang's complete thought, a crucial issue remains, namely how to make the thought practicable. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the practice of the mind, or the theory will be a kind of empty talk. And this is what I consider in the next section.

85 For more discussion, see Chiu King Pong, "Tang Junyi 'Rujiashi minzhu' lilun shuping 唐君毅「儒家式民主」理論述評," in Qian Yongxiang 錢永祥 ed., *Sixiang 27 Taiyanghua zhihou* 思想 27 太陽花之後 (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 2014), pp. 87–108.

86 The original Chinese is '若真為義理上之必然，則哲學義理之世界之全，即為一破裂之世界，而一切哲學將只能各成就一遍觀，而無一能成就對遍觀之遍觀，而人之心靈活動，亦終不能憑哲學以成此高層次之遍觀之遍觀。 . . . 而其心靈活動所依之生命存在，亦不能真通于或成為一無限之生命存在矣。' Tang Junyi, *scrxj* vol. 1, note 18, p. 31.

87 Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011), pp. 77–85.

4.1.7 *The Theory of Practice—A Preliminary Discussion*

Many scholars have correctly stated that the main theme of Confucianism is moral self-cultivation, in which how to become good is the overriding concern.⁸⁸ While some scholars like Julia Ching emphasize the external rituals of Confucianism which Confucian scholars practice in order to achieve self-cultivation,⁸⁹ others pay more attention to the internal practice of the mind.⁹⁰ As Confucius said, 'What can a man do with the rites who is not benevolent? What can a man do with music who is not benevolent?'⁹¹ In this sense, I argue that external rituals seem to play a secondary role in the Confucian tradition of practice, as the most important element is the quality of the mind.

In fact, some scholars tend to think that because of social and economic changes, many Confucian rituals are no longer valid in contemporary society.⁹² Taking this a step further, the characteristics of a Confucian in modern times are inevitably different from those of the past.⁹³ If we consider the words of Confucius, however, there is no necessary relationship between Confucian rituals and being a good person. Even if there was no ritual at all, a person could still achieve self-cultivation. On the other hand, if a person does not achieve self-cultivation, the existence of the rituals alone becomes meaningless.

Before further discussion, however, a point should be noted, which is the difference between suggesting a theory of '*gongfu*' 功夫 and practicing a kind of '*gongfu*'. In general, '*gongfu*' is a word which has no exact equivalent in English but approximately means 'the effort spent on something'.⁹⁴ In discussing

88 Philip J. Ivanhoe, *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation* (Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2000).

89 Julia Ching, *Chinese Religions* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1993), pp. 59–65.

90 Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, 'Xin rujia yu mingqi zhuyi 新儒家與冥契主義', in Chen Dehe 陳德和 ed., *Dangdai xin ruxue de guanhuai yu chaoyue 當代新儒學的關懷與超越* (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe 文津出版社, 1997), pp. 317–363.

91 See *The Analects*, Book 3, Chapter 3. For the translation, see D. C. Lau, *Confucius: The Analects* (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 67.

92 Yao Xinzong, 'Who is A Confucian Today?—A Critical Reflection on the Issues concerning Confucian Identity in Modern Times', in Yao Xinzong and Tu Wei-ming ed., *Confucian Studies* vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 392–410.

93 Liu Shu-hsien, 'Confucianism as World Philosophy: A Response to Neville's Boston Confucianism from a Neo-Confucian Perspective', *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* vol. XL, no. 1–2 (2003): 59–73.

94 Ni Peimin, 'Gongfu—A Vital Dimension of Confucian Teaching', in David Jones ed., *Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the Analects* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2008), pp. 167–187.

self-cultivation, therefore, this can be expressed as the ‘*gongfu* of self-cultivation’. Many Confucians, especially those in the Song and the Ming dynasties, suggested their own theory of ‘*gongfu* of self-cultivation’. Although, to a large extent, it is correct to say that most contemporary Confucian thinkers did not suggest such a theory,⁹⁵ it does not mean that contemporary Confucian thinkers did not practice any ‘*gongfu*’. In fact, reading, writing calligraphy and even drinking tea could be regarded as ‘*gongfu*’ in the Chinese intellectual traditions, as all of them help improve human concentration.⁹⁶ As Thomé H. Fang noted, Tang Junyi seemed to reflect himself via writing.⁹⁷ In this sense, therefore, I argue that writing is Tang’s ‘*gongfu* of self-cultivation’.⁹⁸

As Lao Sze-kwang says, the death of Tang implies the tradition of discussing the ‘*gongfu* of becoming moral’ ends.⁹⁹ In his *Zhexue gailun* 哲學概論 (*Introduction to Philosophy*), Tang stressed the role of practice after his discussion of different philosophical theories, arguing that their real value was in practice rather than in discussion. The theory of ‘*gongfu*’, therefore, is essential.¹⁰⁰ He defined this theory thus:

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- 95 Luo Bingxiang 羅秉祥, ‘Lingxiu xue, jingshenxing yu dangdai ruxue—bijiao shengshiziruowang, Feng Youlan yu Tang Junyi 靈修學、精神性與當代儒學—比較聖十字若望、馮友蘭與唐君毅’, in The Department of Religion and Philosophy, The Hong Kong Baptist University ed., *Dangdai ruxue yu jingshenxing* 當代儒學與精神性 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2009), pp. 192–214.
- 96 For more discussion on this, see Dale S. Wright, ‘Empty Texts/Sacred Meaning: Reading as Spiritual Practice in Chinese Buddhism’, *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* vol. 2, no. 2 (2003): 261–272; Lin Junchen 林俊臣, “Shuruqiren”—yi shufa wei siuji famen de shuxue fangfalun 「書如其人」—以書法為修己法門的書學方法論, *Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun* 中國文哲研究通訊, vol. 20, no. 4 (2010): 61–78; Jin Fengjian 金奉建, ‘Chadao yu “he” jingshen 茶道與「和」精神’, in Yuan Shuya 苑淑婭 ed., *Zhongguo guannian shi* 中國觀念史 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 2005), pp. 183–204.
- 97 Qiang Rixin 江日新, ‘Zhang Junmai yu “Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie” xuan yan—qi xiangfa ji suqiu 張君勱與「中國文化與世界」宣言—其想法及訴求’, *Ehu xuezhishi* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 40 (2008): 1–30.
- 98 Liao Junyu 廖俊裕 and Wang Xueqing 王雪卿, ‘Tang Junyi xiansheng de gongfulun—xushizhiliao de yizhong xingshi 唐君毅先生的工夫論—敘事治療的一種形式’, *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 vol. 35, no. 5 (2009): 41–55.
- 99 Lao Sze-kwang, ‘Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai’, note 75.
- 100 Tang Junyi, *Zhexue gailun* vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1996), p. 544.

The simplest definition of the learning of moral achievement of human beings is the conscious alteration of the behaviour of their bodies. Its most profound '*gong fu*', however, is cultivation of the mind.¹⁰¹

To understand this mental practice, I will highlight four points in Tang's thought. First, he considered that all evil ideas preventing human beings from improving themselves stem from the desire for the material. Second, he argued that human beings should recognize the ability and the possibility of overcoming this desire. Third, if, despite their best efforts, and the possibility of overcoming this desire, human beings still fail to progress, Tang considered that they would feel humiliated, and this would motivate them to improve again. In this sense, it is anticipated that the stronger the sense of humiliation humans feel, the greater their determination for self-cultivation. Fourth, Tang considered that there is no universal principle of practice for all human beings, implying that the commitment to practice depends on individuals.¹⁰²

Admittedly, Tang's discussion of practice is rather simple. However, its characteristics easily make him distinguishable from his fellow scholars since he was not only trying to develop a theory concerning self-cultivation, but also to practise what he suggested. In other words, Tang not only discusses what is good, but also how to be good. Therefore, his thought is also described as the 'scholarship of becoming moral' (Chi. *chengde zhi xue* 成德之學).¹⁰³ In fact, as I will discuss in section 4.3 and Chapter 5 respectively, Tang's emphasis on practice not only influences his interpretation of Huayan thought, but also his response to 'scientism'. This general introduction to Tang's thought leads us to his consideration of the failure of Western culture.

4.1.8 *Tang on the Failure of Western Culture*

Like Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi also considered that Western culture was failing. In general, he concluded that Western culture developed downwards and outwards, from, in his terminology, the 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon' to the 'Objective Horizon'. To explain this, Tang first suggested that the development of modern science stemmed from the

101 The original Chinese is '人之從事道德的實踐之學，其最淺之義，雖即在人之任何對自己身體之行為，自覺的加以改變處，即可表現。然其最深義之工夫之所在，卻可只在人之內心之修養。' See Tang, *ZG* vol. 1, *ibid.*, p. 23.

102 For Tang's theory of practice, see Tang, *DZZJ*, note 17, pp. 48–147. For supplementary discussion, see Thomas A. Metzger, note 50.

103 Lao Sze-kwang, 'Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai', note 75.

'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void', the fifth horizon in his theory of nine horizons, in which humans think about the universal characteristics of phenomena. From this, the development of studying abstract concepts including mathematics became possible. On the one hand, Tang admired the great achievement of Western culture in developing modern science; on the other hand, he criticized Western culture for failing to develop it upwards, from the 'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void' to the 'Horizon of Conversion to the one God' or to any of the other horizons in the 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon'. Tang believed that Western culture developed in an opposite direction:

This turning downwards and outwards from the 'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void' causes problems in the contemporary world that human beings face. The culture of this so-called modern world differs from that of the classical world, which develops upwards and inwards from the 'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void' and creates a moral-and-religion based social culture. This is a difference of direction and this difference is led by changes in Western culture.¹⁰⁴

To Tang, the downward and outward development of culture not only caused 'scientism', which denies the value of religion, but also individualism, which recognises human beings as merely different individuals, and even Marxism-Leninism, which classifies them in various socio-economic groups. As a result, he held that humanism was destroyed and the future of humanity put in crisis.¹⁰⁵ In order to complement the shortcomings caused by this cultural change, Tang suggested that the development of science needed eventually to be subordinated to a kind of moral philosophy or religion, as he argued below:

In previous times, morality which belonged to an individual nation, an individual class and an individual occupation or profession is certainly [a kind of] closed [system]. Only emphasizing certain particular moral norms or a morality in particular behaviours is, however, also closed.

104 The original Chinese is '此一由觀照凌虛境而外轉下轉，以形成人類當前時代之世界，亦即所謂現代社會文化之世界，乃與人類之古典的社會文化，重在由觀照凌虛境而上轉內轉，以形成一以道德宗教為本之社會文化，其根本方向不同者。此根本方向之轉變，則以西方文化之轉變為主導。' See Tang, *scxj* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 456–457.

105 Tang, *ibid.*, pp. 457–462; also see Tang Junyi, *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* 人文精神之重建 (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞研究所, 1974), pp. 153–164.

[Instead,] the morality of truly admiring different kinds of personality and the virtue of penetrating all morals empathically through an open mind are respectable. In terms of philosophical wisdom, a philosophical theory, which illustrates the common nature of all religions, illustrates how a philosophy empathically penetrates all kinds of morals, and illustrates that these kinds of religious morality and philosophical wisdom should predominate over all knowledge and technology, is going to occur. It is not my personal view but the call of our time, or the direction which follows the trend of current religious morality and philosophy.¹⁰⁶

In fact, as Tang argued, all of his writings can be ignored except his response to materialism.¹⁰⁷ In my view, this represents the central element of Tang's thought. At least, it is the goal for which Tang developed his thought. In his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', different scales of values are put into different horizons. Horizons particularly contribute to the development of the study of material and abstract ideas, such as the 'Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things', the 'Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus', the 'Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations' and the 'Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void' are in the lower ranking, while 'Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon' occupies a higher position. In this sense, like the 'blueprint' suggested by Fang that I outlined in Chapter 3, Tang's theory appears to handle the challenge of science. However, before I discuss how effective their responses to 'scientism' are, a more critical review of Tang's thought is needed as it relates to our discussion in the final chapter.

4.1.9 Conclusion—A Critical Review of Tang's Thought

Although Tang is viewed as one of the most important figures in Chinese intellectual history, his thought has been much criticized in academia. First, it is argued that he tended to privilege Confucianism and to integrate different

106 The original Chinese is '昔日之道德之限於一民族、一階級、一職業、一行業中之道德，固為封閉的道德，而只重若干特殊德目，或特殊行為規律之道德，亦為一封閉的道德。真能體驗欣賞不同之形態之人格之道德，而以一開放的心靈，以與一切道德相感通，所成之仁德，必當被重視。以哲學智慧言之，則一能說明上述之一切宗教之共同之核心本質，說明如何有此與一切道德相感通之仁德之哲學，並說明此宗教道德與哲學智慧，當為一切知識技術之主宰之哲學理論，必當出現。此皆順時代之呼召，或應世而生之宗教道德與哲學之大方向所在，而非吾一人之私見所存者也。' See Tang, *scryx* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 465–466.

107 Tang, *sy*, note 3, p. 186.

intellectual traditions into Confucianism.¹⁰⁸ At first sight, this criticism appears reasonable, as Confucianism is considered the final horizon in Tang's theory of the 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', implying that Confucianism is the ultimate intellectual tradition. However, if we consider Tang's own philosophical position more carefully, saying that Confucianism is the most important amongst various intellectual traditions seems only applicable to Tang's own situation. Not everyone regards, nor needs to regard, Confucianism as the most important intellectual tradition as Tang did. His main concern was to explain the existence of the mind, especially its ability to employ moral consideration. For Tang himself, Confucianism provided the most convincing explanation of this.

Since the ultimate goal may be different for different people, considering Confucianism the best philosophy in all situations is not essential. In Tang's view, Confucianism is the best explanation of moral issues amongst other intellectual traditions, as, for him, Christianity, Buddhism and other intellectual traditions are not the final answer.¹⁰⁹ However, they may be the answer for other people. In this regard, Tang's considering Confucianism the last horizon does not mean that Confucianism plays a superior role to other intellectual traditions. Judging various intellectual traditions 'objectively' or in a scholarly way is not his main concern. Instead, I argue that what he tries to achieve is the absorption of different intellectual traditions into his own system, so that each intellectual tradition has its own place.¹¹⁰ The ideal world he wanted is *da he shijie* 大和世界 or 'a world of harmony' (Chi. *he* 和), in which various views and values can co-exist without conflicts and obstacles. A world with identical value (Chi. *tong* 同), which is also sometimes translated as 'harmony', was not what he pursued.¹¹¹ Confucianism, for Tang, is the best intellectual tradition for achieving this world of 'he'.¹¹² In fact, as I noted in section 3.1.6, this is a key difference between Fang and Tang, as the former tends to pursue a value which

108 Du Baorui 杜保瑞, 'Dui Tang Junyi gaoju ruxue de fangfalun fanxing 對唐君毅高舉儒學的方法論反省' in Zheng Zongyi 鄭宗義 ed., *Xianggang Zhongwen daxue de dangdai ruzhe* 香港中文大學的當代儒者 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 2006), pp. 281–330; Peng Wenben 彭文本, 'Tang Junyi lun "geti de ziwo" 唐君毅論「個體的自我」', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 36, no. 8 (2009): 77–100.

109 Tang, *SCYX* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 502–506.

110 See Anja Steinbauer, 'A Philosophical Symphony: Tang Junyi's System', note 58.

111 Tang, *RJZC*, note 105, pp. 63–66. For further discussion of the concepts of 'ho' and 'tung', see D. W. Y. Kwok, 'Ho and Tung in Chinese Intellectual History', in Richard J. Smith and D. W. Y. Kwok ed., *Cosmology, Ontology, and Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 1–9.

112 Tang, *XWYR*, note 30, p. 265.

is shared by different cultures, while the latter aims at preserving a variety of values. In brief, in my view, criticizing Tang for ranking Confucianism as superior and other traditions as inferior may, in the final analysis, be a misunderstanding of Tang's thought.

In fact, I would argue that Tang did not put Confucianism above other intellectual traditions. Instead, his thought helps define the effectiveness of Confucianism. As previously mentioned, Confucianism belongs to 'sequential observation' in Tang's system. It is only one of the three observations which make up the function of the mind. In this sense, there is no absolute superiority of Confucianism over other intellectual traditions. This point is essential because it helps us understand Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in section 4.3. Just as Kant's discussions of the subject actually help limit the power of the subject, Tang's discussions of Confucianism also limit the power of this intellectual tradition.¹¹³ This point, unfortunately, is misunderstood in almost all scholarship about Tang.

Second, Tang's thought is widely regarded as 'pan-moralism', in which all phenomena in the world are summarized as moral activities of the mind.¹¹⁴ Similar criticism, in fact, appears in many discussions of Confucianism, where the issue of morality plays a dominant role.¹¹⁵ Although the term 'pan-moralism' is a kind of criticism that some scholars such as Chen Te 陳特 are eager to make about Tang,¹¹⁶ I argue that such a description can, in fact, be considered a kind of appreciation of Tang based on his own definition of moral activity. While discussing the nature of moral activity, Tang said:

I think the nature of a moral life is to overrule one's own living consciously. Since I believe that, fundamentally, human beings can reflect consciously, we can view ourselves or the world consciously in a different

113 Kwan Tze-wan, 'Subject and Person as Two Self-Images of Modern Man: Some Cross-Cultural Perspectives', paper presented at conference 'Issues confronting the Post-European World', Prague, Czech Republic, November 6–10, 2002. Also see his *Cong zhexue de guandian kan* 從哲學的觀點看 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1994), pp. 55–68; Thomas A. Metzger, *A Cloud Across the Pacific: Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories Today* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005), pp. 266–278.

114 T. A. Metzger, 'The Thought of T'ang Chun-I (1900–1978): A Preliminary Response', in Huo Taohui ed., *Tang Junyi sixiang guoji huiyi lunwenji* vol. 1, note 51, pp. 165–198.

115 For more discussion of this issue, see Li Minghui 李明輝, 'Lun suowei rujia de fan diode zhuyi 論所謂「儒家的泛道德主義」', in *Dangdai xin ruxue lunwenji—zonglun pian* 當代新儒學論文集—總論篇 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe 文津出版社, 1996), pp. 179–245.

116 Chen Te, 'Tang Junyi xiansheng de wenhua zhaxue yu fan diode zhuyi 唐君毅先生的文化哲學與泛道德主義', in *Dangdai xin ruxue lunwenji—zonglun pian*, *ibid.*, pp. 247–264.

manner moral value is shown at the moment that the limit of our actual self is transcended the actual self means the self trapped in an object in a particular time and space the common nature of moral mentality and moral activities is to help the self get rid of the trap, helping the self not to get trapped again. Moral value is shown at this moment of liberation.¹¹⁷

In Tang's view, moral value is manifested whenever actual life is consciously transcended. Whether a life is moral or not depends on the extent of the transcendence. The more the actual life is transcended, the more moral the life is.¹¹⁸ Tang concluded thus:

All of your life can be moralized, as long as you consider that the life is supposed to be.¹¹⁹

'Pan-moralism', in this sense, is not a criticism at all. On the contrary, it reflects the fact that Tang tried to show moral value in various situations, an attitude suggested in Confucius' saying, 'The gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long as it takes to eat a meal. If he hurries and stumbles one may be sure that it is in benevolence that he does so.'¹²⁰ The emphasis on moral value in all situations and phenomena is undoubtedly a characteristic of Tang's thought and I argue that it is similar to Huayan thought, which considers the fruit of Buddha to be always harmonious, a point I will return to in Chapter 5. In my view, considering this characteristic a shortcoming may be inappropriate, as, according to Tang, viewing the world in a contrary way may also reflect that a person is not moral enough. A short story about Tang helps explain this idea. In the myth about Emperor Yao 堯 and Emperor Shun 舜 in ancient China around the twenty-third century BC, it is said that Emperor Yao transferred

117 The original Chinese is '我認道德生活的本質，即自覺的自己支配自己之生活。因我相信，人根本上是能自覺的，所以我們對我們自己、或世界，本來可以有不同之自覺的態度 道德價值表現於「現實自我限制之超越之際」的意思 現實自我即指陷溺於現實時空中之現實對象之自我 而道德心理、道德行為之共性、即使自我自此限制範圍中解放，不復有所陷溺，而道德價值即表現於此解放之際。' See Tang, *DZZJ*, note 17, pp. 4–7.

118 See Tang Junyi, *Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing* 文化意識與道德理性 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2003), p. 25.

119 The original Chinese is '你一切生活可以道德化，只要你之生活都是經你認為應該的就是了。' *Ibid.*, p. 65.

120 See *The Analects*, Book 4, Chapter 5. For the translation, see D. C. Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*, note 91, p. 72.

the ownership of the country to Shun because the latter was a moral person. This myth is always regarded as the political ideal of Confucianism.¹²¹ Once asked by a student if Emperor Yao was forced to give way to Shun when the latter held the military power, Tang replied agitatedly, arguing that we should not doubt others' good intentions simply because we do not share them.¹²² In this sense, following Tang's position, it is the person who cannot act well who needs to reflect, not the person who can act well who deserves the challenge. Therefore, after defining the meaning of moral activity as suggested by Tang, I consider that it is unnecessary to defend the view that Tang's thought is not 'pan-moralism'. On the contrary, this description helps confirm the characteristic of his thought, which is to consider the world full of moral value.

Third, Tang is commonly considered an 'idealist' in academia, which suggests that only the mind is true or real.¹²³ This description, in my view, clearly simplifies Tang's thought. As discussed above, Tang explicitly said that he admitted the existence of matter. In his theory of 'Nine Horizons', there are three horizons explaining the substance, appearance and function of objects. He also argued that there are many reasons which constitute a phenomenon, though moral reason is the one he considered most decisive.¹²⁴ Therefore, I argue that considering Tang an 'idealist' is the converse of his own idea. I imagine that this illusion concerning Tang is probably caused by his emphasis on the role of the mind. Based on the fact that matter and objects also play a role in his thought, it may be said that what Tang is concerned with is the relationship between subject and object, or the mind and the material. The term 'idealist' is so misleading that it only makes Tang's thought confusing.¹²⁵

Although the criticism of Tang may not be as serious as many scholars claim, I admit that there are potential difficulties with his theory. The most important of these is the issue of the existence of the mind, and especially its function of moral consideration. As Tang stressed, the existence of the mind is a practical rather than a theoretical issue. In other words, human beings can experience but not think of the existence of the mind. In this sense, Tang obviously agreed

121 Chang Kwang-chih, *Art, Myth, and Ritual: the Path to Political Authority in Ancient China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 107–129.

122 For more on this story, see Chen Yongming 陳永明, *Zhexue ziwuxian* 哲學子午線 (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1993), pp. 234–242.

123 For examples, see Chan Sin Yee, 'Tang Junyi: Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture', note 38; Li Tu, 'Tang Junyi (T'ang Chun-i)', note 58.

124 Tang, *WYDL*, note 118, pp. 15–19.

125 For more discussion, see Lau Kwok-keung 劉國強, 'Tang Junyi xiansheng zhi shizai guan 唐君毅先生之實在觀', *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 vol. 137 (November 1986): 13–20.

with Xiong Shili's idea that the experience of the mind is a 'manifestation' in our daily life.¹²⁶ Intuition, as Tang admitted, became more important in his later life.¹²⁷

However, if such experience is denied by an individual, or their experience is not as strong as Tang's, I argue that his theory becomes less persuasive.¹²⁸ In fact, while discussing Tang's thought, some scholars may consider that the existence of the mind and its characteristic of being morally good is simply an 'assumption' made by Tang.¹²⁹ Although when we consider the existence of the mind and its characteristic of moral consideration an assumption appears necessary theoretically, this may not touch the core of Tang's thought. As he admitted, his argument concerning the existence of the mind is like that of Descartes' 'I think, therefore, I am.' Only when a human being uses the mind can its existence and characteristics be acknowledged. As long as there is a feeling of sympathy in the daily life of human beings, the capacity for moral consideration is proved.¹³⁰ In this sense, I argue that Tang's argument for the existence of his own mind and its function is ultimately empirical, based on his own inner experience of moral reflection.¹³¹ Therefore, I call him a 'moral empiricist'. Tang's argument for the existence of the mind of other human beings is similar. As Tang considered that his own mind was moral, therefore, it would be immoral to assume that only he had a mind. He also argued that he *felt* the existence of the minds of other people in his daily experience.¹³² This experience Tang called 'empathizing with the same feeling' (Chi. *Tongqing gonggan* 同情共感).¹³³ In brief, admitting that minds exist in all human beings

126 Tang, *scxyj* vol. 2, note 18, p. 359.

127 Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian* vol. 1, note 17, pp. 344–361. For discussion, see Frederick J. Streng, *Understanding Religious Life* (California: Wadsworth, 1985), pp. 259–261.

128 As Mark R. Wynn argues, some persons are 'more sensitive than others to the needs of their fellows.' That means the 'moral experience' is not necessarily the same amongst people. See his *Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1–3.

129 Kevin Shun Kai Cheng, *Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study* (unpublished Th.D thesis, Graduate Theological Union, 1995).

130 Tang, *DZZJ*, note 17, p. 9.

131 For more discussion, see Gong Pengcheng, note 25.

132 Tang, *DZZJ*, note 17, pp. 87–88.

133 Tang, *scxyj* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 631–647.

is not a theoretical but a practical point, experienced in our daily life but not in our thought.¹³⁴

In fact, since Tang's argument is mainly based on his own experience and the existence of the mind is difficult to be proved theoretically,¹³⁵ the feasibility of 'The Nine Horizons' is also doubtful.¹³⁶ Perhaps it is only Tang who can say if the interpenetration amongst 'The Nine Horizons' may be achieved or not, since other people cannot share his experience. Alternatively, people who follow Tang's theory of practice may also experience the horizons as Tang suggested. In this sense, I think that Tang's thought seems doomed to be criticized as subjective and idealistic, though in fact he introduced routes for his readers to follow. Tang stressed that his thought is only an answer for him. I also suspect that his theory is only valid for his own experience since it is, to a large extent, very particular. However, Tang's theory may be considered universal insofar as it is based on an experience that all human beings are believed to have. This is the experience of moral consideration. Different disciplines may have their own explanations of this experience. For Tang, however, it derives from the human mind. Undoubtedly, Tang stressed the function of moral consideration of the mind. For those holding a similar position, therefore, his theory may be more convincing. In brief, in my view, the effectiveness of Tang's thought seems to depend on the individual. The more attention a person pays to Tang's notion of moral consideration, the more effective Tang's thought will be, and vice versa. This point is like Huayan thought, in which the achievement of a harmonious world relies on the quality of the practitioner.

Second, the meaning of the mind Tang suggested is so broad that it is difficult to obtain any specific meaning for it. As I have said previously, in the Confucian tradition, there are numerous words relating to subjectivity, each of them referring to a specific meaning or function. Mind (Chi. *xin* 心), sentiment (Chi. *qing* 情) and desire (Chi. *yu* 欲) are some examples. Although the application of them may differ amongst various thinkers,¹³⁷ containing all their

134 Huang Huiying 黃慧英, 'Tang Mou er xiansheng dui taren xinling yu xingshan de puyanxin de lunshu' 唐牟二先生對他人心靈與性善的普遍性的論述, *Ehu xuezhì* 鵝湖學誌 vol. 43 (2009): 96–119.

135 Fung Yiu-ming, 'Three Dogmas of New Confucianism: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy', in Mou Bo ed., *Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions* (Chicago and La Salle, Open Court, 2001), pp. 245–266.

136 Fung Yiu-ming (Feng Yaoming) 馮耀明, "Chaoyue neizai" de misi: cong fenxi zhexue guandian kan dangdai xinruxue 「超越內在」的迷思：從分析哲學觀點看當代新儒學 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp. 58–73.

137 For a full discussion about their meanings throughout intellectual history, see Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* 新編中國哲學史 (3 vols., Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005).

meanings within a single term is not popular. For Tang, however, all the functions and characteristics of the subject seem to be attributed to the concept of mind or '*xinling*'. This is, on one hand, an innovation by Tang, especially in the context of modern Chinese philosophical study. On the other hand, however, the broadness of the meaning of the concept makes its content too wide and its characteristics too vague. Perhaps it is this innovation which creates the difficulty of understanding his thought.

The subjective nature of Tang's theory has led to much commentary upon it, but whether critical or supportive, all may be valid from certain perspectives. Tang's thought is inevitably enhanced by its complexity, but this complexity also makes his thought less rigid than the thought of many of his fellow academics. As Tang himself said:

I don't want my philosophy to be a castle but a bridge. I don't want my philosophy to be a mountain but a road and river.¹³⁸

Using the bridge, road and river metaphors, Tang suggested that everyone can find their own destination.¹³⁹ He recommends no fixed philosophical model and this is probably the main feature of his thought.¹⁴⁰ It is also the source of its strengths and weaknesses. Tang's work was extensive and discussed many topics, including education and politics, which cannot be covered in a single chapter. However, I believe that the introduction above covers the most important elements in his thought for understanding his appropriation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in section 4.3. First though I wish to show how Tang harmonizes Fang's thought, an issue totally neglected in academia but important to our understanding of their appropriations of Huayan thought.

138 The original Chinese is '吾不欲吾之哲學成堡壘之建築，而唯願其為一橋樑；吾復不欲吾之哲學如山嶽，而唯願其為一道路、為河流。' Tang, *scxyj* vol. 1, note 18, pp. 34–35.

139 Tang, *RJZC*, note 105, pp. 566.

140 Although the theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind' is a model, Tang considered that it is a model of his own but not a model universally applicable to all people. As he argued in the preface of *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* vol. 1, where the theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind' is suggested, it is not essential for a person to read the book. Reading it or not depends on that person feels a need. See Tang, *scxyj* vol. 1, note 18, p. 7. Instead of an expression of his humble character, I think it is a sound comment on his thought.

4.2 Tang Junyi's Harmonization of Thomé H. Fang's Thought

There are two reasons for discussing Tang's harmonization of Fang's thought here. First, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the teacher-student relationship between Fang and Tang is always neglected in academia. However, as I will show below, Fang seems to have inspired Tang. In my view, only by considering this point can Tang's thought be comprehended thoroughly. Second and more important for this study, Tang's harmonization of Fang's thought is a good example of his idea of 'Universal Observation on universal observations'. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Tang tried to harmonize different intellectual traditions in order to avoid causing 'scientism'. In this sense, therefore, his harmonization of Fang's thought provides a preparatory discussion for Chapter 5.

Although Tang declined to be a private student of Xiong Shili and considered he had established his own thought prior to meeting the latter,¹⁴¹ his role as Xiong's follower is always stressed,¹⁴² a phenomenon I do not find satisfactory. Interestingly, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, chatting once with a Western scholar, Tang said, in English, 'Fang *is* my teacher'. The scholar wondered if Tang had said, 'Fang *was* my teacher' but Tang emphasized that even though a long time may have passed, in Chinese tradition, the relationship between a teacher and a student continues.¹⁴³ A letter from Tang to Fang in 1962 suggests the close relationship between them:

My own immature works are not worth mentioning. But I do still remember my teacher saying more than thirty years ago that philosophy should contain both emotion and reason as well as involving an analysis of literature and science. I did not understand then what this meant but I have subsequently realized this task is not easy. Contemporary philosophers separate emotion and reason, taking a particular theme and arbitrarily applying it to everything. The harm this can do is serious and eventually affects everyone. Therefore, I always want to set beginners on the right path, insisting that emphasizing one particular reason is to be avoided and that they should pursue the whole character and wisdom of life. My

141 Tang, *NZX*, note 4, p. 42; Tang, *SCYXJ* vol. 2, note 18, p. 480.

142 Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, 'Tang Junyi yu Xiong Shili', in Huo Taohui ed., *Tang Junyi sixiang guoji huiyi lunwenji* 唐君毅思想國際會議論文集 vol. 3 (Hong Kong: Fazhu chubanshe, 1991), pp. 128–141; Liu Shu-hsien, 'Xiong Shili (Hsiung Shih-li)', in Antonio S. Cue ed., note 41, pp. 801–806; Liu Shu-hsien, 'Tang Chun-i (1909–1978)', in Robert Audi ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 900.

143 See section 1.1.

works are so crude that they fail to achieve this and my intellect is also rather limited so that I am unable to comprehend literature. Fortunately I have not completely abandoned my teacher's words of long ago and I am willing to teach young people in this spirit so that they should not be hidden from a single perspective.¹⁴⁴

Tang's letter explicitly shows both his own sense of humility and his respect for Fang. Perhaps the letter may be viewed as a polite form of address as Tang was observed as always being kind to others.¹⁴⁵ However, I consider that the interpretation of the letter will be different if the characteristics of Fang's thought are taken into account. As I discussed in Chapter 3, Fang distinguished 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics', based on the wholeness of the world, from what he saw as dualistic 'praeternatural metaphysics', based on a single perspective. I argue that Fang's 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics' is probably what Tang described he was trying to achieve in the letter.

However, based on his own thought, which tries to confirm all valuable intellectual traditions and harmonize different 'relative truths', it may not be Tang's intention to negate the value of 'praeternatural metaphysics' but, instead, to acknowledge the values of both 'praeternatural metaphysics' and 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics'. As he stated:

In human metaphysical thought, there are naturally two types of approach: the absolutism that covers the practical world with a metaphysical reality, and the relativism that divides the metaphysical reality and practical world in two I cannot stop the successive occurrence of these two types of metaphysics. I also think that this division never ends. The people who recognize the profound meaning of harmonization I describe will also know that the successive occurrence of the two types of metaphysics helps develop a teaching Since there is successive appearance, there is no contradiction if this happens in the

144 The original Chinese is '拙著無足稱，唯尚憶三十餘年前聞吾師之教，謂哲學當兼綜情與理，並通於文學與科學。當時雖不解其義，後乃知其不可易。而當世之為哲學者，蓋皆不免裂情理為二，而執一曲之理以武斷人生之全者，其弊尤甚，而禍亦終及於生民。因常念端正初學之方向，當先祛一曲之理之執，以嚮往於人生之性情與智慧之道之全。拙著粗陋，固不足以語此，而才力短淺，更不能上契於文學。唯亦幸未大違吾師昔年之教，願以此精神導來學，咸勿以一曲之理自蔽耳。' See Tang Junyi, *SJ*, note 3, pp. 30–31.

145 Donald J. Munro, *Ethics in Action: Workable Guidelines for Public and Private Choices* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), pp. 121–128.

thought of a person or in the intellectual history of humanity these two types of metaphysics help different individuals who are in different phases of development. It helps individuals not to become stuck in the current phase.¹⁴⁶

Although Tang never quoted Fang's works, I argue that his view on the two types of metaphysics is probably identical to Fang's, a point no scholarship has previously noted. In a sense, Tang's harmonization of the two types of metaphysics is a complement to Fang's idea of distinguishing these two metaphysics. In order to harmonize the two types, Tang firstly suggested the idea of doctrinal classification, where I argue that in his view different apparently contradictory ideas actually derive from various periods, so that there is no real contradiction between them. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 5. Secondly, Tang further argued that individual metaphysics fitted the needs of individual people. Therefore, no metaphysics should be negated in principle. Thirdly, based on his idea of 'empathic penetration', different intellectual traditions occur successively and endlessly. In my view, all these ideas of Tang are better understood if the linkage between Fang and Tang is acknowledged. That is to say, if only the relationship between Xiong and Tang is mentioned, such issues in Tang's thought as to why and how to harmonize different subjects and values in the world may not be easily comprehended. Ironically, it is exactly this idea that Tang suggested in the epilogue of his last work, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie*, an idea believed to be his final position.¹⁴⁷

As I argued above, following Fang, 'scientism' should be seen as a kind of 'praeternatural metaphysics'. Tang's harmonization of 'praeternatural metaphysics' and 'transcendent-immanent metaphysics', to a large extent, can be considered an example of responding to 'scientism'. Therefore, investigating the relationship between Fang and Tang not only helps discuss their thought from a different perspective, from that focusing only on the relationship between Xiong and Tang, but also helps better explain Tang's response to 'scientism'. Before assessing this thoroughly in Chapter 5, I first return to Tang's

146 The original Chinese is '在人之上學之思想，又有本質上之二型之分。即以形上真實包涵現實世界之絕對論，與以形上真實與現實世界相對之相對論之分。 吾亦不能絕此二型之形上學之永將更迭出現，吾且將謂其永當更迭出現，而使真知此吾之貫通之論之密意者，即以此二型之形上學更迭為用，以興教。 然其更迭出現，則在一人之思想與人類思想史中，皆不相矛盾。 則此二型之思想，對在不同階段之人，即各有當機之用，以使人不致停滯於其所屬之階段。' See Tang, *scxyj* vol. 2, note 18, pp. 510–517.

147 *Ibid.*, pp. 453–524.

interpretation of Huayan thought, as it is his appropriation of this Buddhist tradition in order to respond to the challenge of 'scientism' that is the focus of this study.

4.3 Tang Junyi's Interpretation of Huayan Thought—A Critical Review

At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned several studies which discuss the relationship between the thoughts of Tang and Huayan. In fact, all of them consider whether Huayan thought fits Tang's thought leading to the conclusion that Tang's appropriation of Huayan is or is not a 'confusion of ideas'. However, I argue all of the studies employ a wrong approach to the discussion of the issue. This is because, in my view, the key is not whether Huayan thought fits the thought of Tang or not, but whether the Huayan thought *perceived* or *understood* by Tang fits his thought. In this sense, it is first necessary to understand how Tang interpreted Huayan thought, and I will discuss this in the following sections.

4.3.1 *Tang's Overall Interpretation of Huayan Thought*

Compared with Fang, the relationship between Tang and Huayan has attracted much more attention within the academy. In general, Tang relied on the writings of Fazang and his interpretation can be divided into two parts. First is his clarification of the ideas of Huayan, particularly its idea of the content of the mind. Second is his explanation about the doctrinal classification theory of the Huayan thought.

For the clarification of the ideas of Huayan, the first step Tang took was to redefine the content of the mind (Chi. *xin* 心) by stressing the relationship between Huayan and Consciousness-Only. This point is very important, since Huayan thought, both historically and theoretically, develops based on the thought of Consciousness-Only. In fact, the characteristics of the thought of Consciousness-Only help guide the direction of Huayan thought. A good example is the relationship between consciousnesses and various phenomena as suggested by Consciousness-Only that all phenomena should be comprehended via consciousnesses. Without consciousnesses, phenomena cannot be understood, a key theme of 'no realm but consciousness' (Chi. *weishi wujing* 唯識無境) of the thought of Consciousness-Only. Although Fazang revised some ideas of Consciousness-Only, considering *ālayavijñāna* subordinate to the pure mind, an idea of *Dasheng qixin lun*, this relationship between subject and phenomena does not change. In this sense, it is impossible to say that Huayan considered the pure mind the origin of phenomena. Tang's task, first

of all, is to explain clearly the relationship between these two systems. For this, Tang emphasized Fazang in his interpretation, considering him a key figure connecting these two schools. In his *Zhongguo zhexue yuanyun. Yuanxing pian* 中國哲學原論·原性篇 (*The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy—Original Nature*), Tang argued as follows:

The Huayan School emphasizes the penetration of the three natures. Based on this penetration, the suchness [of the mind] consists of both the characteristics of unchanged and changed that is to say, the suchness [of the mind] is an absolute which is beyond any comparative concepts like 'defiled' and 'pure', but not only say that the suchness [of the mind] is the 'not destroyed' among 'birth' and 'death', or the 'unchanged' among 'changed'. This idea is not accepted in the thought of Consciousness-Only since it considers defiled and pure [*dharma*s] are contradictory to each other but Fazang mentions the characteristics of being unchanged and pureness of the mind of suchness and how they work with both defiled and impure [*dharma*s]. This does not only mean that the mind consists of both characteristics of being defiled and being pure. It also means that the appearance and the constitution of both defiled and pure [*dharma*s] are from the pure mind. Both defiled and pure [*dharma*s] are from the pure mind of suchness.¹⁴⁸

As Tang defined it, the term *dharma* or 'fa' 法 has different meanings, including the way to *Nirvāṇa*, Buddhist teaching, Buddha nature and, in its most technical sense, all the things which arise dependently. When speaking of the last, instead of discussing each kind of *dharma*, he usually used 'all *dharma*s' (Chi. *yīe zhufa* 一切諸法) in his works.¹⁴⁹ Unlike Fang, who appeared to consider impure or defiled *dharma*s, which he defined as phenomena, morally bad and pure *dharma*s morally good, Tang did not confuse the quality of a *dharma* with its moral value. In fact, Tang's explanation is probably closer to the meaning

148 The original Chinese is '華嚴宗特重三性相即之義，依此三性相即之義，而有真如之隨緣不變之義 此乃重在言真如之為運於一切價值上為相對之染淨中之絕對者；而非只重在言真如之為在生滅中之不生滅者，或變中之不變者。按此義，亦非唯識論之所許。因依唯識義，染淨乃相違法故 法藏則兼論真如心之不動性淨，以成於染淨，此即不只言性具染淨，且言由淨性以起染起淨，成染成淨，染淨乃皆直接為一性淨之真如心之所起所成矣。' See Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanyun. Yuanxing pian* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp. 273–274.

149 *Ibid.*, pp. 178–184.

of Huayan thought, as the ultimate concern of this Buddhist tradition seems to dissolve the apparent distinction and conflict amongst all phenomena. For Tang, the dissolving of the apparent distinction and conflict among phenomena is possible in Huayan thought because of Fazang's revision of the 'three natures' theory of Consciousness-Only. Without Fazang's revision, which is to harmonise different concepts at the level of the mind, a harmonious world such as Huayan suggests would not be theoretically possible. All concepts related to the description of such a harmonious world, therefore, would also be meaningless.¹⁵⁰ The key to the penetration of the three natures, furthermore, is the emptiness of the mind:

Although [Huayan] replaces the passionless seeds with the pure mind or the suchness of the mind, human beings should not consider this pure mind or suchness of mind a general reality only but know that it has an empty nature.¹⁵¹

Here, Tang explicitly states that the pure mind is not a reality which has an independent nature, a point easily misunderstood in much scholarship about Huayan. For Tang, the mind consists not only of types of consciousness but also of the nature of emptiness. Due to the nature of emptiness, what human beings perceive as reality or as the unchanged character of the mind is actually only its appearance. Also because of the emptiness of the mind, human beings can perceive various kinds of phenomena while, at the same time, not be attached to any of them. This non-attachment of the mind helps dissolve the contradictions amongst the three natures. This means that interpenetration among phenomena is already possible at the mind level, which is the initial stage of the entire process of achieving enlightenment. Tang argued that Fazang's emphasis on both the emptiness and appearance of the mind is a combination of the thought of *Madhyamaka* and Consciousness-Only.¹⁵² This point becomes a main characteristic of Tang's interpretation of Huayan.

After clarifying such an important characteristic of the mind, Tang also helped explain the epistemological relationship between the mind and phenomena by better defining the word '*sheng*' 生, a step rare in the scholarship on Huayan thought. In the Chinese language, when employed as a verb, '*sheng*'

150 Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian* 中國哲學原論·原道篇 vol. 3 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p. 280.

151 The original Chinese is '今以如來藏、心真如，代此無漏種，人亦不可執此如來藏、心真如，只是一般之實有，而當說其亦具真空義'，*Ibid.*, p. 312.

152 *Ibid.*, p. 304.

usually means 'to create' or 'to grow'. One of the best-known sentences about '*sheng*' in the Chinese intellectual tradition is probably, 'The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad creatures,' in *Laozi*.¹⁵³ In Chinese Buddhist texts, '*sheng*' is also employed to discuss the relationship between the mind of suchness and differentiated experience. It is probably the usual meaning of '*sheng*' which makes the relationship between the mind and *dharma*s controversial in Chinese Buddhism, since the relationship may be comprehended as cosmological rather than epistemological.¹⁵⁴ Tang, however, explained clearly that '*sheng*' does not mean 'to create' in the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition, of which Huayan is a part. In his interpretation of *Dasheng qixin lun*, Tang explained this idea as follows:

All theories about the mind of suchness 'creating' various *dharma*s are different from the situations where a conclusion comes from a premise, or a baby from its mother if we do not discuss this issue from a cosmological or logical perspective, but from this angle that 'throughout the process of practice, how does the mind respond to the situations we face', then we can understand what "the mind of suchness 'creating' *dharma*s" means the meaning of 'to create' is that we respond to the situations we face by means of our mind of practice, so that the situations can be in the same path [of practice] with such a mind, that can change the defiled into the pure, to give up the defiled but choose the pure.¹⁵⁵

153 The original Chinese is '道生一，一生二，二生三，三生萬物'. For the translation, see D. C. Lau, *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching* (London: Penguin, 1963), p. 63.

154 For scholarship on this misunderstanding, see Liu Jee-loo, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: from Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), pp. 248–276; Fang Litian 方立天, *Sui Tang fojiao 隋唐佛教* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 2006), pp. 433–436; Karyn L. Lai, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 257–259; Jiang Guozhu 姜國柱, *Zhongguo renshilun shi 中國認識論史* (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe 武漢大學出版社, 2013), pp. 95–97.

155 The original Chinese is '凡此所謂心真如生萬法一類之論，此所謂生，皆非邏輯上前提生結論之生，亦非如母之生子，其腹中原有子，子由之生出之生 吾人於此若根本不自此一宇宙論之態度出發，並本邏輯律令以為推論；而自另一「向內反省吾人在修道歷程中，此心之如何對所遭遇者」之態度出發；則謂一切染法萬種塵勞，以及整個之天地萬物，皆由一心真如或清淨如來藏以生，亦有可說 此所謂生之另一義，吾人可說即：「吾人之修道心之貫徹於其所遭遇之一切之中，以使之呈現於此心之前，而又與此心求轉染而依淨，捨染而取淨，相依而轉」之生。' See Tang, ZYX, note 148, pp. 259–260.

Unlike Fang's idea of 'creativity', which is a mysterious force pushing the world and human beings to self-exalt, Tang suggested that '*sheng*' is rather like the meaning of 'to renew' or 'to transform'. It means the value of a phenomenon can be renovated through the functioning of the human mind. The phenomenon, in brief, is not created by the mind.¹⁵⁶ In my view, Tang's interpretation of '*sheng*' here seems rather similar to the characteristic of his own thought, as his thought is usually regarded as a kind of idealism, which suggests that only the mind is true or real, an idea I previously indicated as mistaken. In this sense, it is not reasonable to argue that only the mind is real in the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition. In short, Tang appeared to consider that phenomena have existence independent of the mind and are thus real. However, this position of Tang may not necessarily contradict the position of Huayan thought, which considers that phenomena are experiences of the mind. As Tang further argued:

According to the view of Huayan's 'dharma realm', all *dharma*s are interpenetrated. All *dharma*s are actually mind. Such a realm itself is *dharma*s and also the mind. The penetration of various realms is equal to the penetration of various minds. My view on various *dharma*s is equal to my view on the penetration of various minds. The universe is, therefore, filled with transparent lights of mind, without any attachment to external horizons and there is no attachment to be defeated. the universe and all *dharma*s are actually mutually transparent, an infinite unity. It is the world view that when the pure mind functions, all *dharma*s are the manifestation of the mind.¹⁵⁷

Based on the above citations, I argue that Tang, on the one hand, considered that phenomena are not merely manifestations of the human mind. Phenomena, in this sense, have existence independent of the mind. On the other hand, phenomena are perceptions of the mind. This ambiguity of Tang, in my view, needs to be considered alongside his own philosophy as I suggested in section 4.1. As noted there, Tang showed his discontent with the Buddhist idea of impermanence from his earlier days. In this sense, I argue that Tang could not

156 *Ibid.*

157 The original Chinese is '依華嚴法界觀以觀法界中之一切法，皆能相攝，即皆是心。如境是法，亦即是心，萬境相攝如眾心相攝，我心觀萬境，即我心觀萬心之互攝，於是充塞宇宙皆成一透明之心光所照耀，更無外境可執，無執可破。 宇宙萬法實在互相透明，往復交映，重重無盡之全體中，而此即一「真心顯現萬法皆心」之宇宙觀。' See Tang Junyi, *Zhexue lunji* 哲學論集 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp. 328–330.

hold the view that phenomena are just manifestations of the human mind. Instead, there is an independence of phenomena. However, in his interpretation of Huayan thought, the independent character of phenomena needs to weaken. Otherwise, it is difficult to discuss the possibility of interpenetration between different phenomena. In fact, the latter is exactly what Tang meant in his interpretation of Huayan's theory of 'dharma realm', which he defined as 'the wholeness of all *dharma*s'.¹⁵⁸

According to the citation, from a metaphysical perspective, both the pure mind and phenomena are empty. Therefore, any obstruction between them is not real. Employing this principle in the world of phenomena leads to the conclusion of the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena' (Chi. *Shi shi wuai fajie* 事事無礙法界) of Huayan thought. In fact, Tang argued that because there is no obstruction between phenomena, interpenetration between them becomes possible. As noted in section 4.1.2, Tang aims at achieving an 'infinite life', in which human beings can penetrate the lives of other beings. To connect these two factors, I argue that Huayan's idea of the 'dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena' helps explain the possibility of Tang's idea of the achievement of an 'infinite life', a point Tang also admitted implicitly in his work.¹⁵⁹

In fact, as 'interpenetration' among phenomena becomes possible only when the pure mind functions, Tang's interpretation of Huayan naturally turns to the idea of 'Nature arising' (Chi. *Xing qi* 性起), an idea closely related to Tang's interpretation of Huayan's doctrinal classification theory. As Tang reminded us, the ultimate aim of Buddhism is to help living beings become detached from vexation and cease suffering. Therefore, the most important step is to practise Buddhist theories, as he explained below:

According to Buddhism, the human intellect is capable of thinking of the ultimate truth of the universe and our life. However, if we cannot change our attention from intellectual thinking to the pure mind and work hard in practice, we cannot obtain the true wisdom and employ the wisdom to defeat the attachment. Therefore, the true wisdom is the fruit of practice [but not the intellectual understanding of the principle].¹⁶⁰

158 The original Chinese is '此一切諸法之全體，合名法界'，see Tang, ZYXX, note 148, p. 179.

159 Tang, SCXY vol. 2, note 18, p. 386.

160 The original Chinese is '依佛家義，人之理知或知解縱能思及宇宙人生最高之真理，然若未能引此知解，以反諸心，在修持上用工夫，以破除此深心之執，皆不得為真正之智慧，故真正之智慧實為修行之果。' See Tang, ZL, note 157, p. 311.

Tang's emphasis on the role of practice in Buddhism is crucial to his interpretation of Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification. In fact, many scholars have noted that Tang's thought is like a kind of doctrinal classification theory, which tries to rank and harmonize various intellectual traditions.¹⁶¹ This characteristic of Tang reminds us that his thought might have been influenced by the Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification, a point that some other scholars have briefly mentioned.¹⁶² The questions remaining now are that what kind of doctrinal classification theory did Tang employ and how did this theory affect his thought. Before we discuss these issues, however, we must consider Tang's understanding of doctrinal classification. In general, Tang identified the aim and characteristics of doctrinal classification as follows:

- i.) doctrinal classification is the main characteristic of Chinese Buddhism;
- ii.) the aim of it is to harmonize various Buddhist theories, stressing that the theories are addressed by the historical Buddha at different times, to different audiences;
- iii.) since the theories are not articulated in the same period, to the same person, there is no contradiction between them;
- iv.) different Buddhist theories play various roles in Buddhism
- v.) different Buddhist schools suggest their own theories to achieve the aim of ii.).¹⁶³

Tang's view that doctrinal classification is a characteristic of Chinese Buddhism is perhaps debatable as even Tiantai's Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) and Fazang himself considered that it is also a characteristic of Indian Buddhism.¹⁶⁴ However, this is

161 Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚, '20 shiji Xin rujia de da panjiao—yi Tang Mou er xiansheng weili 20 世紀新儒家的大判教—以唐牟二先生為例', in He Renfu 何仁富 ed., *Tang xue lunheng: Tang Junyi xiansheng de shengming yu xuewen* vol. 2 唐學論衡：唐君毅先生的生命與學問（下）（Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 中國文史出版社, 2005), pp. 126–141; Cheng Zhaoxiong 程兆熊, 'Dao Tang Junyi jiaoshou 悼唐君毅教授', in *Tang Junyi quanji* vol. 30 *Jinian ji*, note 6, pp. 64–69; Tang Duanzheng 唐端正, 'Weida de Zhongguo wenhua yundong zhe 偉大的中國文化運動者' in *Tang Junyi quanji* vol. 30 *Jinian ji*, *ibid.*, pp. 324–328; Lau Kwok-keung 劉國強, *Ruxue de xiandai yiyi* 儒學的現代意義 (Taipei: E hu chubanshe 鵝湖出版社, 2001), p. 19.

162 See interview of Li Runsheng, *Yi Pu* 毅圃 vol. 48 (April 2009): 10–20; also see Gao Boyuan 高柏園, 'Lun Tang Junyi dui ru fo de guantong zhi dao 論唐君毅對儒佛的貫通之道', *Zhexue yu wenhua* 哲學與文化 vol. 40, no. 8 (2013): 5–24.

163 Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanyun. Daolun pian* 中國哲學原論·導論篇 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1993), pp. 236–237.

164 See Zhiyi, *Dzj*, vol. 33, no. 1716, p. 801a17–801b; Fazang, *ibid.*, vol. 45, no. 1866, pp. 480a5–481b4.

not the main issue regarding Tang's suggestions, as it is observed that doctrinal classification really plays a key role in Chinese Buddhism, particularly Tiantai and Huayan.¹⁶⁵ Instead, the main point of these classifications was to stipulate what the ultimate truth is that is suggested by the Buddha. According to Tang's suggestion above, the Buddha taught different theories at different times to different audiences. In this sense, what the Buddha said at a certain time may be expedient as only the theory based on ultimate truth can be called 'yuan' 圓. In order better to explain this idea, Tang compared the thought of Huayan and Tiantai, as the schools both claimed their thought to be 'yuan'.

In Chapter 2, I explained that the meaning of 'yuan' is so broad that it cannot be translated by a single word. Tang also argued that its meanings as suggested by Tiantai and Huayan are different.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, before discussing which school is 'yuan', the definition of 'yuan' employed by each school needs to be clarified. Tang explained the definition of 'yuan' in Tiantai and Huayan as follows:

Tiantai considers the teaching of *Lotus Sūtra* 'yuan', because it suggests the way of reaching the ultimate reality through different expedient means, as well as the way of surrendering the expedient means but confirming the ultimate reality. It implies that there is an expedient means to surrender in order to reach the ultimate reality. Huayan, on the other hand, asserts the reality of the single Buddha-realm. There is no expedient means to surrender but only ultimate reality to confirm.¹⁶⁷

Although the idea of 'expedient means' seems to derive from the Sanskrit '*upāya*', a similar idea, '*quan*' 權 is also seen in *Mencius*. Here '*quan*' means discretion by an individual scholar.¹⁶⁸ In fact, '*quan*', the word Tang employed in his discussion of 'expedient means', is exactly the word used in *Mencius*.

165 As Joachim Gentz suggests, the doctrinal classification theories of these Buddhist schools help make the schools more flexible so that they were able to survive at various points in Chinese history. See his 'Buddhism and Chinese Religions', in Perry Schmidt-Leukel ed., *Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions* (St. Ottilien: EOS, 2008), pp. 172–211. As I will explain in Chapter 5, I argue that this point is important to understand why Tang favoured the theory of doctrinal classification in particular amongst various Buddhist ideas.

166 See Tang, *ZYYD* vol. 3, note 150, p. 324.

167 The original Chinese is '天台之以法華為圓教，乃自其開權顯實，廢權立實說。此自是有權可廢，意在開顯。而華嚴則只說一佛境界之實，而無權可廢，意在直顯。' *Ibid.*

168 See *Mencius*, chapter 7.17. For the translation of the term as discretion, see D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 84.

In this sense, Tang may not consider 'expedient means' exclusively an idea of Buddhism but also an idea of the Chinese tradition. In the above citation, in short, Tiantai confirms the value of both expedient means and ultimate reality, considering the former a means to reach the latter. It helps explain the idea of 'evil in Buddha nature' (Chi. *fo ju xinge* 佛具性惡), a controversial concept of Tiantai which suggests that Buddha may also employ evil means to help sentient beings wherever necessary. Since the means Tiantai uses is flexible, in principle, no sentient beings are excluded. As a result, no sentient beings are excluded from Tiantai teaching and therefore, Tiantai's patriarchs considered their thought '*yuan*'. Huayan, on the other hand, develops its theory based on the functioning of the pure mind, through which all the distinctions and conflicts among various *dharma*s are dissolved. The world in this state, therefore, is non-obstructive and harmonious. This realm is considered ultimate by Huayan thought, since no other realms are regarded as superior.

The definitions of '*yuan*' by Tiantai and Huayan in the above discussion are actually different. To Tiantai, though the Tiantai's patriarchs did not state this explicitly, it is actually the practicability of means which makes its thought '*yuan*' compared with other Buddhist theories. To Huayan, on the other hand, it is the perfection of the harmonious world that indicates its thought is '*yuan*'. Therefore, contrary to Tiantai, it is in the end but not the means that Huayan considered its thought '*yuan*'. In other words, both Tiantai and Huayan considered their thought '*yuan*' in terms of their own definitions. Argument about which school is '*yuan*', therefore, is not meaningful when the criteria used are not the same.¹⁶⁹ By clarifying the definition of '*yuan*' between the two schools, Tang tends to dissolve the dispute which had affected the two schools since the Tang Dynasty.

However, as I mentioned previously, the '*yong*' or function of the mind is definitely important in Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought. The positions of the Tiantai and the Huayan patriarchs, as Tang described them, help support this view:

Tiantai's Zhili suggested Buddha nature contains all characteristics, considering that Huayan's idea of nature arising depends on external conditions. Therefore, it is not as certain as saying that Buddha nature contains all characteristics. Huayan, however, argued that 'if Buddha nature functions completely, is there any reason to say that Buddha nature does

169 Chen Peiran 陳沛然, *Huayanzong zhi Fajie guan yu panjiao guan yanjiu* 華嚴宗之法界觀與判教觀研究 (unpublished PhD thesis, Guangzhou: Zhongshan University 中山大學, 2002), appendix 1.

not contain all characteristics?' 'The idea that Buddha nature functions with certain characteristics [performing good acts for instance] necessarily includes the idea that Buddha nature contains such characteristics [good].' However, the idea that 'Buddha nature contains certain characteristics [good] does not mean such characteristics [performing good acts] will necessarily function'. Therefore, arguing Buddha nature contains certain characteristics is less comprehensive than saying that the Buddha nature functions with these characteristics.¹⁷⁰

As Tang argued, the idea that Buddha nature has certain characteristics, such as the ability to behave well, for instance, implies there are characteristics of goodness in Buddha nature; otherwise, the ability to demonstrate good behaviour could not exist. Arguing that Buddha nature contains certain characteristics, to some extent, means nothing if such characteristics are not functional. For example, a person with good character should perform certain acts in accordance with that good character, like helping others who are in need. If the person is observed not to help when so required, arguing the person has good character seems nonsensical. In this sense, discussing the functioning of the mind is more sensible than discussing its nature.

A point of clarification is perhaps needed here. We may say that a person performing good acts does not necessarily prove the person has a good character because the person can perform good acts for a bad purpose. To please others by helping them so that a long-term benefit can be gained is an example. This argument, in my view, however, does not apply to Huayan thought since Huayan develops its thought based on the idea of the pure mind. The pure mind is by definition good and therefore, its intent cannot be bad. This is a presupposition of Huayan thought and is reflected in the fact that Huayan does not agree with Tiantai's idea of 'evil in Buddha nature', an idea tending to suggest that even Buddha could act badly. In this sense, at least in the case of Huayan thought, Tang's arguing that the mind functioning with certain characteristics always implies there are such characteristics in nature is logically valid.

In the same way, however, Huayan's arguing that a pure mind will always do good is criticized by Mou Zongsan, who considered the argument a tautology.¹⁷¹

170 The original Chinese is '天臺知禮言性具，而以華嚴之言性起，乃隨外緣方起，故不如言本性內具之必具。然後華嚴宗之續法，則以「外全起，內豈不具？」「起必含具」，而「具不必起」，乃以言性具者，不如言性起之全備。' See Tang, *ZYD* vol. 3, note 150, p. 326.

171 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, *Foxing yu bore* 佛性與般若 vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2004), pp. 517–555.

Regardless of the controversy over the form of the argument, as we have seen, the functioning of the mind is always important in Tang's interpretation of Huayan, like the situation in his own thought discussed in previous sections. The emphasis on the functioning of the mind helps determine the practical character of Tang's thought, a point to be borne in mind whenever discussing him. This point also explains Tang's interpretation of 'sudden teaching' (Chi. *dun jiao* 頓教), the teaching just before '*luan jiao*' in Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification.

As described in Chapter 2, there are five teachings in Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification, which are the 'Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples' or 'Small Teaching', 'Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle' or 'Initial Teaching', 'Final Doctrine of the Great Vehicle' or 'Final Teaching', 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' or 'Sudden Teaching' and '*luan jiao*'. The 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' or 'Sudden Teaching' is placed between the tradition of *tathāgata garbha*, which is expressed as 'Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle', and '*luan jiao*'. Therefore, it would be expected that the role of 'sudden teaching' would be highly ranked in the Huayan system. However, in fact, its place was once controversial in the Huayan School. Huiyuan 慧苑 (673–743), a student of Fazang, suggested removing 'sudden teaching' from Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification, considering the nature of 'sudden teaching' different from other teachings.¹⁷² Tang, however, argued that 'sudden teaching' is the key for Huayan thought to change its focus from philosophical theory to religious practice, through which it is possible eventually to recognise the harmonious world.¹⁷³ Traditionally, 'sudden teaching' is a major element in Chan Buddhism and so it is generally thought that Huayan ranks Chan Buddhism as inferior to its own thought.¹⁷⁴ For Tang, however, ranking Chan Buddhism as inferior to Huayan thought is not the aim of the inclusion of 'sudden teaching' in the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, for as he argued:

172 For discussion, see Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, Li Huiying 李惠英 trans., *Zhongguo Huayan sixiang shi* 中國華嚴思想史 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1996), pp. 185–191; Nakanishi Toshihide, 'The Background of Huiyuan's Philosophy: His Twofold Interpretation of the 'Ten Mysterious Gates'', in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 印度學佛教學研究 vol. LVIII, no. 3 (March 2010): 1279–1283.

173 For this idea, also see Dale Wright, 'Language and Truth in Hua-yen Buddhism', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 13, no. 1 (1986): 21–47.

174 For example, see Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, note 43, p. 413.

To agree with the perfect realm is profound. It is not an issue about extensive thinking. In fact, human beings need to stop practising extensive thinking, for only by doing that can they have a profound agreement with the perfect realm. Therefore, sudden teaching is different from the previous teachings suggested by Buddhism.¹⁷⁵

In Tang's view, Chan Buddhism is one of the Buddhist traditions trying to alter the focus from philosophical theory to religious practice. 'Sudden teaching', however, is more than Chan Buddhism. To Tang, any theories sharing the same function can be classified as 'sudden teaching'.¹⁷⁶ In this sense, Chan Buddhism is only one kind of 'sudden teaching'. Huayan's emphasis on 'sudden teaching' is to explain the change of focus, not a basis for discriminating between Chan Buddhism and Huayan thought.¹⁷⁷ In fact, as noted in Chapter 2, Huayan thought has been widely criticized as subjective and a main reason for this criticism is the lack of a clear theory of religious practice in the Huayan patriarchs' teaching. According to Tang, 'sudden teaching' is a kind of religious practice: only from it is the realisation of harmony possible. Like his own theory of practice, which, as I discussed in section 4.1.7, is rather general and open, Tang did not elaborate further on what Huayan's religious practice means. However, it is clear that he considered 'sudden teaching' Huayan's theory of practice.¹⁷⁸ As Tang argued, Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification is not only a theory for harmonizing various Buddhist beliefs at a theoretical level, but also a path or process of self-cultivation through which the harmonious world can eventually be achieved at a practical level.¹⁷⁹

In fact, compared with Fang's interpretation of Huayan, Tang wisely considered the issue of religious practice in his interpretation of Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification, even though he did not discuss Li Tongxuan, who stressed the role of religious practice in the Huayan tradition. In this sense, religious practice need not be found outside the teaching of Huayan's patriarchs. Therefore, it is a characteristic of Tang's interpretation to consider the

175 The original Chinese is '此人乃深度的契入之事，固非廣度的思議之事。人亦正須絕此廣度之思議，乃能有此深度的契入也。故此頓教法門，決不同于以前之諸門。' See Tang, *ZYYD* vol. 3, note 150, p. 321.

176 For similar idea, see Peter N. Gregory, 'The Place of the Sudden Teaching within the Huayan Tradition: An Investigation of the Process of Doctrinal Change', *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* vol. 6, no. 1 (1983): 31–60.

177 Tang, *ZYYX*, note 148, pp. 282–283.

178 *Ibid.*, p. 298.

179 Tang, *ZYYD* vol. 3, note 150, p. 280.

issue of Huayan's religious practice, while at the same time, leaving the pedigree of the Huayan School unchanged.

When understanding the above ideas concerning the theory of doctrinal classification, we can see that, for Tang, different Buddhist theories are mutually complementary. Huayan thought is undoubtedly '*yuan*' since it is directly developed from a Buddhist perspective, and no other theories are considered superior within the tradition of Buddhism. However, without other Buddhist theories, the possibility of reaching the harmonious world is doubtful. Therefore, Tang concluded that there are certain advantages in all Buddhist theories. Whether a theory is superior to others depends on the perspective from which one approaches the issue. Tang explained this idea as follows:

To me, when viewing an issue from a philosophical and aesthetic point of view, Tiantai is not competitive with the thoroughness of Huayan. In terms of the variety of methods for achieving Buddhahood, Huayan's teaching is less sincere and less careful than Tiantai. However, when considering the aim of reaching Buddha state, comprehending the principle of mutual penetration is less straightforward than directly confirming our mind is equal to the Buddha mind. For the latter is the advantage of Chan Buddhism.¹⁸⁰

The above statement shows that, though considering Huayan '*yuan*', Tang also admitted the value of other Buddhist theories. In fact, this point is very important to our understanding of Tang's response to 'scientism'. It is because he confirmed that various intellectual traditions have their own strengths and weaknesses, that each of them could play particular roles in different time periods. This point, together with the other characteristics of Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought, will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5.

From the above citation, one can see the flexibility of Tang's interpretation. This creates a certain degree of openness but this openness may make his position on different Buddhist schools and even on various other intellectual traditions unclear. Discussion about his interpretation, therefore, may be rather difficult. However, based on the above analysis, certain clues to the rationale behind his interpretation can be observed. In the following sections,

180 The original Chinese is '吾意如依哲學與審美之觀點看，則華嚴之通透而上達，蓋非天台所及；若自學聖成佛之工夫看，則華嚴之教，又似不如天台之切摯而警策。然自人之求直契佛所自證境之目標看，則徒觀佛所證之境界之相攝相入，又不如直由一念靈知，以頓悟己心即佛心，更不重教理之詮說者之直截。然此後者則尤為禪宗所擅長。' See Tang, ZYXX, note 148, p. 298.

the criteria used by Tang in ranking Buddhist theories will be discussed, and his overall interpretation evaluated.

4.3.2 *Tang's Criterion in Ranking Buddhist Theories—The Harmonization of Values*

As in the case of Thom   H. Fang, Tang's interpretation of Huayan cannot be discussed separately from his own thought and considering his thought definitely helps explain the rationale behind his interpretation. In the previous sections, I have noted that Tang suggested absolute truth to be the harmonization of various relative truths. This point, to a large extent, can be considered a criterion for Tang's ranking of different intellectual traditions, including Huayan.

Perhaps influenced by Tang's image as a Confucian, scholars discussing his interpretation of different intellectual traditions tend to assume that his perspective is a Confucian one. Confucian ideas thus seem to be the criterion for Tang's interpretation. For example, as he considered the idea of 'Heart-Mind and Nature' to be the core concept of Confucianism, we may think that the more a concept is like the Confucian mind, the more Tang approves it.¹⁸¹ If this claim was valid, however, it would probably have been Chan Buddhism rather than Huayan thought which would have attracted Tang since there are several similarities between the function of the mind in Confucianism and in Chan Buddhism.¹⁸² But, given that Tang did not set particular store by Chan Buddhism, I argue that there must be other reasons for his emphasis on Huayan. In fact, as I explained previously, the constitution of mind put forward by Tang includes substance, appearance and function. But Chan Buddhism emphasizes the function rather than the substance and appearance of the mind in comparison to Huayan. In terms of the analysis of the constitution of the mind, Huayan thought is definitely more comprehensive. Therefore, the pure mind is not the only criterion Tang used in ranking various Buddhist theories. How the pure mind is constructed is also crucial.

For Tang, however, the most important factor is not how the mind is constructed, but the effect this has. As previously mentioned, Tang considered the absolute truth to be the harmonization of various relative truths. Thus all

181 For scholarship discussing these ideas, see Zhang Yunjiang, *Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi yu Huayanzong*, note 1, pp. 34–37; Jing Haifeng, *Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang*, note 1, p. 252.

182 For further discussion, see Cheng Hsueh-li, 'Confucianism and Zen (Ch'an) Philosophy of Education', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 12 (1985): 197–215; Julia Ching, 'The Encounter of Ch'an with Confucianism', in Takeuchi Yoshinori ed., *Buddhist Spirituality: Later China, Korea, Japan, and the Modern World* (New York: Crossroad, 1999), pp. 44–56.

values should in principle be included within a system. The more a system achieves this, the better it is. A theory's ability to harmonize various values, therefore, is Tang's main criterion in ranking different Buddhist theories. To Tang, Huayan thought is the best theory, among various Buddhist theories, for achieving this goal.¹⁸³ Therefore, it can be said that it is the comprehensiveness of Huayan thought which attracts Tang, since comprehensiveness also implies an inclusiveness in which all values co-exist. In fact, this criterion is not only used for ranking Buddhist theories but also in Tang's discussion of many other issues. In his opinion of humanism, for instance, he argued that the best theory of humanism needs to provide humanistic explanations for the appearance of the thought of non-humanism, but not simply to negate the value of the latter.¹⁸⁴ His opinion on the conflict of religions, similarly, suggests that all religions should first put aside their disagreement over the nature of God and admit the value of human beings. In this sense, no specific religion is to be negated.¹⁸⁵ Tang's thought, if viewed closely, is based on this ideal. His interpretations of Huayan thought, as well as his ranking of various Buddhist theories, are not exceptions in his thought. In order better to discuss Tang's interpretation of the former, a wider understanding is first required.

4.3.3 *Insights and Limitations in Tang's Interpretation of Huayan Thought*

As shown above, Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought has its own characteristics, which contain strengths and weaknesses. Regarding strengths, first, Tang helped reconstruct the notion of a harmonious mind, which helps develop a harmonious world and this is usually the focus of scholarship on Huayan. However, the logic behind the construction of such a harmonious world is neglected. In fact, I argue that the result is determined by the cause. The achievement of a harmonious world, in this sense, is caused by a harmonious mind; hence a harmonious mind is always necessary. Tang's emphasis on the construction of such a mind helps supplement Fang's argument.

Second, Tang is one of the few contemporary Chinese scholars trying to discuss Huayan's idea of the relationship between the mind and phenomena. As noted in Chapter 2, Huayan thought is usually considered a kind of idealism, in which phenomena are just a creation of the mind. One of the main contributions of Tang is to redefine the meaning of the word '*sheng*' and, as

183 Jing Haifeng, *Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang*, note 1, pp. 251–252.

184 Tang Junyi, *RJZC*, note 105, pp. 596–599.

185 Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie* 中華人文與當今世界 vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1988), pp. 35–60.

a result, the ideas of Huayan thought can be seen as more consistent and less controversial.

Third, Tang tried to introduce a theory of practice for Huayan thought through reinterpreting Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification. As Huayan is widely criticized as a beautiful theory lacking feasibility,¹⁸⁶ a theory of practice is definitely required. Among the various teachings in the doctrinal classification theory of Huayan, Tang stressed the role of 'sudden teaching', considering it a key for turning the focus of human beings from philosophical theory to religious practice. According to Tang, Huayan never lacks a theory of practice, since the entire body of Huayan thought is itself a theory of practice. In this sense, Huayan thought should be reviewed as a whole and not discussed in a piecemeal fashion.

However, strictly speaking, the discussion of 'sudden teaching' in Tang's interpretation may not be sufficient to answer the doubts about Huayan articulated by other scholars. According to Tang, the suggestion of 'sudden teaching' aims to turn the focus of human beings from philosophical theory to religious practice. But how they are to change the focus is not discussed. Perhaps a problem facing both Huayan thought and the scholarship about it is that human beings may not find it easy to change their focus. Therefore, if Tang's interpretation is to be criticised, his failure to indicate how human beings can change their focus must be acknowledged. In fact, perhaps influenced by the common view that Huayan thought is mainly developed by the five patriarchs including Dushun, Zhiyan, Fazang, Chengguan and Zongmi, Tang seems to ignore the role of Li Tongxuan, a scholar also contributing to Huayan study during the time of Fazang. As Li appeared to focus on religious practice, we might have expected Tang to use him to supplement the discussion of 'sudden teaching'. There would then be some specific content about 'sudden teaching' so that it is not just a suggestion about a change of focus. By considering the role of Li, Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought could have been more comprehensive. In fact, thinking 'out of the box' sometimes helps improve the quality of a theory of hermeneutics. In his interpretation of Huayan, unfortunately, Tang tended to follow the old tradition as many other scholars did and do. In general, however, his interpretation of Huayan thought is still one of the most comprehensive studies in academia and we should not neglect it.

Before commencing Chapter 5, I would like to make the following point. At the very beginning of this study, I cited an idea of Lao Sze-kwang, which is that Tang's philosophical method is actually Huayan's 'All is One, One is

186 Lu Cheng 呂澂, *Zhongguo foxue yuanliu lüejiang* 中國佛學源流略講 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), p. 199.

All'. Since Lao did not explain this further, it is difficult to respond to it. Here I would just say that, according to Tang's theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', Buddhism, Huayan thought included, belongs to a kind of 'Horizontal Observation'. This classification implies that, at least in Tang's view, Buddhism in general observes the '*xiang*' or appearance of phenomena in an instant but does not follow any kind of 'order'. Confucianism, which Tang considered the ultimate answer to his own concerns, however, follows a kind of 'order'. In fact, it is clear that 'empathic penetration', an idea of Confucianism as Tang argued, needs to follow an order, from penetrating the horizons belonging to objects to that belonging to subjects. With this fundamental difference, I argue that Tang's method is not Huayan's idea of 'All is One, One is All'. Instead, it is the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification that plays a main role in Tang's appropriation of this Buddhist tradition.

In Chapter 5, based on the findings of the previous chapters, I discuss the three research questions I set out at the beginning of this study, as well as suggesting how Fang's and Tang's interpretations of Huayan thought help improve the current debate concerning the development of 'Chinese hermeneutics'.

Fang's and Tang's Appropriations of Huayan Thought and 'Scientism'

As Jennifer Oldstone-Moore observes, the present Chinese Government now considers Confucianism a tool to complement 'scientism'.¹ I argue that Fang and Tang suggested a similar project nearly half a century ago, and their experience is undoubtedly worthy of attention. Thus far, this study has discussed the historical context in which Thom   H. Fang and Tang Junyi developed their own ideas, as well as the characteristics of contemporary 'scientism' and those scholars' interpretations of Huayan thought. All this helps answer the research questions I set at the beginning of this study, which are: first, why 'scientism' became an issue in twentieth-century China; second, why Chinese thinkers at that time tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas; and third, why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to 'scientism'. In what follows, based on the findings of the previous chapters, I will discuss these questions section by section, aiming at evaluating the role Huayan thought played in both Fang's and Tang's response to 'scientism'.

5.1 'Scientism' as an Issue—From the Point of View of '*Ti*' and '*Yong*'

The background to the development of 'scientism' in early twentieth-century China becomes clearer if we consider the historical problems facing the country from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As I discussed at the beginning of section 2.2, there have been some excellent studies on the historical events of that period. However, what is needed most for the purposes of this study is a theoretical framework to help provide a better explanation for these events. In brief, by using the concepts of '*ti*' and '*yong*', which I believe provide an appropriate theoretical framework, I aim at considering *why* rather than *how* 'scientism' became a focal issue at that time.

1 Jennifer Oldstone-Moore, 'Scientism and Modern Confucianism', in Kenneth J. Hammond and Jeffrey L. Richey ed., *The Sage Returns: Confucian Revival in Contemporary China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), pp. 39–63.

In Chapter 2, I emphasised that the history of science in China can be traced back to as early as the fourth century BC, while China's encounter with Western science can be traced back to the seventeenth century. I therefore argued that science was not a new issue for the Chinese people in the early twentieth century. The aims of both Fang's and Tang's theories were thus not to reject scientific investigation as such but to reject 'scientism'. In fact, we can think about the question of why 'scientism' became an issue in twentieth-century China from a different perspective, namely, by asking why 'scientism' was not an issue in China before the twentieth century. In my opinion, this reorientation is necessary because it not only retains the original meaning of the research question but also helps to answer it more accurately.

When discussing the Chinese attitude towards Western learning during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–1894), I cited Li Hongzhang's well-known criticism, arguing that to many Chinese people at that time, Western learning was a mixture of 'strange techniques and tricky crafts' (Chi. *qiji yinqiao* 奇技淫巧). This demeaning phrase shows, on the one hand, how negative the Chinese attitude was towards Western learning but, on the other hand, it indicates the perceived role of Western learning in China immediately prior to the twentieth century. As noted in section 2.1, while '*ti*' is generally regarded as body, substance, principle or condition, '*yong*' is seen as function, phenomenon or approach. I would therefore argue that, by using the words 'technique' and 'craft', Chinese people, during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement, saw Western learning as a kind of function or approach. That is, Western learning was considered as '*yong*', a point supported by the leading ideology of the Movement, that of 'Chinese learning for fundamental principles (*ti*), Western learning for practical applications (*yong*)', as I discussed in section 2.2.1. However, considering Western learning as '*yong*' only may contradict the important characteristic of '*ti*' and '*yong*' that I have stressed throughout this study: that they are inseparable.

In fact, in Chapter 2, I referred to the ideas of Yan Fu and Wang Fuzhi, which help sharpen our understanding of '*ti*' and '*yong*'. As Yan argued, an animal with a cow's '*ti*' should not have the '*yong*' of a horse, implying that '*ti*' determines '*yong*'. According to Wang, however, the content of '*ti*' is also defined by the '*yong*'. Thus, not only does '*ti*' determine '*yong*' but '*yong*' helps to define '*ti*'. As I will discuss below, this understanding of '*ti*' and '*yong*' helps explain why twentieth-century Chinese thinkers tended to return to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas, and why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to 'scientism'.

Returning to the discussion of why 'scientism' became an issue in twentieth-century China: Chinese thinkers, acknowledging that '*ti*' and '*yong*' are not

separate, gradually took the view that it was the backwardness of Chinese institutions rather than Chinese technology which rendered the country inferior to its Western counterparts. That is to say that, while Chinese institutions are regarded as '*ti*', the development of Chinese technology comprises the '*yong*'. In other words, it is institutional arrangements that influence the level of scientific development within a country. To me, it was exactly this fundamental assumption that lay behind the Hundred Days of Reform of 1898. However, as mentioned in section 2.1, the usages of '*ti*' and '*yong*' are context-dependent. Institutions, on the one hand, can be '*ti*', influencing national scientific development, but, on the other hand, they can be '*yong*'. To many Chinese thinkers of the New Cultural Movement of early twentieth-century China it was Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular, that was the ultimate reason for the backwardness of the country. In other words, Chinese culture is '*ti*', while institution is '*yong*'. To go a step further, if Chinese culture is '*ti*', scientific development is its '*yong*'. If the history of China from the middle of the nineteenth century supports Yan Fu's notion of '*ti*' influencing '*yong*', I would argue that the appropriations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang support Wang Fuzhi's idea. This is because, as I will show in the following sections, Fang and Tang first confirmed the '*yong*' of both scientific development and Confucianism, before reconstructing the '*ti*' of Chinese culture. In other words, they believed it necessary to attempt to redefine the '*ti*' through first reviewing the '*yong*'. Here I argue that condition or state is a better translation of the word '*ti*', as '*ti*' is obviously changeable in the eyes of Fang and Tang.

The discussion so far may seem irrelevant to the first research question, though in fact it already touches upon the subject matter of the answer to that question. In section 2.2.2, I explored the ideas of 'empirical scientism' and 'materialistic scientism', in which science is no longer regarded as a 'technique' or 'craft' but as a kind of ideology. If ideology is '*ti*', it needs to be related to its '*yong*'. Thus, 'materialistic scientism' considers all beings fundamentally material. Human beings are therefore deemed to follow natural laws and no spiritual activities are recognised. So, if 'materialistic scientism' is '*ti*', the denial of spiritual activities is the '*yong*'. This helps provide the answer to the research question, as the prevalence of 'scientism' may lead to a possible negation of the value of traditional Chinese culture, in which spiritual activities play a key role.

Historically, as noted in section 2.2.2, the exact date of the first appearance of 'scientism' in China is unknown, though it is widely recognised that 'scientism' became an issue in the early twentieth century, the time of 'the polemic on science and metaphysics'. Historical events indicate when 'scientism' became an issue but they cannot on their own explain *why* it became an issue precisely then, particularly if we consider the fact that scientific invention had existed in

China for thousands of years. In fact, as just noted, the role of science changed during the discussion about 'scientism', from one associated with 'technique' or 'craft' to one connected to ideology. In other words, the perceived role of science changed, in the eyes of many early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers, from '*yong*' to '*ti*', and this precisely helps to provide the answer to the first research question.

In Chapter 2, I referred to two developments experienced by China in the early twentieth century. The first was the collapse of the traditional value system, as reflected in their various ways by the writings of Chiang Monlin and the suicide of Wang Guowei. Following the above analyses of '*ti*' and '*yong*', I would argue that this collapse actually meant that the old '*ti*' of Chinese society was perceived to have disappeared. The second development was the appearance of the ideas of 'scientism', as represented in the writings of Ding Wenjiang, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu. For these thinkers science was no longer a technique but a worldview. In this context, and as identified earlier, science changed its role from '*yong*' to '*ti*' and, in my view, the two developments did not co-exist by chance but were closely related. As noted in Chapter 2, both occurred in the early twentieth century, so that once the new '*ti*', represented by 'scientism' threatened the old '*ti*', based on the dominant intellectual traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, 'scientism' became an issue. This explains why 'scientism' occurred in twentieth-century China and not earlier, as science was still viewed as '*yong*' before that time.

To sum up, to answer the first research question, I would argue that it is from the time that science began to be regarded as '*ti*' rather than '*yong*', and was even considered a replacement of the older '*ti*' of Chinese culture that 'scientism' became an issue. As I will discuss below, it was this threat to the old Chinese '*ti*' that required early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers to return to ancient Chinese thought to rediscover the former '*ti*' of Chinese culture, in order that the old value system could be maintained in the face of the challenge of 'scientism'. This requires a discussion of the second research question, which is why these Chinese thinkers tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas.

5.2 Ancient Chinese Thought as a Means for Enhancing '*Ti*'

In section 2.2.3, I suggested that early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers could be divided broadly into two groups: those demanding a total 'Westernization' and those seeking a protection—or re-construction—of traditional Chinese culture. In fact, in terms of '*ti*' and '*yong*', I have argued that the position of

the former group was to replace Chinese 'tí' with Western 'tí', so as to acquire Western 'yong'. In short, the position of them was to replace Chinese culture with Western culture in order to obtain Western science. However, I have also emphasised that the rapid change of 'tí' may cause problems, for example, that the old value system may be destroyed before the new value system is fully established. Unfortunately, as illustrated in the writings of Chiang Monlin and the suicide of Wang Guowei, this was exactly the situation facing China in the early twentieth century. Unlike the thinkers who demanded a change of 'tí' through total 'Westernization', the second group of thinkers sought to enhance the traditional 'tí' of Chinese culture, so that the latter could respond to the Western challenge. I argue that, in order to do this, these thinkers tended to redefine the 'tí' of Chinese culture by reconsidering the 'yong' that the country most needed,² an idea similar to that of Wang Fuzhi.

In fact, I considered that there were several ancient Chinese ideas that were favoured by early twentieth-century pro-traditional thinkers. Among these ideas were those of Mohism, Legalism and even the School of Diplomacy. There were different reasons for these ideas regaining popularity at the time. For example, Mohism was widely viewed as scientific and logical and promoted the idea that scientific thought had existed in China's past and that the development of science was not a contradiction of the Chinese tradition. In addition, the ideas of Legalism were considered equivalent to the Western idea of the rule of law, so that the rule of law was not a Western monopoly but a value shared by China. In my view, it is because these traditions of scientific development and the rule of law were urgently needed by China at that time that Mohism and Legalism were adopted by the pro-traditional thinkers. For them, responding to the challenge of the West did not need to mean abandoning Chinese culture or replacing its 'tí' with the Western one, but rather encouraged them to return to its origin to enhance the traditional 'tí'. This is exactly the idea of 'going back to the origin and developing new elements' or *fanben kaixin*, the notion that I mentioned at the very beginning of this study. In my view, this idea of enhancing the Chinese 'tí' by going back to ancient Chinese thought provides the answer to the second research question: why early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers tended to return to ancient Chinese thought to develop their own ideas.

Before proceeding further, however, one point needs greater consideration. Earlier in this section I stressed that the old Chinese value system was destroyed in early twentieth-century China. In fact, although there was a

2 Lao Sze-kwang also suggests similar idea. See his *Zhongguo wenhua luxiang wenti de xin jian-tao* 中國文化路向問題的新檢討 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1993), p. 124.

phenomenon of appropriating ancient Chinese thought, such as Mohism and Legalism, to develop contemporary theories, I would argue that these appropriations could not help preserve the old value system, as the establishment of the system was mainly based on Confucian ideas. Because the old value system was destroyed before the new value system was established, the pro-traditional thinkers faced a dilemma. Their most urgent task was to reconfirm the values of Confucianism in order to preserve the old value system but they needed to admit the value of science, whilst at the same time avoiding 'scientism'. That is to say, while responding to 'scientism', they should not abandon Confucianism, and it is this that is the prerequisite of the theories of both Fang and Tang. Thus, the appropriations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang are both attempts to achieve this difficult task. Below I go on to consider this question, which forms the central subject matter of this study.

5.3 Revisiting the Role of Huayan in Fang's and Tang's Responses to 'Scientism'

While discussing cultural convergence, Thomas A. Metzger suggests that it must be a painful process, as various parties need to abandon certain aspects of their own culture.³ However, as Roger T. Ames argues, there is a possibility that different cultures develop together without giving up much of their own.⁴ As I will explain below, the cases of Fang and Tang are probably closer to the latter position.

In section 2.2.2, I defined 'scientism' as a belief that quantitative natural science is the only valuable element in human learning and the only source of truth. In Chapters 3 and 4, where I discussed Fang's and Tang's criticism of 'scientism' and their views of the failure of Western culture, I also suggested that emphasis on perception and cognition as the dominant human faculties could be seen as a main cause of 'scientism'.⁵ As Edwin A. Burt considers, in order

3 Thomas A. Metzger, 'Limited Distrust of Reason as a Prerequisite of Cultural Convergence: Weighing Professor Lao Sze-kwang's Concept of the Divergence between "the Confucian Intellectual Tradition" and "Modern Culture"', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua no. 3 Jingdian quanshi zhi dingxiang* 中國哲學與文化：第三輯—經典詮釋之定向 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2008), pp. 22–75.

4 Roger T. Ames, 'Paronomasia: A Confucian Way of Making Meaning', in David Jones ed., *Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the Analects* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2008), pp. 37–48.

5 For Fang's and Tang's ideas, see sections 3.1.2 and 4.1.8 respectively.

to harmonize different theories, the rules of 'inclusiveness' and 'impartiality' are always needed. For the former, it means no theory should be easily rejected while for the latter, no theory should be assumed predominant without careful analysis.⁶ In my view, these two points are also applicable to both Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought to respond to the challenge of 'scientism'. That is to say, in the cases of Fang and Tang, Huayan thought needed to argue, first, that there are other human faculties besides perception and cognition, and, second, that perception and cognition should not be dominant over the other human faculties. In my view, only by acknowledging these factors could their appropriations of Huayan thought be really responsive to the issue of 'scientism'. Thus, in what follows, I will address the third research question, which is why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought in particular to respond to 'scientism', based on these two prerequisite factors.

5.3.1 *Fang, His Appropriation of Huayan Thought, and 'Scientism'*

As I discussed in section 3.2, Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought can be summarized in a sentence: Huayan thought is a representation of his philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony'. In fact, according to one biography,⁷ Fang's discussion of Huayan thought began very late in his life, from 1973 onwards, just four years before his death, though his 'Correlative Structure of Men and the World' or 'Blueprint' first appeared in 1969. In this sense, I suggest that Fang developed his own philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' before he considered Huayan thought. In other words, he appropriated Huayan thought to support, rather than to develop, his philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony'.

In my view, Fang tended to assume that there are various faculties in humanity and tried to search for an appropriate culture which fits this assumption. That means, he firstly suggested the 'yong' of a culture and then redefined the 'ti' of it. In fact, although Fang stressed that Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Buddhism all share the characteristics of 'comprehensive harmony',⁸ I consider that it is not until his discovery of Huayan thought that his philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' finds the support that is crucial in his redefining the 'ti' and 'yong' of Chinese culture. Since Fang considered Huayan thought a

6 Edwin A. Burt, 'Basic Problems of Method in Harmonizing Eastern and Western Philosophy', in Charles A. Moore ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), pp. 103–123.

7 Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing* 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2007), pp. 165–264.

8 Thomé H. Fang, *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Ltd., 1986), pp. 17–35.

fine example of 'comprehensive harmony' and that the characteristics of this 'comprehensive harmony' were shared by the major Chinese traditions, I argue that Huayan thought is, for Fang, representative of Chinese culture as a whole. As I discussed in section 3.1, Fang argued that the main function or '*yong*' of the philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' is to dissolve dualism, which he considered the main product of 'praeternatural metaphysics'. In terms of the analysis of '*ti*' and '*yong*', I argue that the philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' is '*ti*', its '*yong*' being the dissolution of dualism. In fact, Fang explicitly stated that the value of Huayan thought is to help dissolve dualism, which is an essential requirement in responding to the challenge of 'scientism'.⁹ As with his explanation of Huayan in terms of his own philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony', Fang's linking of Huayan thought with 'scientism' is also unique amongst his interpretations of various intellectual traditions. That is to say, he did not link 'scientism' with any other intellectual traditions, apart from Huayan.

At the start of this section, I indicated two factors that Huayan thought needs to include in order to respond to 'scientism', namely that it should stress, first, that there are other human faculties apart from perception and cognition, and, second, that perception and cognition should not be the dominant human faculties. Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought, based on his philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony', achieved this. As a fine example of 'comprehensive harmony', Fang argued that Huayan thought does not exclude any particular values, nor allow any one of them to be dominant. As a result, 'scientism' could be avoided. If this analysis is correct, I argue that Fang's view that Huayan thought could provide an ideal response to 'scientism' is reasonable.

In fact, as noted in Chapter 2, for many Chinese people in the early twentieth century, Confucianism meant social order. The most urgent task for pro-traditional thinkers was thus to reconfirm the values of Confucianism so that the old value system could be preserved, whilst at the same time the value of science could be acknowledged, thus avoiding 'scientism'. In terms of '*ti*' and '*yong*', Fang's claim that Huayan thought is representative of Chinese culture actually enhances the '*ti*' of Chinese culture. As a result, the '*yong*' of Chinese culture can also be enlarged. Fang's enhancing of the '*ti*' of Chinese culture helped preserve Confucianism, as no values, including those of Confucianism, are excluded in his philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony', thus allowing for the development of science without accepting 'scientism'. I conclude that this is the core of Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought.

Since Fang considered that Huayan thought is a fine example of the philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony', theoretically, I argue that people may simply

9 Thomé H. Fang, *Huayan zong zhexue* vol. 2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1992), p. 223.

go back to this Buddhist tradition to find the answer to 'scientism'. That is to say, by using Huayan thought, 'scientism' can be avoided. In this sense, Fang may be regarded as a classical philosopher despite his employing concepts of Western philosophy and writing in English. However, in modern times, Fang implicitly considered that it is impossible for the Chinese people to go back to traditional values. Therefore, instead of employing Huayan thought to respond to the challenge of 'scientism', Fang suggested that different cultures need to learn from each other in order to achieve the ideal of 'comprehensive harmony', as various cultures share certain elements of this ideal state.¹⁰ Perhaps it is why he never claimed that Chinese culture is 'superior' to its Western counterparts. As he said:

The ancient Greeks,—I mean, their souls—should come down to the workaday world to save its appearances. The Chinese should descend from the metaphysical-moral order to the order of physical nature to learn to appreciate the achievement of modern science. The Indians should break through the maya of hierarchical castes to see into the real importance of equality of men and of all creatures, as was once vehemently advocated by the Mahāyānic Buddhists. Modern western men should lead people to a little higher level in the endeavour of life to apprehend and comprehend spiritual values, as has been achieved in the classical age of all peoples throughout the world. East-West philosophers should form a united front in advocating authentic spiritual democracy in its largest scope and in its highest quality.¹¹

Since exclusion of values obviously contradicts Fang's philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony', which is embodied in Huayan thought, as I stressed in section 3.1, classifying Fang as a cultural nationalist is not appropriate as it is against his intention of appropriating Huayan thought. Similarly, I consider that it is not appropriate to label him a Confucian thinker or a Buddhist layman as this risks the values of other intellectual traditions being excluded. Perhaps this is why Fang never called himself a Confucian. The claim of his becoming a Buddhist layman in his final years has also been challenged by individual scholars, as I mentioned in section 3.1.

¹⁰ Jesús Solé-Farràs, *New Confucianism in Twenty-First Century China: the Construction of a Discourse* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 123–125.

¹¹ Thomé H. Fang, *Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection of Philosophical Essays* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983), p. 83.

Although more evidence may be needed, I suggest this point is worthy of further consideration. In section 3.2, I indicated that Fang was unhappy with the 'negative' worldviews of Hīnayāna Buddhism and the thought of Consciousness-Only. In Fang's view, it is only when Huayan thought develops on the basis of the idea of the pure mind that Buddhism becomes an example of 'comprehensive harmony'. That is to say, in Fang's view, the 'Chinese spirit' once succeeded in transforming a foreign religion into a 'better' shape. In face of the challenge of 'scientism', I estimate that Fang may use Huayan thought as an example, encouraging the Chinese people that they would be able to deal with the challenge of 'scientism' and transform it into a better philosophy in the future. I argue that this estimation matches the optimism of Fang that I referred to in section 3.1.2.

However, a story about Fang may also suggest the potential difficulties facing his theory:

Fang presented a paper entitled 'The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics' at the 1964 East-West Philosophers' Conference [in Hawaii]. Professor Findlay, the British philosopher, remarked that Fang's view sounded like a beautiful dream; how could Fang convince him of the truth of this beautiful dream? After commending Findlay for his seeing the beauty of the dream, Fang told Findlay a story he had heard from Professor Dodds of Oxford, the author of *The Greeks and the Irrational*, while in the war-time capital of Chungking [Chongqing]. Dodds was visiting the British Museum admiring the Parthenon sculptures when he was approached by a youth who said that, although it was an awful thing to confess, he found himself unmoved by the display of Greek art. Fang thereupon asked Findlay, 'Suppose that you were in the position of your esteemed colleague, Professor Dodds; tell me please, Professor Findlay, how can you convince the young man of your beautiful dream?'¹²

Although it is said that Fang's reply was admired by many scholars at the conference,¹³ I would argue that Professor Findlay's reply, where he described Fang as 'absolutely assertive',¹⁴ is more relevant to this study. In fact, in my view,

12 Robert L. Greenwood, 'The Unheard Melody in Thomé H. Fang', in Executive Committee of the International Symposium on Thomé H. Fang's Philosophy ed., *Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang* (Taipei: Youth Cultural, 1989), pp. 151–162.

13 Thomé H. Fang, George C. H. Sun trans., *Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan* vol. 2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005), pp. 245–246.

14 *Ibid.*

there are three implications of the story. First, how can Fang convince others to believe in his notion of 'comprehensive harmony', in which different values co-exist? Second, how can he prove that the faculties of perception and cognition, which are largely represented by Professor Findlay's question, are necessarily inferior in his 'comprehensive harmony'?¹⁵ Third, given that Fang's philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony' *did* exist, why should some faculties be dominated by perception and cognition? If these questions cannot be fully answered, I would argue that the satisfactoriness of Fang's solution to the 'scientism' problem might be in doubt.

Although evaluating the satisfactoriness of Fang's response is not my main concern, I would like to raise one issue, namely Fang's method in solving the above practical difficulties. In section 3.1, I noted that some scholars see Fang's mode of expression as an obstacle to understanding his thought. In my view, in fact, Fang's way of writing is the key to understanding how he deals with the practical difficulties listed above. In section 3.2, I observed that Fang regarded the language of *Huayanjing* to be metaphorical or poetic. Indeed, Mou Zongsan also noted that Fang's own style is poetic or literary,¹⁶ while Fang tended to express his ideas through poems and stories. In section 4.2, during my discussion of Tang Junyi's harmonization of Fang's thought, I quoted a letter from Tang to Fang, in which the former stressed Fang's emphasis on literature. All these examples highlight the fact that Fang used literature or a literary style to attract his readers, encouraging them to see that there are values other than those of science. It also helps explain why Fang had a collection of poems of his own among the figures in the camp of 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism'. In short, in my view, in judging the effectiveness of Fang's response to 'scientism', we need first to assess the impact of his literary style on his readers, although this question is beyond the main focus of this study. However, if my analysis is correct, this helps to explain why Fang's style is so different from his contemporaries, most of whom tried to explain their ideas as clearly as possible. In this context, I would argue that criticising Fang's style as literary reveals a misunderstanding or even ignorance of his method.

My discussion of Fang's appropriation of Huayan thought to develop his response to 'scientism' concludes here and I now go on to consider Tang Junyi's

15 As I mentioned in section 3.1.7, Fang, on the one hand, considered that the form of an ideal personhood depends on particular situations. On the other hand, however, he held the view that the faculties of perception and cognition are inferior in his idea of 'comprehensive harmony'. While evaluating Fang's thought, I argue that this inconsistency should be kept in mind.

16 Mou Zongsan, *Wushi zishu* 五十自述 (Taipei: Ehu chubanshe 鵝湖出版社, 2000), p. 108.

appropriation of this Buddhist tradition, a topic which has had far more attention within the Chinese academy.

5.3.2 *Tang, His Appropriation of Huayan Thought, and 'Scientism'*

In section 4.2, I noted that Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought focuses mainly on two points. First, there is his emphasis on the harmonization of different concepts within the mind, as Fazang had suggested, and second is the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification. In fact, as I mentioned in section 4.1, Tang's idea of 'xinling' 心靈 was rather imprecise in his earlier writings, in which there was little discussion about what it denotes. It is only in his last work, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (*The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind*), finished in 1977, that the character of 'xinling' is fully explored. Tang's earliest consideration of Huayan thought was in the late 1960s, when he discussed Fazang's harmonization of the 'Three Natures'.¹⁷ Indeed, it was as late as the early 1970s before he discussed Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification.¹⁸ I therefore argue that Tang's consideration of Huayan thought developed late in his life. It is therefore possible that Tang's general ideas, including his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', were inspired by Huayan thought.

Before examining the concept of the mind, however, I wish to discuss the relationship between Tang's thought and his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, as this is closely related to his response to 'scientism'. In section 2.4.3, where I discussed Huayan's key concepts, I argued that from the perspective of Huayan's 'yuanjiao', all values are equal in that each has its place in the relevant context. In my view, this idea is endorsed by Tang and probably represents the most important element in his response to 'scientism'. As noted in section 4.2, Tang considered Huayan's doctrinal classification theory as a process of enlightenment, in which the 'Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples', 'Initial Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle' and 'Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle' belong to certain kinds of verbal directions, while the 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' is designed to turn people away from philosophical theories towards personal practice. Only by practising virtuous theories can someone achieve the state of ideal personhood and, from the perspective of ideal personhood, all previous theories are worthwhile

17 Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanyun. Yuanxing pian* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p. 2.

18 Tang Junyi, *Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), p. 64.

and necessary, as they all contribute to the process of enlightenment. Thus, no theories should be viewed as worthless.

There are three implications of this for Tang's response to 'scientism'. First, he suggests that all theories, from the point of view of ideal personhood, have equal importance. Thus, again from the perspective of ideal personhood, the values of both Confucianism and scientific development should be acknowledged. Second, all earlier theories—and even experiences—can be seen as lessons or steps towards achieving the state of ideal personhood. None of them should therefore be casually dismissed and, again, the values of Confucianism and scientific development must be recognised. Third, practice is necessary to achieve the state of ideal personhood. As I mentioned in section 4.2, in his interpretation of Huayan thought, Tang stressed the idea of 'Nature arising' or *Xing qi*, considering that the function of the mind, in a sense, is more meaningful than its content. This is because it is not practical to discuss the characteristics of the mind if the mind is never functioning. In other words, responding to 'scientism' is more than a purely theoretical issue. I would argue that this is the central difference between the respective responses to 'scientism' of Fang and Tang. In fact, as observed in section 4.1.7, Lao Sze-kwang also stressed that Tang's thought is a form of the 'scholarship of becoming moral' (Chi. *chengde zhi xue* 成德之學), in which practice is essential. This is why, in my view, Tang put Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity together as the final three horizons in his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', as he explicitly mentioned that these intellectual traditions emphasize practice and experience. In brief, they all embody forms of teaching rather than being merely theoretical.¹⁹

Following his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, Tang did not believe that any one value is necessarily inferior to another, as Fang had suggested. According to Tang, whether a value is superior depends on the circumstances. In 'A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese culture—Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook', a declaration published in 1958 and widely held to be a reflection of Tang's thought, this was further clarified:

If the Chinese really want to set themselves up as a moral subject they must try also to set themselves up as an epistemological subject [because scientific development can also help improve the lives of human beings]. In that subtle process, the former should temporarily suspend its role or at least temporarily retreat behind the latter as its supporting character. That must be done till the latter has accomplished its mission and

19 For details, see section 4.1.5.

resolved knotty problems. Till then, the moral subject might step forward, evaluating, guiding and promoting its pragmatic activities.²⁰

The position that no values should always be seen as superior to others is obvious. The declaration continued:

We thus advocate that in accordance with its own demand for development, Chinese culture must develop a full[y]-fledged ideal of culture in a way that the Chinese people not only realize themselves to be a moral subject (moral being) through their Rationalism but also a political subject (political being) with regard to politic[al] matters, and an epistemological self (epistemological being) in dealing with the world of knowledge, and a technological, practical subject (technological, practical being) in controlling their social and natural environment.²¹

At the beginning of this section, I observed that in order to develop science, whilst at the same time avoiding 'scientism', humankind needs to acknowledge the faculties of perception and cognition, but insist that they should not dominate the other human faculties. Tang's thought explicitly observes these two requirements.

In Chapter 2, I mentioned that Huayan thought considers the idea of 'emptiness' provisional and only that of the 'pure mind' as final. Using this classification, Buddhist teachings can be explained within a hierarchical framework, from the most elementary to the most profound. Furthermore, I argued that doctrinal classification theory helps unify different Buddhist teachings, allowing Buddhism to be viewed as a whole. As a result, modern Confucian thinkers, Mou Zongsan for example, could compare Confucianism and Buddhism more fully. In Chapter 4, I suggested that some scholars have noted that Tang's thought is probably inspired by the Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification. However, they fail to indicate which Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification Tang employed, nor do they say in what particular aspects Tang was influenced by Huayan theory. Combining these different perspectives, I would argue that the influence of Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification on Tang enabled him to see Buddhism as a whole and thus compare Confucianism and Buddhism more effectively. However, unlike Mou Zongsan who argued that Confucianism was 'superior' to Buddhism, Tang stressed that the conclusion

20 This citation is from the English version of the declaration. See Tang Junyi, *Completed works of Tang Junyi* 唐君毅全集 vol. 19 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p. 529.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 526.

of Huayan thought was that, from the perspective of ideal personhood, various values have equal status.

As I noted in Chapter 4, Tang's recognition of different values appears to be derived from the idea of 'empathic penetration' or *gantong*, through which all values and phenomena should be seen as interpenetrative without obstruction. However, I would argue that 'empathic penetration' only leads to an acknowledgement of the existence of different values, rather than suggesting that, from the perspective of ideal personhood, all values have *equal* status. In other words, although 'empathic penetration' admits different values, there could, in principle, be some discrimination between them. Thus, I would argue that Tang's view that all values are equal from ideal personhood's point of view derives from his appropriation of Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification.

At the beginning of this study, I mentioned that, according to Lao Sze-kwang, Tang tended to explain Confucianism using Huayan thought. In fact, in his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', Tang clearly indicated that each intellectual tradition has its own characteristics. Although Confucianism may explain moral judgment in human beings, in Tang's view, Confucianism is not contributive to the establishment of any objective knowledge of the world. In order to achieve an ideal personhood, therefore, intellectual traditions other than Confucianism should be considered. In this sense, I suggest that Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification helps 'save' Confucianism, as it helps suggest that each intellectual tradition has a role to play during the process of achieving the ideal personhood.

In fact, in interpreting the theory, Tang emphasised the role of the 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment', considering it a key step on the path to enlightenment, because the process of enlightenment is not a conceptual game but something requiring serious practice. In section 3.2, I mentioned that in his interpretation of *Huayanjing*, Fang had emphasized the role of practice in reaching Huayan's concept of the harmonious world. However, ironically, he did not include it while developing his own philosophy of 'comprehensive harmony'. This neglect of practice means his thought is more of an assertion, as reflected in the story of Fang and Professor Findlay. I would argue that this ambiguity in Fang's thought is due either to his overlooking Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification or his very different interpretation of doctrinal classification theory from that of Tang.

By contrast, Tang's view of the 'Great Vehicle's Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' as a turning point in changing our attitudes from philosophical theory to practice matches his own theory about the final three horizons belonging to the category of practice, a point I highlighted in section 4.1. In fact, after Tang's death, there was a great number of essays in memory of him. However,

in my opinion, the nature of the essays was mainly to discuss Tang's personality but fail to link his personality with his thought. As I mentioned earlier, Fang's method of inspiring others was his writing style. Here I argue that Tang's method of influencing others was to set himself as a personal example, teaching teenagers by his own deeds, which is called '*shenjiao*' 身教 in Chinese.²² Only by understanding this characteristic of Tang can we better comprehend the following issues: why New Asia College, which was co-founded by Tang, Qian Mu and Zhang Pijie, emphasized students' conduct so much; why Lao Sze-kwang argues that the death of Tang means the end of the 'scholarship of becoming moral' or *chengde zhi xue* and why doing research about Tang is so difficult. I argue that all of the above relate to the fact that Tang's ultimate method of transforming others was not verbal or written. It was through his personality and deeds that Tang showed his readers, mainly students as I mentioned in Chapter 4, that there are other values in addition to those of perception and cognition. Unlike Fang's method, which largely shows the value of beauty, I argue that Tang's method mainly shows the value of morality.

In brief, I would argue that, in Tang's view, there are other human faculties besides those of perception and cognition but the value of these faculties depends upon the attendant circumstances. Thus, developing scientific knowledge may be preferable in some circumstances, whilst moral development is more important in other circumstances. Similarly, whether someone avoids the problem of 'scientism' or not depends on his or her own circumstances and no universal model is applicable in all cases.

In my view, the above idea of Tang's is very similar to the argument of Liang Shuming, as I discussed in section 2.3, since Liang also suggested that Confucianism should be preferred as long as China was suffering from civil unrest and foreign challenge. For Liang the values of Western and Indian cultures should only be rejected because they did not seem relevant at that time. Taking into account his harmonization of the ideas of Thom   H. Fang and his confession that his thought followed the direction of Carsun Chang, I would argue that Tang's thought is actually a response to—or synthesis of—the thought of Fang, Xiong and Liang and Chang.

We now encounter a theoretical difficulty. In section 4.1, I argued that Tang considered Confucianism the answer to his own central concern, which was to explain the existence of the moral self. In this context, Confucianism is the '*ti*' or principle of Tang's thought. At the same time, I have suggested that the '*yong*'

22 In a letter to Mou Zongsan in 1955, in fact, Tang reminded Mou that they should set themselves as an example with good conduct so that people could learn from them. See Tang Junyi, *Shujian* 書簡 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990), pp. 164–165.

of Tang's theory is actually Huayan. Thus, Tang's theory of having both the Confucian '*ti*' and Huayan's '*yong*', seems to contradict the principle of '*ti*' and '*yong*' that I have assumed throughout this study, the two being inseparable. To some extent, Lin Yu-sheng's harsh criticism of Tang, as noted in Chapter 4, that Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought represents a 'confusion of ideas' seems accurate. However, because Wang Fuzhi suggests that the content of '*ti*' is also defined by '*yong*', I would argue that Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought is not as problematic as suggested by Lin Yu-sheng.

In section 1.1, I mentioned that, in a private conversation between Lao Sze-kwang and Tang Junyi, it is reported that Tang said he intended to explain Confucianism through Huayan thought. While appropriating Huayan's '*yong*' of considering all values of equal status from an ideal personhood's perspective, I would argue that Tang needed to re-define and enlarge the '*ti*' of Confucianism, so that it could carry the '*yong*' of Huayan. Such a view derives from the first characteristics of Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought, which stress the harmonization of all concepts at the level of the mind. In section 4.1, I discussed Tang's idea of '*xinling*', in which both concrete and vacuous sides of the mind are considered equally important. In fact, in his earlier work, *Xinwu yu rensheng* 心物與人生 (*Minds, Material and Life*), completed before the early 1950s, Tang had already put forward the idea of '*xinling*'. Following his focussing on Huayan thought from the late 1960s,²³ however, the term '*xinling*' became a philosophical term and, as such, became a key concept in his last work *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie*. This change may seem trivial but I think Tang's emphasis on the vacuous aspect of the mind was possibly affected by Huayan thought. In Tang's view, since Confucianism and Huayan share a similar '*ti*', which relates to the vacuous aspect of the mind, both enjoy a similar '*yong*', which comprises the harmonization of various values at the mind level. In brief, both intellectual traditions admit different values, including those of scientific development and moral cultivation. In this context, Lao's recollection that Tang intended to explain Confucianism through Huayan is possible, as Tang appears to enrich the '*ti*' of Confucianism by reviewing the '*ti*' of Huayan thought.

As I noted earlier, from an ideal personhood's perspective, Huayan thought considered all values to be of equal status, a point markedly different from the Confucian idea of 'empathic penetration'. In this regard, although Tang redefined the '*ti*' of Confucianism, it did not contain the '*yong*' of Huayan. However, as I argued in section 2.1, the contents of '*ti*' and '*yong*' are context-dependent. Thus, although the '*yong*' of Confucianism and that of Huayan thought are

23 For details, see chronicle of Tang in NZX.

different, Tang believed that the ultimate '*ti*' is the mind. All intellectual traditions develop in the mind, as I discussed in section 4.1, when considering Tang's theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind'. Thus, while the mind is '*ti*', all intellectual traditions, such as Confucianism and Huayan thought, are its '*yong*'. Therefore, although Confucianism does not have the '*yong*' of Huayan, the mind has the '*yong*' of the Buddhist tradition. This is why Tang stressed that '*xinling*' can move from one horizon to other horizons without any attachment, based simply on the change of environment. In this context, I would argue that Tang's appropriation of Huayan thought, in order to respond to 'scientism', does not contradict the principle of '*ti*' and '*yong*', since Tang considered that the most effective way to respond to 'scientism' in his time was to confirm the values of both scientific development and Chinese culture, and not to argue that one is superior to the other. This concludes my examination of the role Huayan thought plays in the thought of Tang Junyi. In what follows, I discuss the significance of Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought to the development of 'Chinese hermeneutics', an issue hotly debated in current Chinese philosophical studies.

5.4 The Writings of Fang and Tang in Terms of 'Chinese Hermeneutics'

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are three points that need to be considered when discussing 'Chinese hermeneutics'. First, such hermeneutics must avoid analyzing the characteristics of Chinese thought from a single perspective. This is, to a large extent, a response to the tradition emphasizing 'Heart-Mind and Nature', as suggested by Xiong Shili and his followers. Second, traditional Chinese thought must answer current needs and therefore a transformation of the thought is necessary. Third, the 'original meaning' of traditional Chinese thought also needs to be explored, but not in an arbitrary way. Together, these three elements provide excellent criteria for evaluating the significance of the interpretations by Fang and Tang of Huayan thought.

First, so as to avoid discussing things from a particular narrow perspective, both Fang and Tang offered their own answers. As Fang argued in his own thought and in his interpretation of Huayan thought, considering an issue from a macro-perspective is preferable. In Fang's view, 'comprehensive harmony' is just such a macro-perspective, in which there is no dualism and where the wholeness of the world cannot be divided into separate parts. This avoids approaching the subject from a single perspective. However, Fang seems to overlook the fact that viewing an issue from a single perspective can sometimes have its advantages. Taking his interpretation of Huayan thought as an

example, Fang discussed the thought from the perspective of a perfect world, believing that in such a world, all values are included. However, as I mentioned in section 3.2, his interpretation of Huayan thought cannot affect its image as the subjective fantasy of a group of patriarchs. A route for achieving a harmonious world is required. Thus, in this case, discussing the issue from a single perspective appears necessary. The key concerns here for any thinker are how to avoid being constrained by a single perspective but how also to advance from it. Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought appears more successful in this context.

For, as Tang argued in his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, various Buddhist theories have had different positions at different times. Thus, no theory can be dominant; that is, whether one theory is superior to others depends on the context. So viewing an issue from a single perspective is not always wrong, assuming the single perspective is necessary at the time. In Tang's interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, for instance, '*yuan jiao*' is certainly important, as it represents the perfect world that Huayan thought pursues. However, for a sentient being which cannot use its pure mind, '*yuan jiao*' is simply a fantasy. For such sentient beings, other Buddhist teachings, as identified in Huayan's theory of doctrinal classification, are probably preferable. Thus, in this example, Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought appears to meet the requirement to avoid seeing an issue from a single perspective—unlike Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought—while at the same time avoiding the shortcomings of Fang's theory.

Second, the need to respond to current issues is perhaps one of the things which current studies misunderstand most about thinkers in the times of Fang and Tang. As noted in section 2.5, some scholars complain that contemporary Chinese thought fails to respond to the needs of our time. According to these scholars, in the time of Fang and Tang the goal of thinkers seems to have been finding the 'original meaning' of Chinese thought and the criteria for assessing the value of an interpretation largely depended on how much it conformed to the original texts. The aim of transforming traditional Chinese thought to meet current issues was simply overlooked. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a historical background to the development of the thought of the pro-traditional thinkers, including Fang and Tang. This background helps define the thinkers' area of concern, namely the challenge of 'scientism', based on the assumptions that Western culture had been 'failing' and that Chinese culture was worth retaining. Because of particular historical factors, the response of the pro-traditional thinkers at the time was not arbitrary. Although it is true that pro-traditional thinkers in the early twentieth century did not consider issues like human rights, environmentalism and feminism, such issues at the

time, if they existed, were not as vital as meeting the challenge of 'scientism'. In this sense, many pro-traditional thinkers tried to respond to the needs of *their* time. From the findings of this study, it is clear that Fang and Tang responded to this challenge rather than seeking the 'original meaning' of traditional Chinese thought, though the results of their responses varied considerably.

Third, the 'objectivity' of the interpretations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang also needs to be considered. Although I argue that both Fang and Tang tried to transform traditional Chinese thought in order to meet the needs of their time, their approaches to the 'original meaning' of the traditional thought also needs to be examined. Otherwise, the product of their work would be a totally new theory, rather than a transformation of traditional thought. In Fang's case, his absorption of Huayan thought may be rather controversial as the Huayan patriarch on whom he focused was Dushun, about whose life little is known. In addition, Fang ignored the relationship between Huayan thought and other Buddhist theories, such as the concept of Consciousness-Only and *Dasheng qixin lun*. Theoretically, Fang's interpretation is also debatable because he neglected the thought of other Huayan patriarchs, considering their thought a footnote to Dushun's idea of the perfect world. As a consequence, many important concepts from Huayan thought—'Dharma Realm', 'Dependent Arising' and 'Nature Arising' are mentioned only briefly and not explored in any depth by Fang, nor related to Dushun's idea of the harmonious world. As a result, Fang's interpretation of Huayan thought may easily be criticized as selective since many of the important texts and concepts were not considered.

Tang's interpretation, by contrast, is, in my view, less controversial. Unlike Fang, Tang discussed Huayan thought based on its relationship to the concepts of Consciousness-Only and *Dasheng qixin lun*. Therefore, the relationship between the mind and the concept of 'dharma realm', as well as the word '*sheng*', are more fully considered. In addition, he focused on the thought of Fazang, who is widely recognised within the academy as the real founder of the Huayan School. Fazang's thought is more comprehensive than Dushun's, so Tang's use of Fazang to develop his interpretation provides for a more complete interpretation. In fact, many important concepts of Huayan thought are included in Tang's interpretation and their meanings are, as a result, better explained, thus helping avoid the difficulty of Fang's interpretation, which discusses the harmonious world *in vacuo*. Certainly, whilst the 'original meaning' of Huayan thought may not be gleaned from Tang's interpretation, his theory probably avoids the criticism that his interpretation is selective. As a result of his interpretations of other intellectual traditions, in my view, Tang's theory is considered one of the best amongst his contemporaries, as it goes some way

to meeting the three requirements of developing 'Chinese hermeneutics' in today's Chinese academy.

Although Tang's interpretation of Huayan thought, in terms of the discussion about 'Chinese hermeneutics', seems more comprehensive than that of Fang, the discussion about the relationship between Huayan thought and these two thinkers does not end here, because the question of absorbing Huayan thought also needs consideration. Their interpretations of Huayan thought are closely related to the effectiveness of their own theories in responding to the challenge of 'scientism'. In this sense, following the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, I suggest the idea of 'theoretical power' as a fourth requirement of developing 'Chinese hermeneutics', which is to evaluate the effectiveness of a hermeneutic theory in terms of its 'explanatory power' of the issues to which it is responding.²⁴

In other words, I argue that the effectiveness of Fang's and Tang's theories needs to be considered while discussing their roles in the development of 'Chinese hermeneutics'. In my view, as noted previously, their methods are rather personal and it is difficult to judge if their methods are influential on others. As I discussed in section 4.2, even Tang Junyi admitted that Fang's writing style is difficult to learn. It is also said that Fang was once very disappointed as his writing style was criticised by other scholars as 'a heavenly steed soaring across the skies' or *tianma xingkong* 天馬行空 in Chinese.²⁵ Although I believe that Fang himself may have experienced different kinds of value and have avoided 'scientism', others may not feel the same. The exchange between him and Professor Findlay supports this point. That is to say, Fang's story-telling style may not inspire others very successfully. It certainly weakens the effectiveness of his theory. Similarly, Lao Sze-kwong's view that the death of Tang means the end of the tradition of the 'scholarship of becoming moral' also implies that, at least in Lao's eyes, very few people, if any, can or do follow Tang's path. Although I believe that Tang himself practised his theory, appreciating different values and avoiding 'scientism', I argue that a more comprehensive theory of practice is certainly needed. Otherwise, it is difficult for others

24 For this idea, I am inspired by Lao Sze-kwong. See his *Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wen hua* 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp. 19–24.

25 Qin Ping 秦平, *Dajia jingyao Fang Dongmei* 大家精要方東美 (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe 雲南教育出版社, 2008), pp. 137–139.

to follow his path. Therefore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of Tang's theory, a theory of practice is a topic we need to pursue in future study.²⁶

This study concerning Fang's and Tang's appropriations of Huayan thought is coming to a close here. However, in my view, their cases are not only academically significant but also relevant to the situations facing China today. In what follows, I will briefly discuss the modern relevance of Fang's and Tang's theories, considering the related issues based on their philosophical point of view.

5.5 The Modern Relevance of Fang's and Tang's Thought—A Preliminary Discussion

The actual impact of Fang's and Tang's thought on 'scientism' in present-day China remains unknown, as their thought has long been ignored in academia, a point I stressed in Chapter 1. However, apart from the issue of 'scientism', their thought is relevant to many issues facing modern China. In what follows, though very briefly, I try to list some of them. First, their thought has implications for the debate on 'Chinese culture versus Western culture' in contemporary China. In recent years, the idea that Chinese values, Confucian values in particular, cannot co-exist with Western values appears to have become rather popular in mainland China. In short, if one respects traditional Chinese values, Western values need to be rejected and vice versa.²⁷ However, according to Fang and Tang, Chinese and Western cultures are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, different cultures may co-exist without conflict. In my view, this idea is reasonable and realistic, as no cultures nowadays could isolate themselves from others in such a 'globalized' age. In this sense, I consider that Fang

26 As Ni Peimin 倪培民 suggests, theory of practice is what contemporary Chinese philosophy urgently needs. It is because, in Ni's view, such kind of theory helps turn the focus of contemporary Chinese philosophy from a theoretical to a practical perspective. I consider this point important to our discussion of the effectiveness of Tang's thought. For details, see his 'Jiang "gongfu" yinru zhexue 將「功夫」引入哲學', in *Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua* no. 10 *Ruxue: xueshu, xinyang he xiuyang* 中國哲學與文化：第十輯—儒學：學術、信仰和修養 (Guilin: Lijiang chubanshe 漓江出版社, 2012), pp. 49–70.

27 Jiang Qing 蔣慶 is a typical figure who holds a similar view. For his ideas, see Jiang Qing, Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan ed., Edmund Ryden trans., *A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China's Ancient Past Can Shape its Political Future* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013). For more discussion about this, see Ren Jiantao 任劍濤, *Futiao ruxue: cong gudian jieshi dao xiandaixing tanjiu* 複調儒學：從古典解釋到現代性探究 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin 國立臺灣大學出版中心, 2013), pp. 300–353.

and Tang have suggested an alternative idea of development for China, that it is the request of cooperation with other countries.

Second, Fang's and Tang's thoughts can be regarded as a response to relativism, an idea prevalent in mainland China which suggests that 'truth and reality depend on our point of view'²⁸ and moral values are relative to cultures or individuals.²⁹ Although relativism seems to admit the values of various intellectual traditions, it rejects the idea of universal values. Following the idea of relativism, some Chinese scholars argue that concepts like freedom, democracy, human rights, equality and peace are all only applicable to Western society. For all these words, China may have its own definitions.³⁰ For instance, when Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波, the Chinese political dissenter, received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2010, some Chinese scholars insisted that the definition of peace in China is different from that of its Western counterparts. In order to balance the impact of the Nobel Prize, therefore, a 'Confucius Peace Prize' was set up, saying that it is for rewarding those who fit the Chinese definition of peace.³¹ However, as Fang considered, there is a 'ranking' among different values. Therefore, they are not relative to cultures or individuals. Although Tang did not agree that there is an absolute 'ranking' amongst values as Fang suggested, he stressed the importance of different circumstances in which various values are discussed. According to Tang, a certain kind of value may be preferred in a particular context. However, it may be rejected on other occasions. In this sense, clarifying the relationship between various circumstances and values is essential. In my opinion, both Fang's and Tang's thoughts help confirm the cultural values of China and the West, while at the same time, avoiding the problems posted by relativism.

28 Robert Kirk, *Relativism and Reality: A Contemporary Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.

29 Gerald Gillespie, 'The Significance and Limits of Cultural Relativism', in Mabel Lee & Meng Hua ed., *Cultural Dialogue and Misreading* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 3–10.

30 The edited work of Zeng Yi 曾亦 and Guo Xiaodong 郭曉東 is a good example which holds such a relativistic point of view. See their *Hewei pushi? Shuizhi jiazhi? Dangdai rujia lun pushi jiazhi* 何謂普世？誰之價值？當代儒家論普世價值 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe 華東師範大學出版社, 2014). For criticism of this view, see Chiu King Pong 趙敬邦, "Rujia de pushijiazhi" yishuo nengfou chengli?—yu dalu rujia xuezhe shangque 「儒家的普世價值」一說能否成立？—與大陸儒家學者商榷, *Ehu yuekan* 鵝湖月刊 no. 473 (Nov 2014): 40–42.

31 For discussion, see Alice Yu, 'Romantic, patriot, or just a prize fool?', *South China Morning Post*, EDT 9, 20 November 2011; Priscilla Jiao, 'Confusion Prize hits another low', *South China Morning Post*, EDT 5, 10 December 2011.

Third, there are implications for the discussion about 'harmony' (Chi. *hexie* 和諧). Although the Chinese Government has promoted the idea of 'harmony' from the early twenty-first century onwards,³² it fails to answer the following questions: what are the characteristics of this idea? How is it to be achieved? Without considering them, 'harmony' will easily become an empty word and even a slogan for political use. In fact, in the eyes of many Chinese people nowadays, the word 'harmony' is a negative term, as it is employed by the Government as a means of censoring political discussion. The word is even written as 'River Crab' (Chi. *hexie* 河蟹), which is a homonym for the word 'harmony'.³³ As I argued in the previous chapters, Fang is probably the first modern Chinese thinker who considered 'harmony' a technical term. Tang also suggested the ideal of 'a world of harmony'. In my view, their theories certainly help improve the quality of discussion about 'harmony', as they mentioned the characteristics of the idea and suggested ways of achieving it.

Fourth, Fang's and Tang's thoughts are a potential rejection of the idea of 'omnipotence of money', a belief widely prevailing in contemporary China. In Chapter 2, I defined 'scientism' as 'a view that only what is measurable in terms of science is considered knowledge'. Although the pursuit of money may be a political issue as money implies power,³⁴ here I suggest that it may also be a by-product of 'scientism', as money is precisely a thing that can be clearly measured.³⁵ To some extent, the prevalence of 'scientism' helps lead to the idea of the 'omnipotence of money' and helps draw the conclusion that morality is less important.³⁶ However, in his 'blueprint' that I discussed in Chapter 3,

32 Guo Baogang and Guo Sujian, 'Introduction: China in Search of a Harmonious Society', in Guo Sujian and Guo Baogang ed., *China in Search of a Harmonious Society* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), pp. 1–12.

33 William A. Callahan, 'Conclusion: World Harmony or Harmonizing the World?', in William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva ed., *China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 249–268. Literally, 'River Crab' is not a negative term. However, it helps satirize the Chinese Government that the so-called 'harmony' it now promotes is, in fact, only political propaganda.

34 For more discussion, see Jytte Nhanenge, *Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development* (Maryland: University Press of America, 2011), pp. 234–241.

35 Joel Kaye, *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchanges, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 170–199.

36 For more discussion, see Ouyang Guangwei, 'Scientism, Technocracy, and Morality in China', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol. 30, no. 2 (2003): 177–193.

Fang argued that the ability to engage in moral reflection is 'superior' to perception and cognition. In his theory of 'The Nine Horizons of the Mind', Tang also suggested that an ideal personhood needs to consider the different abilities of human beings. In this sense, I argue that Fang's and Tang's thoughts help correct the idea of the 'omnipotence of money', if their thoughts are practised successfully.

Last, Tang's emphasis on practice is essential to help solve the problems listed above at a practical level. Although Fang's and Tang's thoughts may be, theoretically, useful in dealing with some cultural challenges facing contemporary China, it is important to practise the theories. Otherwise, the suggestions Fang and Tang provided will only become a kind of conceptual game, a point stressed in Tang's own thought and in his interpretation of Huayan thought. Unfortunately, this position of Tang appears to be overlooked by many scholars in the field of Chinese philosophical study. That means, the problems are regarded as a kind of theoretical rather than practical issue. As a result, the country is still struggling with them.³⁷

The appropriations of Huayan thought by Thom  H. Fang and Tang Junyi in order to respond to the challenge of 'scientism' provide a notable example of Chinese thinkers looking to the past for inspiration about the present and future. However, in consideration of the continuing need for Chinese thinkers to argue for a viable approach to progress in the twenty-first century, I am sure that discussions about appropriating the past to meet current needs will not end here. Tang's words in *The Experience of Life* 人生之體驗 are therefore, perhaps, an appropriate way to conclude this study:

在真理世界本身，一切真理是互相融攝，
而有一絕對的真理為中心。
這絕對的真理中心，即在你愛真理的態度本身。

In the World of Truth, all truths are mutually penetrative,
with an absolute Truth as its centre.
This absolute Truth is your passion for truths itself.³⁸

37 To me, the case of Zheng Jiadong 鄭家棟 helps explain this point. As a leading Confucian scholar in mainland China, Zheng was arrested in 2005 because of his involvement in several cases of human trafficking. His arrest shocked many Chinese scholars and many of them began to think of the importance of practice in Confucianism. For more discussion, see Ma Licheng 馬立誠, *Dangdai Zhongguo de ba zhong shehui sichao* 當代中國的八種社會思潮 (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe 明報出版社, 2012), pp. 357–361.

38 Tang Junyi, *Rensheng zhi tiyan* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), p. 47.

Appendix 1: Reply from the University of Wisconsin-Madison about Fang's Status

From: "Patty Winspur" <pwinspur@wisc.edu>
To: "King Pong Chiu" <Kingpong.Chiu@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>
Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 5:16 AM
Subject: records on degrees for Thome Fang

Dear King Pong,

I heard back from the Registrar's office today. Their records confirm that Thome Fang received a M.A. (master's) degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1922. They do not show any subsequent Ph.D. degree at our university.

Patty

Patty Winspur
Grad Coordinator
Philosophy
U.W.-Madison
(608) 263-5278

SOURCE: CHIU KING PONG, *THOMÉ H. FANG, TANG JUNYI AND THE APPROPRIATION OF HUAYAN THOUGHT* (UNPUBLISHED PHD THESIS, THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, 2014), APPENDIX 1.

Appendix 2: Prolegomena to A Comparative Philosophy of Life: An Outline

Ideals of Life and Patterns of Culture

- I. The Philosophical Assemblage
 1. Wisdom lost and wisdom regained in potency
 2. Philosophical anthropology
 3. Types of man
 4. Intuition, explication, and the unity of knowledge
 5. Integral universe and differentiating worlds
 6. The choice ingress into the differentiating worlds
 7. Characteristics of the differentiating worlds
 8. Orientation, transport, and co-ordination of the differentiating worlds
 9. The interfusion of things and the confluence of life
 10. Extensive connection and the principle of comprehensive harmony
- II. The Discernment of Worlds and the Appropriation of Languages
 1. The intelligible worlds and the eloquent languages
 2. Causes of misunderstandings and ill-usage
 3. Nine kinds of language pertaining respectively to the following world-orders:
 - a.) the upper world,
 - b.) the lower world,
 - c.) the outer world,
 - d.) the inner world,
 - e.) the common world,
 - f.) the world of labour and technical manipulation,
 - g.) the moral world,
 - h.) the historical world,
 - i.) the 'hinter-Welt', behind world
 4. Languages re-classified
 5. Semiotics, semantics & syntax
 6. Science, art & religion
 7. Philosophy versus 'meta-philosophy'

III. Existence and Value

1. The meaning of existence
2. Three theories of existence
3. The meaning of value
4. Psycho-biological theories of value
5. Logical consideration of value
6. Idealistic and realistic conceptions of value
7. The relation between existence and value considered in the light of the major traditions of philosophy
 - a.) Greek thought
 - b.) European science and philosophy
 - c.) Hindu speculation
 - d.) Chinese philosophy

IV. Types of Wisdom and the Spirit of Culture

1. Nature of wisdom
2. The roots of wisdom
3. Wisdom manifested in the articulate forms of Spirit: A fourfold tripartite division-
 - a.) The Greek: i.) the Apollonian ii.) the Dionysian iii.) the Olympian
 - b.) Modern Europe: i.) the Renaissance ii.) the Baroque iii.) the Rococco
 - c.) The Indian: i.) the Upanishadic ii.) the Buddhistic iii.) the Bhagavadgitaic
 - d.) The Chinese: i.) the Taoist ii.) the Confucian iii.) the Mohist
4. The varieties of wisdom: A quarternary division re-considered
 - a.) the Greek
 - b.) the European
 - c.) the Indian
 - d.) the Chinese
5. The essences of wisdom as elucidated in section (4)
6. The modes of wisdom
 - a.) the Greek pattern of culture
 - b.) the European pattern of culture
 - c.) the Indian pattern of culture
 - d.) the Chinese pattern of culture

V. The Varieties of Cosmology

1. The sentiment of life and the conception of the universe
2. Characteristics of Greek cosmology
3. Characteristics of modern European cosmology
4. Characteristics of Indian cosmology

5. Characteristics of Chinese cosmology
6. The open world versus the closed universe
7. Life creative and Life petrified

- VI. Inquiries into the Constitution of Human Nature
 1. Religion and religiosity
 2. Integration vs. Bifurcation of human nature
 3. Unity of personality vs. 'the schism of the soul'
 4. Contrast, contradiction and harmony
 5. The principle of three-fold unities and the noetic order. . . . (the Greek concept of mind)
 6. The scientific claim of neutrality and the empiricist-rationalist controversy concerning the human mind. . . . (Modern European turns of thought)
 7. Brahma-Ātman Aikya vs. the diversified Ālaya. . . . (the Indian outlook)
 8. The thorough goodness of all the endowments of human mind. . . . (the full-fledged Chinese conception)
 9. Metamorphosis of the human spirit
 10. The divergence of East and West and a possible way of mutual adaptation
 11. Trends of life and human destiny
 12. 'Guilt-culture', innocence-culture and glory-culture

- VII. Glimpses of the Variegated Spirit of Life
 1. Exemplifications of the cosmic principles in life
 2. The ultimate consequences of different estimates of human nature
 3. Leveling-up, leveling-down and the ways of democracy
 4. Self-diversification and self-perfection
 5. Brahma-Ātman Aikya, the perennial flux of the Ālaya-vijñāna and the ways of Yoga
 6. The Confucian ways of living characterized
 7. The Taoist ways of living characterized
 8. The Mohist ways of living characterized
 9. The dimensions of life: shrinking and expansion

- VIII. Moral Endeavour and Ethical Culture
 1. Metaphysical foundations of moral life
 2. Causal monism vs. causal pluralism
 3. Power and the highest reach of life
 4. Moral plane and moral hierarchy
 5. Moral restraints and moral choice
 6. Moral determination and moral freedom

7. Moral values
8. Ideal personality and the measure of moral value
9. Items of virtue
10. The ethical reverence for life

- IX. The Sentiment of Art
 1. Actuality, ideality and the magic touch of beauty
 2. Imitative art vs. creative art
 3. Essences of beauty
 4. Forms of beauty
 5. Tasks of art
 6. The transformed world or art
 7. The conquest of space and its wondrous transmutation
 8. The rhythm of life
 9. Style and the divine fervour
 10. Aesthetic education, morality and religion

- X. The Organized Life of the State
 1. Reasons of existence for the State as an organized power
 2. Greek Political ideals: their virtues & limitations
 3. Theoretic foundations of Western democracy
 4. Laws of nature and human rights
 5. Freedom and equality: a philosophical critique
 6. Two misfortunes in History: lessons from Israel and India
 7. Chinese political ideals and their ways of realization
 8. The present crises and the prospects of world-order in the future

- XI. A Critique of Culture
 1. The Meaning of Culture
 2. Spirit and form of culture
 3. Value-directions in the realms of life
 4. Transcendence and immanence of the spirit
 5. The historical vista of humanity
 6. History at its cross-ways; the tragedy of life
 7. Historical wisdom and historical folly
 8. The procreation of culture
 9. The rhythmic development of culture
 10. The achievements of culture
 11. The advancement of spirit
 12. Social enjoyment of culture

13. Assimilation of culture
14. Transformation of culture
15. Interfusion of culture
16. Vitality of culture
17. Human immortality
18. Spiritual exaltation and spiritual freedom

SOURCE: THOMÉ H. FANG, *CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: ITS SPIRIT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT*, PP. 535–538.

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